


The Life of
JOHN A. ANDREW



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JOHN A. ANDREW



Julius Anderson

THE LIFE OF
JOHN A. ANDREW

GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTS

1861-1865

BY

HENRY GREENLEAF PEARSON

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME II



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JOHN A. ANDREW

CHAPTER IX

THE YEAR OF EMANCIPATION

WHEN Abraham Lincoln wrote his signature to the Proclamation of Emancipation, though in form he was announcing the decree of a military ruler, that form meant little more than that it happened to be the most convenient method of enacting what was already the popular will. Emancipation was the deed not of one man, but of a nation ; not of one day, but of a year. In its accomplishment, Massachusetts, through her governor, played her proper part.

The cardinal fact in Andrew's political course throughout the year 1861 was his sealing his lips on the subject of slavery for the sake of the Union. To make his State stand with firm front for nationality, to rally conservatism of every kind to the support of the government, had been his steady labor. For no less cause could he have consented to silence ; the wonder is that he schooled himself so long. Nevertheless, he was far from being satisfied with the result. In his view the Union was to be

preserved not by fair words but by hard blows ; but as the year 1861 drew to its close, there was little sign that the Administration had brought itself to the point of waging vigorous war. Seward's jaunty optimism was believed to be in the ascendant in the Cabinet, and to it and to the President's "border-state" policy were attributed, unjustly it is true, the inertness of the War Department and of McClellan's splendid army. In the general discouragement Andrew shared, — if indeed it can be said that he ever was discouraged. At all events, he put forth all the influence he could to justify the Administration in the belief that Massachusetts was for war. His tone of strong remonstrance appears in a letter which he wrote to F. P. Blair, Senior, with a view, of course, to its being read by his son, the Postmaster-General.

The South must be conquered. The war is *war* ; not gas nor gammon like that with which Governor Seward treated me, and others in my hearing, on my last visits to the Capital.

There is no bargain. Nobody is to be cheated ; but somebody is to be beaten ; and Democratic-Republican Liberty is the tremendous stake for which we play.

"Why stand we shivering on the brink,
And fear to launch away ?"

With the English embroglio before us, — the lion growling at our shores, — and the possibilities of speedy blows from his fierce paws, from the lair where he has crouched these nine months past for a chance to spring, — we can no longer jest with the President, smoke and play "Sir Oracle" with

Seward, nor debate with Congress, nor drive party politics on to the battle-field on the gun-carriages and in the caissons and baggage-wagons with military politicians.

In a private letter to a friend in Washington he wrote, somewhat more in the spirit of complaint: —

The President has never yet seemed quite sure that we were in a war at all. As to Mr. Seward, who has been his mentor, he has always regarded the case about as a police justice would an assault and battery between two loafers in a pot-house, — or else he has worn a well-contrived mask for the last six months.

In thus urging the Administration up to the point where the conquest of the South should be accepted as its first duty, Andrew was acting under the conviction that when government and people had once set their feet in this direction, they would find themselves irrevocably on the road to Emancipation. "The war has gone on," he wrote, "*under protest*, as it were, that it was not intended to *conquer* the South, but to 'restore the Union.' I think all that talk *twaddle*; but *babes* must have *milk*; — meat comes afterwards. . . . The people now understand the case twenty times better than they did last July — far better than even three months ago. And, in the stern necessity of the logic of the war, they will reach the point of grappling with *Slavery*, and turning the guns of that fortress against the power of *Slavery* itself." ¹

¹ To F. W. Bird, December 14, 1861.

Nevertheless, though privately Andrew was “working unweariedly in the interest of our most liberal ideas” upon officials in Washington, his cue in public was still silence. Thus it happened that, when through the zeal of Frank Bird an Emancipation League was organized in Boston and Andrew was asked to preside at its first public meeting, — a lecture by ex-Governor Boutwell, — he refused. In justification, he wrote a long letter to Bird. After setting forth the need of uniting the country upon a vigorous prosecution of the war, of making it a war for national supremacy first and for freedom afterwards, he explained that the same reason which had led him to attend lectures given in Boston by D. S. Dickinson, a New York Democrat who had come out emphatically for the use of the slaves in crushing the Rebellion, now prompted him to stay away when the “black Republicans” agitated the subject. “Governor Boutwell,” he said, “can say and do usefully what *I* could not, without injury to our own cause, since I am, from the necessity of my life and opinions and tendencies, so much more dangerous and heretical a person in the eyes of the Hunkerism of the community where I am known. . . . My wish is, while I do not conciliate a personal support from men who do not *believe* with me, to avoid offering the conspicuous and responsible position I hold, as a mark for shafts from their quiver of partisan hatred.”¹

Andrew’s reason for his present attitude toward

¹ To Bird, December 14, 1861.

Emancipation was one which he could present with telling effect before a popular assembly. Sumner, repeating the watchword of his speech at the Republican State Convention in September, had written to him: "We hope that in your message¹ you will keep Mass. ahead, where she always has been, in the ideas of our movement. Let the doctrine of Emancipation be proclaimed as an essential and happy agency in subduing a wicked rebellion. In this way you will help *a majority* of the Cabinet whose opinions on this subject are fixed and precede the Pres. himself only by a few weeks." Nevertheless, Sumner's request fared no better at Andrew's hands than had Bird's. When, in the closing paragraphs of his message, the Governor discussed national affairs, he pleaded in his most earnest periods that Massachusetts should give herself loyally to the prosecution of the war and to the support of the Administration without condition or cavil.

Let none of us who remain at home, presume to direct the pilot, or to seize the helm. The ultimate extinction of human slavery is inevitable. That this war, which is the revolt of Slavery, . . . will deal it a mortal blow, is not less inevitable.

I may not argue the proposition; but it is true. And, while the principles and opinions adopted in my earliest manhood, growing with every year in strength and intelligence of conviction, point always to the policy of Justice, the expediency of Humanity, and the necessity of Duty, — . . . I yet mean, as I have done since the beginning of the "Secession,"

¹ To be delivered to the Legislature in January, 1862.

— I mean to continue to school myself to silence. . . . And now, when the Divine Providence is leading all the people in ways they had not imagined, I will not dare attempt to run before, and possibly imperil the truth itself. Let him lead to whom the people have assigned the authority and the power. One great duty of absorbing, royal Patriotism, which is the public duty of the occasion, demands us all to follow. Placed in no situation where it becomes me to discuss his policy, I do not stop even to consider it. The only question which I can entertain is what *to do*, and when that question is answered, the other is what *next to do* in the sphere of activity where it is given me to stand. For by *deeds*, and not by *words*, is this People to accomplish their salvation.

For Andrew thus to set himself against the inexorable radicalism of Frank Bird and Charles Sumner was not an easy or agreeable task. No experienced wayfarer in that middle road which the Latin proverb calls with intention the safest, he was walking in it now at the sole behest of his own free judgment. His friends of the Bird Club knew that he was every letter within the truth when he wrote: "All my life long I have aimed not to belong to that category mentioned by the Apostle, who, 'through fear of death are all their lifetime kept in bondage.' Nor can I be afraid of my friends more than of my enemies. Neither will I do anything for the sake of an effect back upon myself."¹ Manifestly, however, this position of Andrew's was one of unstable equilibrium, much like that of Lincoln when, seven

¹ To Bird, December 14, 1861.

months later, he wrote his letter in reply to Horace Greeley's *Prayer of Twenty Millions*. As with the President the victory of Antietam in September was the makeweight which determined the preponderance once for all, so with Andrew a critical combination of circumstances and events in May was effective, causing him to use all the influence of his position as Governor of Massachusetts for accomplishing the liberation of the blacks and the employment of them against the enemy.

In the first place, various signs of the times one after another showed that the doctrine of Emancipation was making its way through the North. Congress, largely at the instance of Charles Sumner, set itself right on several matters of abstract justice to the negro, such as granting passports to negroes and recognizing the republic of Hayti; the Senate ratified Seward's treaty with Great Britain for the suppression of the African slave trade; Lincoln, working in his own way, urged upon Congress, in his message of March 6, that it should offer aid to any State which was willing to undertake the gradual emancipation of its slaves.¹ That Andrew felt all these to

¹ Apropos of the President's message of March 6, Chandler (pp. 113, 114) tells a story characteristic of both Lincoln and Andrew. Eager to recognize and commend this sign of grace, the Governor had the state Legislature pass a resolve approving the President's course, and sent an engrossed copy of it to Lincoln by the hand of Frank Bird. With it went a letter composed in the Governor's most formal periods. "Having, Sir," he wrote, "already transmitted to you a copy of these Resolves, by mail, according to the usual custom in similar cases, I desire to add emphasis to the voice of the Commonwealth, by this method suited to grave occasions, accrediting to you a special

be straws showing the current of popular opinion appears in the letter which he wrote to Sumner when the bill recognizing Hayti had obtained a "triumphant and exemplary majority" in the Senate.

The law when passed will be a recognition of the *colored man*, not merely of Hayti. It is a jewel in your crown. I have felt impatient about this measure. I knew *you* were devoted to it; but I have wondered at the unwillingness of some of our Nor. men to deal with it, at once and gladly. But they voted right at last, and I am sorry I ever grumbled; . . . However — Army officers are forbidden by law to return fugitive slaves. Slaves are emancipated in the District. The colored race is recognized in the adoption of Hayti into the family of nations.— And — "The Lord is marching on."

In the second place, Andrew felt more and more strongly that the prosecution of the war could not be sufficiently vigorous so long as the South kept its slaves. General McClellan and his subordinates of the regular army set the tone of conservatism, and as the campaign in Virginia and the Carolinas un-

agent whose duty it is to place this parchment and letter in your hands, and to assure you, by the living voice of one of her citizens, of the sincere and respectful sympathy with which Massachusetts has noticed your message and its purposes, and of our earnest desire to aid and promote them." In due time Bird presented the letter and the parchment at the White House. Lincoln, seated in an arm-chair, with one leg over the elbow, having read the letter deliberately, proceeded to open the parchment roll thus elaborately introduced, and, as he glanced at the brief sentences engrossed upon it, drawled out the remark, "Well, it is n't long enough to scare a fellow." The "special agent," upon his return to Boston, did not fail to report this reply.

folded itself, it became plain that the interpretation which they put upon the duty of protecting the enemy's property, especially if it happened to be human property, was of a most energetic liberality. To men of Andrew's way of thinking, every such act of protection demonstrated afresh the futility of pretending to wage war against the South and at the same time of jealously guarding its chief "institution." As it happened, General David Hunter, in command of the Department of the South, was heartily in sympathy with this view. Since he had no power against army conservatism with things as they were, he planned by a bold stroke to get the upper hand. On May 9 he issued an order which declared free all slaves in South Carolina, Florida, and Georgia, and forthwith took steps to begin the compulsory arming of the blacks. John M. Forbes, just returned from a trip to Beaufort, was fully persuaded of the wisdom of Hunter's course. "I do hope," he wrote to Sumner on May 16, "the President will not make another Frémont blunder or rather Missouri blunder by disavowing Hunter's act. Whatever may be the case elsewhere, it is time the Kidglove and Rosewater mode of carrying on the war should be exploded in South Carolina, that *the only loyal men* there should be encouraged to come over to our side!"

With the judgment of Forbes added to the other information which Andrew was in the way of receiving, the Governor deemed that the time had come for him to break silence, and to make Lincoln feel that if he should sustain Hunter the North would

back him up. To explain how he found his opportunity, it is necessary to take up again the story of the relations between the State of Massachusetts and the War Department.

At the beginning of April an order¹ from the Adjutant-General's office at Washington closed all the government recruiting offices in the several states, required the sale of property belonging to the recruiting service, and sent the officers in charge to their respective regiments. Since after the first of January no new organizations had been raised by the governors of states, the only regular means for securing soldiers was thus deliberately done away with. The spring campaigns were already under way, McClellan's great army which he had been so long in perfecting was considered to require no further increase. To repair losses in the regiments, however, it was arranged that the commanders in the field, whenever a regiment needed replenishing, should make a direct call upon the governor of the State to which it belonged. On whatever theory this plan was based, the course of McClellan's and Halleck's campaigns in the next few weeks sufficiently proved its futility. Moreover, on May 17, when Lincoln, yielding at last to McClellan's outrageous importunities, decided to send him McDowell's corps, which had been detained for the defence of Washington, the need for new regiments became immediate. Stanton telegraphed to the governors of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio a request that they should each

¹ O. R., Series III. vol. ii. p. 2.

organize a new regiment "without delay," and sent to all the governors an inquiry as to how soon regiments could be raised in their respective states, the number of regiments specified varying from one to six, and the total number being fifty-one. At such a summons most of the governors were rather taken aback. One or two promised a regiment in a few weeks; the others said that the work would take two or three months. Some protested that the reorganizing of the recruiting service would cause delay; the governors of agricultural states declared that everybody was at work on the farms; others objected to Stanton's proposal that the troops should be armed and equipped at Washington; the governor of Wisconsin, on his part, took the opportunity to itemize his objections to the system of recruiting as practised by the War Department. "With the matters above referred to arranged and distinctly understood," he concluded complacently, "so as to be laid before the people, we can raise one or two regiments in a brief period of time, probably as soon as they can be raised in any other State in the Union, and I shall be glad to do so." The letter of the Governor of Massachusetts was as follows:—

BOSTON, May 19, 1862.

HON. EDWIN M. STANTON,

Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

SIR,—I have this moment received a telegram in these words, viz:—

The Secretary of War desires to know how soon you can raise and organize three or four more in-

fantry regiments and have them ready to be forwarded here to be armed and equipped. Please answer immediately and state the number you can raise.

L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.

A call so sudden and unforewarned finds me without materials for an intelligent reply. Our young men are all preoccupied by other views. Still, if a real call for three regiments is made I believe we can raise them in forty days. The arms and equipments would need to be furnished here. Our people have never marched without them. They go into camp while forming into regiments and are drilled and practised with arms and march as soldiers. To attempt the other course would dampen enthusiasm and make the men feel that they were not soldiers, but a mob. Again, if our people feel that they are going into the South to help fight rebels, who will kill and destroy *them* by all the means known to savages, as well as civilized man; will deceive them by fraudulent flags of truce and lying pretences (as they did the Massachusetts boys at Williamsburg), will use their negro slaves against them, both as laborers and as fighting men, while they themselves must *never* "*fire at an enemy's magazine*," I think that they will feel that the draft is heavy on their patriotism.

But, if the President will sustain General Hunter,¹ recognize *all* men, even black men, as legally capable of that loyalty the blacks are waiting to manifest, and let them fight, with God and human nature on their side, *the roads will swarm if need*

¹ Lincoln's proclamation, cancelling Hunter's, bears the same date with this letter of Andrew's, May 19.

be with multitudes whom New England would pour out to obey your call.

Always ready to do my utmost, I remain most faithfully,

Your obedient servant,

JOHN A. ANDREW.

Leaving out of account the considerations already mentioned which led Andrew to write thus, it is fairly clear that he did not consider the telegram preliminary to "a real call." A battalion of six hundred men which he had on hand at Fort Warren, all enlisted for three years, he had repeatedly asked permission to recruit to a regiment and send to the front, and the request had been ignored. It was moreover inconceivable that within so short a time the War Department should take back its action about recruiting. To Andrew's mind, therefore, Stanton's request meant not so much a military emergency to be met as an opportunity to put the Administration in touch with what the Governor felt to be the sentiment of his people. In his estimate that in Massachusetts three regiments could be raised and despatched in forty days, it is worth noting that he was among the most sanguine of all the governors.

In order that Andrew might make the utmost out of his opportunity, he sent copies of his letter to the members of the Massachusetts Delegation in Congress and to the governors of the other New England states. The replies which he received were encouraging. Sumner and Wilson said that it had a good effect; John B. Alley called it "the best letter

that this rebellion has called forth;" Governor Washburn of Maine agreed entirely with Andrew's views, though it had not occurred to himself to take that occasion to express them. The rumor that some such letter had been written was not long in finding its way to the papers. The nineteenth was Monday; on Saturday "Warrington" gave an abstract of it in the *Springfield Republican*, the *Advertiser* preferred to doubt its existence, disbelieving that the Governor had "ever expressed a doubt as to the readiness of Massachusetts to respond to any demand made by the country," and the New York *Tribune* published the letter in full.

Meanwhile, after the departure of McDowell's troops from Washington, the fears of Lincoln and Stanton for the safety of the capital increased daily. They knew that the city was inadequately protected, that Lee was not the man to let such an opportunity slip, and that McClellan was not the man to be depended on for aid. Orders were issued for the recruiting of a new regiment in each of fifteen states; Governor Morgan of New York was urged to have his regiment ready within ten days, and Governor Andrew, having again made offer of the battalion at Fort Warren, was instructed to recruit it to a regiment and make it ready to march as soon as possible. On Saturday, May 24, came the news which men in Washington were so much dreading to hear. Stonewall Jackson was sweeping down the Shenandoah Valley towards Harper's Ferry; Banks, with his diminished force, was powerless to

block the way. The President and the Secretary recalled McDowell, in the expectation of his coming to the defence of Washington, if not to the help of Banks, and warned the governors of Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts to have their militia ready for a sudden call. The chance, however, of accomplishing much by such amateur strategy at Washington seemed slight, and the reports of the next day, Sunday, brought more alarm. In the race between Banks and Jackson down the valley to the Potomac, it seemed that disaster to the Union forces was a foregone conclusion. Stanton's alarm communicated itself to the rest of the Cabinet; the President decided to take military possession of all the railroads and to call out the militia. To Governors Curtin, Sprague, and Andrew, who were known to have troops ready to march, Stanton accordingly sent the following telegram:—

Send all the troops forward that you can immediately. Banks is completely routed. The enemy are in large force advancing upon Harper's Ferry.

This summons precipitated upon a quiet May Sunday in Boston such a state of excitement and activity for the Governor and his staff as had not been known for more than a year. So soon as Andrew had discovered that a real need existed at Washington, he had dropped his expostulatory tone and made evident his readiness to help. "Please make any requisition on me you desire," he had telegraphed to Stanton on Friday, "and we will do our utmost,

conquering all difficulties and obstacles by earnest will to obey and serve." Now he fairly bombarded the War Department with requests and suggestions for expediting the Massachusetts troops. "Give me discretion," he urged. "Will watch telegraph all night;" and Stanton, yielding, authorized him to make requisitions on quartermasters and commissaries,¹ and "to do and perform whatever acts and things may be necessary for the raising and forwarding troops." All night long the lights burned in the rooms of the Executive Department and in the Adjutant-General's office. The major of the battalion at Fort Warren, who having just resigned in disgust at his inability to get into active service now offered himself for duty, has described the scene. "Governor Andrew was the busiest of the workers, radiant with the joy of one who possesses great powers, and who knows that he is wielding them effectually. All through the night came over the wires appeals for help and for haste, and always the Governor was cheery and full of faith."² The effect of this excitement appears in the language of the proclamation which Andrew dashed off for publication in the morning papers.

¹ After the year 1861 the federal government reserved to itself the provision of all supplies for the troops, thus preventing any rise in prices from interstate competition and securing uniformity throughout the volunteer army. In Massachusetts, however, what Andrew called the "inevitable circumlocution" of this method, and "the inability of the state government always to control the provision and issue of supplies to the best advantage," were "clogs on our recruiting service which we did not encounter in 1861."

² *History of the Thirty-Second Regiment*, F. J. Parker, p. 26.

A PROCLAMATION

BY THE GOVERNOR AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

Men of Massachusetts !!!

The wiley and barbarous horde of traitors to the People, to the Government, to our Country and to Liberty, menace again the National Capital. They have attacked and routed Major General Banks, and are advancing on Harper's Ferry and are marching on Washington.

The President calls on Massachusetts to rise once more for its defence. The whole active Militia will be summoned by a general order issued from the office of the Adjutant General to report on Boston Common tomorrow. They will march to relieve and avenge their brethren and friends, to oppose with fiery zeal and courageous patriotism the progress of the foe. May God encourage their hearts and strengthen their arms, and may He inspire the Government and all the people.

Given at Head Quarters in Boston at Eleven o'clock this Sunday evening, May the 25th, A. D. 1862.

This startling summons threw the community into a tremendous state of agitation. By Monday night two thousand militiamen had assembled on Boston Common, and the battalion was on its way to Washington. "Our people are rushing in as in April, 1861," Andrew telegraphed joyfully to Stanton. "They will repeat the enthusiasm and glory of Lexington and Baltimore." When, however, it came to mustering the militia into service a most unexpected

damper to this enthusiasm appeared. Instead of being liable for a three months' period, the men found that by a change in the law made by Congress during the preceding summer, they must promise to serve for six. This was so far from satisfactory to them that Andrew was forced to ask the War Department that they might be accepted for three months only.

By this time the immediate danger to Washington was over ; on Monday morning Stanton learned that Banks had crossed the Potomac safely with almost all his trains of ordnance and baggage. With McClellan closing in upon one rebel army at Richmond and Halleck upon the other at Corinth, the fears of the Administration were changed to high hopes of victory. Things being thus, the authorities at Washington thought to take advantage of the demonstration of ready loyalty of which their fear had been the cause, and on Tuesday, hardly forty-eight hours after the first alarm, Stanton sent the following telegram to each of the loyal governors : —

The President directs that the militia be released and the enlistments made for three years or during the war. This I think will practically not be longer than for a year. The latest intelligence from General Banks states that he has saved nearly his whole command with small loss. Concentrations of our forces have been made which it is hoped will capture the enemy.

This information was what the Governor was obliged to communicate to the waiting militia, who, by Tuesday evening, were assembled to the number of nearly

four thousand. About half of them had agreed to go to Washington for the six months' period ; now they were called upon by the Governor to leave their militia organizations and enlist for the war. They underwent a complete revulsion of feeling ; some forty of them enlisted in a six months' battery, the rest went home.

In producing this reversal of popular feeling, there were causes besides those which have been narrated. As luck would have it, on the Monday morning on which the *Advertiser* printed the Governor's first proclamation, it copied also from the New York *Tribune* of Saturday his letter to Secretary Stanton about the dissatisfaction of Massachusetts with the management of the war. It published also an explanation of what was happening in the Shenandoah Valley which was derived from an officer of General Banks' staff, and which put the severest blame upon Stanton, first for stripping Banks of his troops, and then for alarming the whole country about a danger to Washington which, but for this act, would never have existed. These strictures were repeated in an editorial in the next morning's issue, and "for once the respectable old daily," as "Warrington" wrote, "betrayed into something like energetic treatment of a subject," was out in full cry after Stanton and Andrew, demanding the removal of the one and protesting that the other totally misrepresented the quality of Massachusetts loyalty. All these things the men gathering from up and down the State upon Boston Common discussed excitedly, and, when the

time came to act, took into account. "When they found, . . ." wrote Robinson, who was eager to justify Andrew's letter, "that they were liable to be held the entire summer and fall, and perhaps winter, subjected to precisely that kind of service, and peril which Gov. Andrew described and under the political restrictions against which he protested, they voted, *four to one, (I take the estimate of the Boston Journal) not to go!* One part of the Governor's statement is proved indubitably true, viz : that our soldiers feel this kind of warfare 'a draft on their patriotism.'"¹

The publication side by side of the Governor's proclamation and his letter to Stanton, making him seem to blow hot and cold in the same breath, stirred up a great commotion. "*Which is crazy,*" wrote Richard Henry Dana, Jr., to Sumner, "Mr. Stanton or Gov. Andrew? That is the popular question here." Andrew's conservative supporters, reading his letter in bewilderment, found in it enough to justify their worst fears that he had refused further troops to the national government, and charged him with "conditional patriotism." Then they looked out of their club windows upon the militia on the Common, and saw how he was throwing the whole State into confusion in his haste to defend the capital. With illogical impartiality they blamed him for both acts. His radical friends, crying "Amen" to the letter, were confounded by the proclamation; though when the militia went marching home again, they had the unspeakable joy of saying, "We told you so." A

¹ New York Tribune, June 4, 1862.

comic aspect was lent to the incident by the behavior of Mayor Wightman, who, in a burst of pharisaical indignation, wrote to Lincoln, entreating him not to be misled by the disloyal governor into a belief in any lukewarm loyalty among the people of Massachusetts, and vouching for the readiness of citizens of Boston to prove their patriotism by enlisting.

All this tempest troubled Andrew little. When his angry aides implored him to satisfy public clamor by sending to the newspapers an official statement that it was Stanton who had bade him call out the militia, he jumped from the lounge where he was sitting, and raising his arms in an emphatic gesture thundered: "No, sir! if the people of Massachusetts don't know John A. Andrew well enough without his rushing into print with a 'card' to explain his acts every time that somebody is frightened, then let him be misrepresented and misunderstood till the end of time! I will have nothing printed on the subject."¹ Over the *Advertiser's* attack on the Secretary of War, however, he was wrought up mightily. Determined to find out the truth, he inclosed the articles in question to all his Washington correspondents, both the gatherers up of the crumbs of rumor, and those elect who sat at the board. Samuel Hooper, the representative from the Boston district, telegraphed at once the true state of things, giving the President himself as his authority and requesting Andrew to make no public use of the information; Stanton added to one of his telegrams a friendly line.

¹ Article in the *Boston Commonwealth*, November 9, 1867.

“ Mr. Hooper showed me your telegraph to him. I am not disturbed by the howling of those who are at your heels and mine.”

The full story of the causes which produced the “ scare,” as so few knew it then and as history knows it now, came the next day from Charles Sumner.

The whole trouble is directly traceable to McClellan, who took away to Yorktown an amount of troops beyond what he was authorized to do, *so as to leave Washington defenceless*. When the Prest. became aware of this, he was justly indignant. I have seen his letter of rebuke to McClellan in his own autograph under date of 9th April, to which McC has never deigned to reply. Should this letter ever see the light it will reflect honor upon the calmness, sagacity, and firmness of the Prdt. If published now it would crush McC.

Andrew, in replying, allowed himself to justify his letter to Stanton.

What means Stanley¹ in N. C. ? Don't they know *whom* they send ? Do they wish to drive our N. E. troops out of the field and disgust mankind ? The most “ hunker ” officers we have ever sent, cry out, in their private correspondence, that the army is so managed in its relations to Southern men that a positive bribe is held out to whites and blacks both to be disloyal. Even guards are furnished for rebels' property not vouchsafed to men of known loyalty. This in McClellan's Department.

My letter to Mr. Stanton was within the truth.

¹ Edward Stanly, a conservative, appointed May 19 military governor of North Carolina.

Our militia, startled by the most startling summons I issued at midnight, based on the telegram of the Sec. of War, supposing the very capitol in danger, rushed to Boston. But all were unwilling, and but a handful consented, to go for the full Militia period. *It was not so a year since.* No one was reluctant. No one stipulated for short terms. Twenty regiments eagerly pressed for leave to go for any term however indefinite. Now, a battery Co. whose enlistment began a week yesterday has not 85 men. And they are only enlisting for *Six Months*. The War looks to be of indefinite length. . . .

Perhaps *all men* do not reason out a conclusion by careful logic or minute observation, *but the instinctive sagacity and practical sense* of our people is an element we may always be sure exists. Most public men despise the people, think they are foolish and knowing their own personal limitations, believe the people not to be honest.

But Yankees are pretty knowing; they are by instinct sagacious; they have sense of the hardest sort; and they are by disposition honest and manly.

In the long run he will always dupe himself who doubts the people. An honest and brave man who looks into his own heart will find *public opinion just there*. He need not look at the clouds nor the church steeples, watching the wind for evidence.¹

Again, a month later, he showed that he was still persuaded of the wisdom of his attempt to hold higher the hands of the Administration.

How dreadful it is to see our best boys of all the State, slain, bleeding, worn out by ditching, bridging,

¹ June 4, 1862.

dirt digging, and wheeling, and by guarding the property of rebels who, with their very slaves, are in the war against us; — and the cold people not allowed to lighten the toil. Now — is not a “nigger” who is good enough to fire grape, cannon and rifle shot into the ranks of a Bunker Hill regiment good enough to fight traitors? That is my only question. Before God I believe we are doomed unless we will awake to reason. — But I am a follower — not a leader. I will work with the energy of despair even if I am shorn of the buoyancy of Hope. And I must perhaps be allowed — as Todd¹ — in my letters to Mr. Stanton [to] make a humble *suggestion*, sometimes. — You know the old proverb that “A cat may *look* at a king.”²

In accordance with this belief that the time had come to make Liberty and not Union the immediate and supreme issue, and encouraged by the degree of approval which his act had met, Andrew continued to work. He was instant in season and out of season in helping men to discover for themselves the right opinion which he believed every man’s heart to contain. If he spoke at the Commencement exercises of a country academy, as at Wilbraham, he failed not to urge his theory of the conduct of the war, as he failed not to report afterwards the approval which his views had met. If he addressed soldiers he was sure to remind them for what cause they were to fight. The necessity of liberating and then arming the negroes filled his talk and even his telegrams. In his familiar letters to Frank Howe and Count

¹ Governor Tod of Ohio.

² To F. P. Blair, Senior, July 5, 1862.

Gurowski,¹ one of his Washington correspondents, he freed his mind in page after page of argument and appeal, in the old anti-slavery vein. Most of all he sought to influence the President, appealing to him whenever opportunity offered by a sentence of exhortation at the end of letter or telegram, sending him this man or that as representative of the New England desire for Emancipation. Sometimes, as the letter to Blair shows, he despaired of the President. Then Lincoln seemed a man of informalities and

¹ Count Gurowski was a Polish exile, for whom Sumner had secured a place as translator in the State Department. Edwin P. Whipple characterizes him (MS.) as "a combination of cynic, gossip, philosopher and hero — intrepid, disinterested, with an eye for the weak points of character, enthusiastic in fault-finding, incapable of insincerity, with a mind which went to the heart of a question or a character ; sagacious after his kind ; furious at incompetency ; wishing to hang all dunces in office ; . . . insatiable in search of news — interior facts — intrigues — characters of public men and generals." His position, which gave him exceptional opportunities for obtaining inside information, he took advantage of by publishing a diary. On one of the pages of the book were the names of the chief men in public life, classified in three columns under the headings of "praise," "half-and-half," and "blame." The objurgations which he published in this book on officials of the Administration, as well as his daily comment, finally lost him his place in the State Department. One example of his style is as good as another ; the following was his comment to Andrew on the leader in the *Advertiser* of May 27 (see p. 19): "The editor of the *Advertiser* deserves the gallows on the Boston Commons. You who have so much pluck, you ought stretch your power and finish that infamous traitor. Were he within my reach, I should not hesitate a moment to shoot him as I would a mad dog. I speak earnestly." Yet undesirable as it was to be looked upon by Gurowski as an enemy, it was perhaps worse to be his friend, for he was a bore and a borrower. He was the only man, says Edward L. Pierce, against whom Sumner was forced to close his door.

irrelevancies, in touch with the politicians rather than the people, clogged by Whig traditions of constitutionalism, and unable to withstand the sapping power of Seward. At other times the buoyancy of hope returned to Andrew. After all, the logic of events was on the side of the radicals; Lincoln could not cling to his "border-state" policy forever, and even if he were "slow," he must defer to an overwhelming public opinion. Andrew's forbearance, in such moods, toward the man who might ultimately come out on the right side, appears in a letter written on June 25 to Count Gurowski.

I do not attempt to refute the very strong position in your letter concerning the views and the moral responsibility of the President. I cannot see the case as he sees it. But, still I do not denounce a man who is sincere, is looking in the right direction, as I hope, who may yet get to the right place; and who being the responsible and lawful head *can* decide what I cannot; and to support whom seems to present great opportunities for good, while to oppose whom would seem to threaten dangerous, if not fatal discords, and for the time being, ruin to the hopes of Liberty. I "hope all things," and try to "believe all things." You are stern and inflexible. I reverence the spirit so immovable. But, I hesitate to believe that you are wholly correct in not allowing something more for differences of mental constitution, which must always be taken into our account, and which being allowed for, do for the moral world what friction does in the world of matter. There is *one Truth*, but many possible roads to it. And minds as well as legs have their limitations.

Whatever may have been the reasons, the fact that men would not enlist became plain when the State began the work of raising the three regiments of three years' men asked for in the call of May 19. The War Department was urgent; Stanton was calling for infantry and cavalry by companies, and even, now that the Massachusetts militia had gone home, accepting for a term of three months such militia in other states as was ready to start. Still, in Massachusetts hardly a man came forward. Andrew first tried to get permission to offer a bounty of one or two dollars to civilians for each man they enlisted, as had been done in 1861; this, the War Department replied, was now illegal. He then asked the power to give each recruit a month's pay in advance; this, too, was refused. "Warrington's" letter to the *Republican* shows the discouraging state of things at the end of June.

It is now more than a month since Mayor Wightman wrote to the President, urging him to make his requisition upon Massachusetts with confidence, and assuring him that Boston will cheerfully respond, in spite of Gov. Andrew's letter to Secretary Stanton. Nothing has been heard since from Wightman or his recruits. . . . I understand that the Governor intends to send one company off to join Col. Parker's incomplete regiment¹ in the course of next week. It is just a month, I believe, since this regiment left us, and not a soldier has yet followed it. The Governor was evidently too sanguine when he

¹ The battalion which was sent off on May 26, and which needed the addition of three companies to make it a regiment.

wrote to the Secretary of War that three regiments could be raised in forty days, even under the present policy of saving slavery. It is proper to say that there is a very general disbelief in the necessity for more troops. People think there are men enough, if they are only properly distributed.

This condition was not peculiar to Massachusetts. When, on June 18, Stanton sent a telegram to the loyal governors, saying: "We are in pressing need of troops. How many can you send on immediately?" the answers that he received were most disheartening. The Governor of Connecticut replied: "If you want 2000 or 3000 troops for three months' service, I have no doubt I can raise them in a very few days if you can show our citizens that a necessity exists for such service. In that case they would abandon their business and readily obey your call." Illinois, with a regiment of cavalry and one of infantry, was the only State that could despatch troops forthwith. Ohio would have a regiment of three months' men ready in ten days' time; the little states of Vermont and New Hampshire promised a regiment apiece in July; but the reply of the other states was in effect the words of Scripture: "I pray thee have me excused." Governor Morton explained that in Indiana a large secret order existed for the purpose of preventing enlistments, and asked for ten thousand stand of arms for his militia. Nothing, it seemed, could rouse the nation from its skeptical lethargy but defeat and disaster, — a fate which awaited it in the issue of the Peninsular Campaign.

Andrew had given his promise to spend the Fourth of July at Windham, to help in celebrating the one hundredth anniversary of the naming of his native town. Suddenly, on June 30, as he was getting ready to start for Portland, came a telegram from Governor Morgan of New York, in the following words:—

In view of the depleted condition of the army, on account of the killing and wounding of men, their capture, and the number needed for garrison duty, it is proposed to address a memorial to the President, to be signed by the governors of the loyal States, asking him to call for such number of men as shall be necessary to fill up the army, and be sufficient to crush the rebellion speedily.

This request aroused Andrew's suspicions. He was unwilling to telegraph his signature to a document of which he had no definite knowledge; moreover, any proposal emanating from Seward's friends he feared as a trick meant to forestall or disarm the radical Republicans. He was not to be trapped into seeming to go back on the protest of the "conditional patriotism" letter; as for appealing to the Administration to call for more men, what governor had been more insistent than he? The true state of things was too terrible for him to suspect. He could not know how near the brink of ruin, after McClellan's defeats before Richmond, the government found itself, neither could he know that Seward had taken to New York drafts of an appeal to be signed by the governors and of a proclamation in response

to be issued by Lincoln, — both planned at the White House. Preferring to be on the safe side, he replied to Morgan's telegram : —

With the utmost respect for the gentlemen interested in memorializing the President, I cannot put my humble name to a paper unseen. Moreover, were Massachusetts invoked anew ever so emphatically, I know not how to increase our zeal or labors. If \$25 bounty in hand were authorized, it would bring many recruits whose duties at home now delay or prevent them.

On the next day the Governor received from Seward a telegram saying that he was coming to Boston that night. He regretted that Andrew had not signed the governors' memorial, which was "much approved in Washington." On July 2 the Boston papers published the memorial and the President's call, in response to it, for 300,000 men. Early in the morning Seward appeared at the State House with his friend Thurlow Weed, whose relations with him it is as unnecessary as it is difficult to define, and General Buckingham of the Adjutant-General's office. One glance at the letters from Lincoln which Seward bore, — one to the Secretary himself, and the other to the governors, — was enough to make it plain to Andrew that this was no time for suspicion or for holding back. Besides, the \$25 advance payment of the bounty was now promised, the lack of which had been one of his chief causes for complaint. Schouler was called in, and the talk was turned to ways and means of recruiting ; by eleven o'clock everything was arranged and Seward prepared

to start for Cleveland. Andrew, first letting Stanton know of his hearty assent, set himself to writing the necessary proclamation, and to preparing a letter to colonels in the field asking them for the names of officers under them who could be spared to come home to take higher commands in the new regiments which they would help to raise. Beyond this there was nothing for which he was needed, and he decided not to give up the proposed trip to Windham. On the day before the Fourth, at Portland, when the morning papers were filled with the terrifying news of McClellan's losses in the six days' battles and his final crushing defeat, he sent for Albert Browne to come to the telegraph office in Boston to "talk" with him. He quieted the alarm of the men at the State House, who were for sending off the militia to Washington, and urged that the newspapers exhort the people to enlist at once. "There is nothing to alarm the faithful," he concluded.

The next day the Governor drove to Windham, to take part in the celebration in which he was to be the most distinguished figure. On his way he stopped at the little house where, forty-four years before, he had been born, and where, thirty years before, his mother had died. He went into the house for a moment, and then drove on to the place appointed for the meeting. The anniversary was celebrated with the "exercises" which are usual for such occasions, — the "welcome" to the sons of Windham who had come from away, the historical sketch of the town, the chapter from the Bible, the prayer, the reciting

of the Declaration of Independence. As a means of working up to the climax, the correspondence between the committee and Governor Andrew was read, and then the Governor was introduced.

It was a plain little celebration in a remote country place, at the high tide of summer, with the warm sun beating down upon the broad fields where the scythes were to begin their work on the next day. There, amid the peacefulness of nature, were the happy greetings of friends and the recollections of "old times;" yet upon the heart of every one was the sense of national trouble, brought home more poignantly than ever by the thought of the tens of thousands lying dead and wounded in the Peninsula. Stirred by all these emotions, and not least by the old associations which thronged back upon him, Andrew spoke in a tone of simple friendliness, in which his identification of himself with his hearers was complete. To please them he called to mind one after another of the "characters" whom he had known in the town as a boy; and then in the same friendly vein began to speak about the war. He had no speech prepared, he did not try to make a speech; he simply talked to them, using the same arguments, illustrations, and phrases that he employed in his every-day talk in Boston. What he said in this unstudied fashion has interest, therefore, as showing the daily temper of his mind at this time.

. . . Among all the promises revealed to us by the witness within that testifies to us or by history,

there is no promise more sure than that of certain deliverance to a people worthy to be saved. It remains to you, ye yeomanry of Maine, ye solid *men* (I mean not solid blocks, houses or gold), to see whether this people shall be free and prosperous. . . . Look not to the vanes upon the meeting houses to observe the signs of the times, but to your hearts. . . . In my sincere judgment the *people* of New England and the free North-West have got to take this work up, according to the dictates of their own hearts. . . . When traitors have attempted to drive the ploughshare of ruin through this land, I declare that we are driven from necessity to so conduct our relations to them in this war, as that we shall stand justified between ourselves and all who are related to us, — stand justified between ourselves and God. Short of that I know of no salvation. The unwise, yet I think well-intended idea, to fight for freedom and yet to protect the property of rebels in and over their crouching slaves, is depleting our treasury, draining the best blood of our veins, and causing untold misery. . . .

I am here simply as a Windham boy to extend congratulations with you. No one is here to pull me down, to say I am too rash, or to suggest that I may lose a vote, by saying so and so, but I am at liberty to speak right out and free my mind. . . . Let all who wish rush against the bosses of the buckler of Jehovah, but *I dare not*. . . . It is a sad and solemn task which Providence imposes, — to carry truth on the pinions of battle and enforce it with steel, — but no men have the right to plunge families into woe, to inflict losses, disasters and death on *foes even*, unless in maintenance of moral right. . . . Some things are worse than death or its infliction, and

that is why we have the right to fight. And I would have the people make up their minds to make the rebels, black or white, and all their posterity, to see in the future that they are to become happier and wiser as a result of this controversy. . . .

This was the faith, never more desperately needed, whereby Andrew was to move mountains. The tide of Northern fortune had ebbed incredibly low ; it seemed that it must ebb still lower. The army was shattered in strength and spirit ; foreign intervention appeared certain ; there were no fresh troops. By the force of human wills the tide must be turned ; the people must be made to enlist, to put into the renewed prosecution of the war all their resources of money and of life. To help create in his people the will to do this was Andrew's task. The story of his labors to this end all through the summer, one day following another with its crowded confusion of work, is largely the chronicle of a dull office routine ; yet through this toil of body and of spirit the end he wrought for came to pass.

Returning to Boston, Andrew found there a breezy discussion over his refusal to have his name put to the governors' appeal to Lincoln. Such an incident was enough to set by the ears the moderate and the radical Republicans, the pro-Seward and the anti-Seward men. The Governor's friends rushed to print in his defence, but he himself kept quiet. When, however, Francis P. Blair wrote to know whether the omission were Stanton's act, as a snubbing for Andrew's "conditional patriotism" letter, he made

haste to explain that the trouble this time was with "Morgan, and Seward, etc., etc. in N. Y."

I am not sorry [he continued] that the memorial was printed without my name. After all the efforts that I have unceasingly made to have some of those in power treat this war as a *war* and not as a *picnic*, or a *caucus*, to accept troops, to raise troops, even to accept from Massachusetts—I am glad [not] to have suffered the final humiliation of having my name printed to a document dictated from Washington, but apparently emanating from the governors—merely to save appearances. Why—my dear friend—I had only a week before the midnight cry of the last of May succeeded—after repeated refusals—in being permitted to raise our companies at Fort Warren to a regt. — (which I could just as well as not have had on hand as a full regt. of 1000 men in advance). . . . I have no doubt the Sec. of War would gladly have increased the forces earlier. But, I think the Adj. Genl. has always been a "slow coach." But no matter.¹

The quota of Massachusetts under the President's call had been fixed between Seward and Andrew at 15,000 men.² To distribute this amount equitably among the cities and towns of the State, a rough estimate, based on the proportion of the population liable to military duty, was made in the Adjutant-General's office of the number of men which each should furnish. This estimate was embodied in the Governor's general order, and the local authorities

¹ To F. P. Blair, Senior, July 5, 1862.

² But see discussion of quotas on pp. 134, 135.

were urged to offer a bounty in addition to the federal bounty. Six regiments only were to be raised by the State, for the remainder of the quota was to be distributed among the depleted regiments in the field; and, though it was the duty of the State to see that the men were forthcoming, all further dealings with them were in the hands of an officer of the regular army stationed in Boston. Simultaneously the militia was to be overhauled and made ready, much as had been done in the first months of Andrew's term in 1861. More camps were established, bands were engaged, all the devices for arousing in the citizen enough enthusiasm to make him a volunteer were put into play. As a last goad there was dropped the hint of an impending draft.

Now, in these desperate straits, when war had been the business of the people for fifteen months, the state officials were beset with the same "town-meeting" difficulty that had so aggravated the labor of the preceding summer. Not even the promise of muster-out with the veterans could induce the Massachusetts Yankees to enlist for service in some unknown and unfriendly regiment at the front; they would serve only in new companies composed of men from their own town and the neighboring countryside. Moreover, to command them they would not accept officers released from old regiments. They would have raw men of their own choosing. "The *local* feeling," wrote Andrew, in exasperation, "is so strong that it seems as if people often would prefer to go to certain death and disgrace under an officer

of the bailiwick, rather than to be led to glorious victory under Washington himself." "I can understand," he burst out at another time, "the desire to make choice of associates on *social* grounds if they were going on a *picnic*, but not when going to *war*. In the latter case the best soldier or officer is not always the companion who would be preferred at a party." The game was more or less in the hands of these conditional patriots, for if their terms were not granted they could and did threaten not to enlist. Much to Andrew's disgust, the Secretary of War came to their assistance by refusing to permit any exceptions to the rule that no officer should leave his regiment when doing active duty in the field.

You can have any officer that you designate who is on furlough [Stanton telegraphed to Andrew]. It seems to me that it should occur to you that officers who are before the enemy or in the enemy's country are quite as necessary to the men under their command as new recruits, and that you would regard the rule of the department as a necessary military exigency and not an arbitrary exaction.¹

Andrew in reply pointed out that the officers whom he needed belonged not to Pope's army in Virginia, but to Burnside's, which was lying inactive in North Carolina, adding : —

I am right, no matter what the army officers think or say, in asking you for some officers to be promoted in new regiments. Our *old* ones have plenty of men well worthy of promotion ; and, when

¹ August 19, 1862.

I take out an officer I merely weaken by *one* man the regiment. . . . Batchelder, of the Thirteenth, *is not* needed there. *That* regiment could furnish officers for a *whole* regiment outside of itself, and be no more weakened than is a bird by laying its eggs.¹

The final word was spoken in Stanton's reply : —

I have your letter and feel its force but without change of duty. If you feel averse to send men to the field without competent officers, how can I take officers from men who are in the face of the enemy. . . . I have never distrusted your coöperation and hearty support.

This decision effectually tied the Governor's hands in his battle over commissions with the city and town authorities ; it gave, as he wrote to a friend, "great encouragement to the municipal authorities to be exacting in their demands for the appointment of civilians whose recommendations consisted in their having stayed at home for a year during which they should have been in the field, and in their being able to drum up recruits."

In the other loyal states causes similar to those in Massachusetts operated to discourage recruiting. The "three hundred thousand more" were depressingly slow in coming, whereas the need of them was greater than ever before. McClellan, with his defeated Army of the Potomac, was still stuck in the Peninsula ; Pope, to whom the Administration now looked for victories, had undertaken a campaign with the new Army of Virginia, which as yet was hardly

¹ August 24.

more than a good force for defence. At the end of July Lincoln addressed telegrams to the loyal governors asking for returns of recruiting. Their replies showed a general belief that so long as men could choose between old and new regiments they would invariably flock, if they flocked at all, to the new. To yield something to this desire, for the men must be got, at whatever cost, Lincoln and Stanton decided to order a draft of three hundred thousand militia to serve for nine months. The draft was to be applied also to cover whatever deficiency should exist on August 15 in quotas under the call of July for volunteers.

The quota of Massachusetts under this second call was 19,080 men. Since the militia was in so good a state of preparation that it could respond voluntarily even before the machinery of conscription could be created and set in operation, Andrew had no difficulty in procuring a postponement of the draft for a fortnight. The quick answer of the militia justified his expectations. He now had on his hands the work of getting off two sets of troops at the same time. Three years' men enlisting in six new regiments and to some extent in old regiments, nine months' men enlisting in fifteen militia regiments, officers to be commissioned by scores and to be rejected by hundreds, constant inquiries from Stanton as to the progress of the six regiments, and asseverations that on their arrival might depend the fate of a battle, — all of these circumstances produced a bewildering volume of work at the State House no

detail of which could safely be omitted as of minor importance. Chief among the difficulties was a crisis in the long series of vexations which all through the summer had characterized the relation of the state authorities with the United States Army officials in Massachusetts. These men were two, — one officer for mustering and one for paying all the new troops in the State, — and they held strictly to the traditions of red tape. At one time, thirty selectmen, who had brought their respective quotas of men to Boston, were kept waiting by the mustering officer for five days. Again and again Andrew had complained to Stanton, and now he appealed to the President.

I can't get those regiments off [he telegraphed to Lincoln], because I can't get quick work out of the United States disbursing officer and the paymaster, and I can't start our men in violation of my authorized proclamation and promises. Everybody here is alive. Men swarm our camps. We will raise regiments until you cry hold! But why not turn over the funds to me, and we will disburse and account for them, and stop delays.¹

Lincoln's sharp reply shows what the tension was at Washington.

Your despatch saying, "I can't get those regiments off because I can't get quick work out of the U. S. disbursing officer and the paymaster" is received. Please say to these gentlemen that if they do not work quickly I will make quick work with them. In the name of all that is reasonable, how

¹ August 11.

long does it take to pay a couple of regiments? We were never more in need of the arrival of regiments than now, even today.¹

As a result of Andrew's protest, a brigadier-general, full of authority and good-will, was sent from Washington. For the ten days that he was in Boston matters moved more quickly, and the first regiments were got off, but his departure for the West, to untangle the confusion there, left things to relapse into their former state. Red tape, and nothing else, it seemed, might after all make the draft necessary. The mustering officer refused to muster in the militia except by regiments, and then refused to pay for their transportation to camp. "We have more than 5000 nine months' militia ready to go into service immediately," telegraphed the Governor to Stanton, "who . . . are repressed and discouraged by these refusals. . . . Why cannot mustering and disbursing officers be appointed by you who will coöperate heartily in the recruitment instead of inventing obstacles? If I were capable of discouragement I should be almost discouraged by the obstacles which block my efforts at every turn. If the whole recruitment, transportation, and equipment were left to the State, as last year, we should be a month ahead of our present condition."² Secretary Stanton replied: —

If all the states were like Massachusetts and all governors like hers, transportation and everything

¹ August 12.

² August 28.

else might be left to state authorities. It must be done to all or none. Experience of last year produced too many frightful evils to renew the experiment. If the disbursing officers in one state trouble you so much I have eighteen times as much trouble. We must both therefore patiently endure what we cannot remedy. The rules will however be changed or modified as far as possible to cure the evils you suffer under.¹

In passages such as these between the Governor and the Secretary there is an endless fascination in watching the shock of two commanding wills. Each had perfect confidence in the other, and each was sure that if they could only meet, everything would be straightened out; each knew, too, at what point it was necessary to yield. With such a man to work for, Andrew could keep on to the end, feeling that he was not laboring in vain.

As the month of August went by, Andrew began to plead that the draft might be again postponed to the first of October, by which time he was confident that the two quotas of the State would be filled. That no effort might be spared to raise the number of enlistments as high as possible before September 3, the date to which the draft had first been put off, he issued a proclamation requesting that throughout the State all places of business be closed in the afternoons of the last week in August, and that the whole people devote itself to the work of filling the quota. In Boston this movement culminated in a grand meeting on the Common on the afternoon of

¹ August 28.

Wednesday, the twenty-seventh. There were processions, bands, and banners, and at the stands erected on the Common were speakers who brought all the power of their eloquence to bear upon the crowds before them. The two famous orators of Boston, Edward Everett and Robert C. Winthrop, were there; B. F. Thomas, a well-known Democrat, also spoke. Andrew snatched an hour from the State House to add his voice. His speech was merely an impassioned exhortation, hopeful in its prediction of success, bold in its references to Emancipation, full of his sense of protection and fatherhood over a whole people.

"I am here this afternoon," he said, "much more that I might drink in from the warm breath of your hearty zeal and patriotism an encouragement which all who labor daily in this cause do so much need. When the flesh is weak and weary and faint, how it thrills the heart and stimulates the courage and hope of man to feel the beating heart of a sympathetic brother." His last words were almost a benediction. "Go you there if you choose, join the Cadet Regiment if you prefer, the Second Regiment of militia if you like it better, the Second Battalion or the Fourth, if they contain any whose society you like. But go somewhere. Go now, go together all of you, and heaven bless you, save and preserve our country, and be with our children forever, as God has been with our fathers until now."

The effort of this last long pull met its reward. The three years' regiments were filled up. Three of them marched away in the last ten days of August,

just when Washington was being stripped of troops to be sent to Pope before the second battle of Bull Run, and McClellan was grudgingly sending back his men from the Peninsula, careful that they should come too late to be of assistance to his rival. Upon this earnest of what Massachusetts could do, Stanton permitted the draft to be postponed, leaving the date to be fixed by the Governor. On the first of September, the old Sixth Regiment of militia was sent, Andrew taking pride in having it again the first to answer the call for militia, and within the next three weeks the other three three years' regiments left for the front. There was now some easing of the strain. Officers came from Washington to help muster the troops. The quota of 15,000 under the first call was nearly filled, and, with the will of the people at last aroused, the militia quota was reasonably assured.

All this work, exhausting as it was, was done under a supreme inspiration that the day of Emancipation was at hand. The *in hoc signo vinces* of Freedom was seen in the sky and believed of all men. The most striking testimony to this fact was Horace Greeley's *Prayer of Twenty Millions*, addressed to Abraham Lincoln. "The great phenomenon of the year," said the conservative *Advertiser*, on August 20, "as it seems to us, is the terrible intensity which this resolution has acquired. A year ago men might have faltered at the thought of proceeding to this extremity in any event. The majority do not now seek it, but, we say advisedly, they are in great measure prepared for it." That men

might be in full measure prepared, Andrew neglected no opportunity to preach with greater vigor than ever before the gospel of liberty for all mankind. On Sunday, August 10, he had, as it happened, an appointment to speak at a Methodist camp-meeting on the island of Martha's Vineyard. There, before an audience eight thousand strong, which he felt sure was with him in political faith as well as in the emotion of the hour, he enlarged for nearly an hour and a half upon the issues of the day, in what he afterwards called the best speech of his life.

I have never believed it to be possible [he said, in speaking of slavery and the war] that this controversy should end, and Peace resume her sway, until that dreadful iniquity has been trodden beneath our feet. I believe it cannot, and I have noticed, my friends (although I am not superstitious, I believe), that, from the day our government turned its back on the proclamation of General Hunter, the blessing of God has been withdrawn from our arms. We were marching on, conquering and to conquer; post after post had fallen before our victorious arms; but since that day I have seen no such victories. But I have seen no discouragement. I bate not one jot of hope. I believe that God rules above, and that he will rule in the hearts of men, and that, either with our aid or against it, he has determined to let the people go. But the confidence I have in my own mind that *the appointed hour has nearly come*, makes me feel all the more confidence in the certain and final triumph of our Union arms, because I do not believe that this great investment of Providence is to be wasted.

The impression which the speech made upon the audience was tremendous. For Andrew it was a moment when all his powers of thought and emotion worked together, and he abandoned himself, prophet-wise, to their sway. The thrill of the occasion is incommunicable in printed words ; nevertheless, it is some sign of the spell under which people listened that the sentence of Andrew's that has been most frequently quoted was heard and remembered then and there. "I know not," it runs, "what record of sin awaits me in the other world, but this I know, that I was never mean enough to despise any man because he was ignorant, or because he was poor, — or because he was black." That it was this sentence, touched with deep humanity, and not an eloquent phrase about the Constitution or the Country, which sank into their memories, is a sign also that these good Methodists were with the Governor in conviction as well as in emotion. "The brethren shouted 'glory' and 'amen' to my anti-slavery war views with great unction," he wrote to Frank Howe; plainly, he was more than ever convinced that by looking into one's own heart a man can best come to a knowledge of right public opinion.

The people were ready for Emancipation. The question was : How would it come to pass ? Would Lincoln recognize the opportunity¹ and act of him-

¹ Edward W. Kinsley, an ardent Republican, has left on record the following story of an attempt by Andrew to make Lincoln see his opportunity:—

"It was in the summer of 1862, when emancipation was being

self, or was it on the cards that the great event must befall in spite of him? On August 22 the President wrote his letter to Horace Greeley. In those

talked a great deal. We had not had any great successes, and everybody had a notion that emancipation ought to come. One day the Governor sent for me to come up to the State House. I went up to his room, and I never shall forget how I met him. He was signing some kind of bonds, standing at a tall desk in the council chamber, in his shirt sleeves, his fingers all covered with ink. He said, 'How do you do? I want you to go to Washington.' 'Why, Governor,' said I, 'I can't go to Washington on any such notice as this. I am busy, and it is impossible for me to go.' 'All my folks are serving their country,' said he; and he mentioned the various services the members of his staff were engaged in, and said with emphasis, 'Somebody must go to Washington. . . . I command you to go.' 'Well,' said I, 'Governor, put it in that way and I shall go, of course.' 'There is something going on,' he remarked. 'This is a momentous time.' He turned suddenly toward me and said, 'You believe in prayer, don't you?' I said, 'Why, of course.' 'Then let us pray;' and he knelt right down at the chair that was placed there; we both kneeled down, and I never heard such a prayer in all my life. I never was so near the throne of God, except when my mother died, as I was then. I said to the Governor . . . 'I will start this afternoon for Washington.' I soon found out that emancipation was in everybody's mouth, and when I got to Washington and called upon Sumner, he began to talk emancipation. He asked me to go and see the President, and tell him how the people of Boston and New England regarded it. I went to the White House that evening, and met the President. We first talked about everything but emancipation, and finally he asked me what I thought about emancipation. I told him what I thought about it, and said that Governor Andrew was so far interested in it that I had no doubt he had sent me on there to post the President in regard to what the class of people I met in Boston and New York thought of it, and then I repeated to him, as I had previously to Sumner, this prayer of the Governor's, as well as I could remember it. The President said, 'When we have the Governor of Massachusetts to send us troops in the way he has, and when we have him to utter such prayers for us, I have no doubt that we shall succeed.'" — Chandler, pp. 34-36.

balanced and qualified sentences, the perfect expression of a mind still holding its decision in suspense, awaiting the moment for action, the radicals could read an invitation to them to make it possible for him to act according to their desires. "As the hope rises of vigorous, large, bold and hopeful policy," wrote Andrew to Stanton just after the letter was published, "so rises the enthusiasm of the people." The interpretation of Lincoln's letter, which was open in more senses than one, was naturally looked for in his next public act. Unfortunately for the hopes of the radicals, this act was the reinstatement of McClellan in command, immediately after Pope's defeat at Bull Run. Whether for the military or for the political welfare of the country, no act could appear to them blacker than this. It now seemed impossible that Lincoln was a man steering a steady course by the stars; the salvation of the country must come from outside Washington.

Andrew's opportunity came soon. "Besides doing my proper work," he wrote to Count Gurowski, on September 6, "I am sadly but firmly trying to help organize some movement, if possible to save the Prest. from the infamy of ruining his country." This language expresses the spirit in which he looked forward to what is known in history as the Altoona Conference. He had on that very day received from Governor Curtin a proposal that "the loyal Governors should meet at some point in the border states to take measures for the more active support of the Govt.," and had immediately telegraphed his

assent.¹ It is easy to imagine his determination that any appeal made to Lincoln as the result of this conference should not have its contents "dictated from Washington." On the contrary, he felt that such a meeting, composed of men who were in close touch with local sentiment, would represent a body of opinion to which Lincoln must give heed. If, in addition to taking counsel on military matters within their proper sphere, they could reach an agreement as to the necessity of Emancipation, and then, if, as being of one mind on this subject, they appealed to the President, he must yield to their pressure, for he could not spare their support. A week later the formal invitation was issued by telegraph, the date set for the meeting being September 24, and the place the mountain town of Altoona in western Pennsylvania.

If conditions had remained as they were when the meeting was first proposed, the beginning of the new epoch might have been marked by the Altoona Conference; in the history of a country plunged in civil war it is fitting that this turning-point should have been a battle. When Curtin sent his first telegram, Lee's army had already swept into Maryland; when he sent the second, the Northern and the Southern forces were lining up on opposite sides of

¹ At the end of August Andrew had attended a meeting of New England governors, held at Providence, under cover of the Commencement exercises at Brown. The main object of the conference was to take concerted action with regard to securing credit on the quota of each State for men who had enlisted in the navy. *Vide infra*, vol. ii. pp. 140-142.

Antietam Creek. That the fate of slavery hung in the balance Andrew received intimation in no uncertain terms and from no uncertain source. On September 10 Francis P. Blair wrote to him : —

I have such faith in the success of our patriot army that I shall keep open house as now at Silver Spring, until I see what I never expect to see, the Rebel flag on the Heights beyond me. If we are victors the electric flash that announces the fact will strike . . . the fetters off every slave on this continent. It is success in the decisive battle that is to do this, — not proclamations. . . . If we crush the disaffected. . . . we will be able to proclaim universal emancipation and may *justly* do it as the only guaranty for the maintenance of the Govt. rescued from the conspirators.

Wednesday, the seventeenth, was the day when the cannon roared for fourteen hours, and thousands upon thousands went down to death. By the end of the week, when Andrew started on his journey to Altoona, it was known that the Confederate Army was in retreat. On Monday night, when he reached Philadelphia, he learned that Lincoln had that day issued a proclamation declaring that he intended to emancipate, as a military necessity, all slaves belonging to masters who should be in rebellion against the government of the United States on January 1, 1863. Andrew, having all his energies bent on accomplishing this end through the coming conference, and now finding his plans forestalled, could not be expected instantly to check his momentum. Even

in his rejoicing he kept his censorious attitude toward Lincoln. "The Proclamation of Emancipation by the President is out," he wrote to Albert Browne, before leaving Philadelphia. "It is a poor *document*, but a mighty *act*; slow, somewhat halting, wrong in its delay till January, but grand and sublime after all. 'Prophets and kings' have waited for this day, but died without the sight."¹

Here was the true climax of all Andrew's efforts for the last six months. The conference of loyal governors which was to prevent the President from ruining his country had had the ground cut from under its feet. It remained for them only to commend Lincoln's proclamation, to pledge their loyalty and support to the government in all its acts, and, as a practical measure, to ask him to call for one hundred thousand more troops to be organized into a reserve corps for emergencies. In order to put these recommendations before the President and at the same time to justify to a suspicious public their private meeting at such a crisis, the governors appointed Andrew and Curtin a committee to prepare

¹ Browne, p. 74. Edward Kinsley's story of Andrew's sending him to Washington (see p. 46) concludes as follows: "In September the Governor sent for me. . . . He and I were together alone again in the council chamber. Said he, 'You remember when I wanted you to go on to Washington?' I said, 'Yes, I remember it very well.' 'Well,' said he, 'I did n't know exactly what I wanted you to go for then. Now I will tell you what let's do: you sing Coronation, and I'll join with you.' So we sang together the old tune, and also Praise God from Whom all Blessings Flow. Then I sang Old John Brown, he marching around the room and joining in the chorus after each verse."

an address and to take it to Washington. The document was written by Andrew, and read by him to Lincoln in the presence of most of the men who had taken part in the Conference. Inasmuch as the meeting at the White House was attended by neither reporters nor even the President's secretaries, it is highly probable that after the formality of the address was over, Lincoln asked for and the governors gave a frank expression of opinion, not only about the proclamation, as to which they had agreed, but even about the removal of McClellan, as to which, having failed to agree, they had made no public recommendation. The meeting over, they returned to their several states, encouraged by their discussion of ways and means to put new vigor into the work of recruiting, and confident that the nation, at last in truth a land of the free, must needs deserve well of the future.

As for the influence which the Altoona Conference had upon Lincoln, it may be estimated at virtually nothing. Though in the days after Pope's defeat at Bull Run, when Curtin had first suggested to him such a meeting, he had welcomed the chance of any tangible support, Lee's swift invasion of Maryland and his repulse at Antietam absorbed Lincoln wholly, and he could truthfully say that, in deciding to proclaim Emancipation, he "never thought of the governors." After the deed was done, he naturally accepted with gratefulness the hearty and immediate sanction which the meeting gave him, but his relation to the Conference was

nothing more than this. In telling by what way Abraham Lincoln was led to declare freedom to the slave, the fact which history finds significant is that for two months the draft of the Proclamation had lain in the drawer of his desk, there awaiting, under his solemn promise to man and to God, the sanction of victory.¹

It was not to be expected that Andrew's work for Emancipation, in which he had seemed to set himself against the President, should not arouse opposition to him within the party. Through the first eight months of the year Lincoln's resistance to the radicals had been entirely satisfactory to the good old Massachusetts Whigs who formed the conservative wing of the Republicans. They talked much about the duty of sustaining the President, of the unconstitutionality of Emancipation as an act of the military power, and of the futility of government by

¹ For four very unlike estimates of the importance of the Altoona Conference, see Nicolay and Hay, vol. vi. pp. 164-167; McClure's *Lincoln and Men of War Times*, pp. 269, 270; *Andrew Gregg Curtin, His Life and Services*, pp. 305-330; McClure's *Recollections of Half a Century*, p. 360. The last estimate, given to Colonel McClure in conversation by Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederate States, is of special interest.

"Stephens . . . declared that Curtin had delivered the most destructive blow to the South in 1862, when they believed that the North was on the point of surrendering the conflict. He spoke of the Altoona Conference of Northern Governors, of which Curtin was the author, and he expressed the conviction that but for that conference the North would have been demoralized by the emancipation proclamation and the failures of the Union army, and that peace would have come on some compromise and honorable basis."

proclamation. In the same degree in which they praised Lincoln, they condemned Andrew and Sumner, who chiefly harassed him. At the Republican State Convention, which was held at Worcester on September 10, some of these Hunker members of the party took the first step in schism. When a resolution expressing gratitude to the two Massachusetts senators and recommending to the next Legislature the reelection of Sumner was introduced, they opposed it. They received little support, and the convention adjourned after having inserted in its platform a strong anti-slavery plank. Put out by this defeat, the discontented agreed to issue a call for a convention of a new party, which was to be named the "People's Party," and which was to nominate a state ticket on a platform of unconditional support of the President. For a few days the movement looked formidable. It had the open support of the Springfield *Republican*, and it seemed certain that many men were awaiting only the raising of the new standard to gather about it. The call for the convention, which had been prepared by Judge Joel Parker, of the Harvard Law School, "a Republican so very conservative as to be practically against the party," appeared in due season. It was a somewhat intemperate document, which made much of the allegation that Sumner, by his constant clamors for Emancipation, was greatly embarrassing the President, and pompously declared, "We want no *impotent proclamations* now." Never did pride more surely go before a fall. "Warrington," fairly gloat-

ing over the discomfiture of the *Republican*, described the event in its columns.

The very day after the manifesto . . . appeared, . . . the judge opened his morning paper, and looked to see further evidences of the progress of the movement; and, lo! he beheld in startling big letters (impotent) "Proclamation of Emancipation by Pres. Lincoln." I draw the veil over the scene, but can only hope the judge had finished his coffee and muffins before he came to that dreadful heading.¹

Andrew, who had been much disturbed by the opposition movement, was quick to see that his enemies were hoist with their own petard. In a letter which he wrote from Philadelphia as soon as he heard of Lincoln's proclamation, and which Browne characterizes as "perhaps the nearest approach to political partisanship which he manifested during the whole war,"² he dashed off instructions to his friends at home.

Republicans must make it *their* business to sustain this act of Lincoln, and we will drive the "conservatism" of a pro-slavery Hunkerism and the reactionaries of despotism into the very caves and holes of the earth. The conquest of the rebels, the emancipation of the slaves, and the restoration of peace founded on liberty and permanent democratic ideas! Let this be our platform. No bickerings, no verbal criticism, no doubting Thomases, must halt the conquering march of triumphant liberty. GO IN FOR THE WAR. Hurry up the recruitments. Have grand *war meetings* all over the State. I hope our

¹ "Warrington:" *Pen-Portraits*, p. 286.

² Browne, p. 77.

friends will begin at Faneuil Hall to-morrow night. Let not the rebels gain by delays, either in Massachusetts or in the field. We can "knock the bottom out" of the Hunker "citizens'" movement before ten days are gone. But tell Claflin, Sumner, Wilson, etc., etc., to *strike quick*.

When the convention of the "People's Party" assembled in Faneuil Hall on October 7, their case was somewhat awkward. Committed beforehand to the support of the President, whose position was now identical with Sumner's, they could no longer oppose the Senator as radical; so Andrew, from his part in the harmless Altoona Conference and his well-known opposition to McClellan, their darling, was chosen as the object of attack. Judge Parker led the onset, blaming him "for causing the President's proclamation by going to Altoona the day after it was printed;"¹ as a further count, another speaker read a letter which quoted Governor Bradford of Maryland as saying unofficially that at the conference "a formal proposition" to the effect that McClellan's removal should be urged upon the President had been made by one of the governors, the withholding of whose name was taken to be proof that it was Andrew. On the basis of these statements, the convention worked itself into a fine frenzy of indignation; and although immediately after the convention it was proved that the words "a formal proposition" had been in reality "no formal propo-

¹ Andrew's expression in the letter to Daniel Henshaw, part of which is quoted on pp. 57, 58.

sition," the substance of these two "campaign lies" continued to be the main arguments of the opposition.¹

Governor Andrew took no public part in the campaign. He refused to speak, saying that if his record would not reelect him, he preferred to be defeated. To inquiring correspondents, however, whose faith needed the prop of knowing in detail what he had said and what he had done, he replied with entire willingness and frankness. In one letter he wrote :² —

The meeting [at Altoona] was one which, whether as citizens or magistrates, we had a right to hold. . . . Nor do I suppose that any person has even doubted the propriety of the conduct of the Governor of Massachusetts in joining that consultation of governors, except the very persons who were swift to observe and exclaim that his name did not appear with the names of many other governors on a certain petition to the President last July. And had not the President's proclamation of freedom appeared, as it did (just one day before our meeting), sadly disappointing certain gentlemen, who

¹ "Warrington," writing to the *Republican* on October 11, recorded the further discomfiture of the People's Party. "So it seems, first, that Mr. Saltonstall did not have any letter from Gov. Bradford ; second, that what he did have, if anything, was from some nameless and irresponsible person ; third, that Gov. Bradford did not say to this person anything like that which Saltonstall reported, but just the contrary ; and, fourth, that Judge Parker and the Count Johannes and the audience generally, who wagged their heads and shouted derisively over the conviction of Gov. Andrew, were as greatly mistaken 'as if they had lost their shirts.'"

² To Daniel Henshaw, October 22, 1862.

had rightly declared it a great merit and public duty to stand by the President, and had the Altoona conference been held and its address published without *my name or presence* I have no manner of doubt that I should have felt the heat of their burning indignation at my slowness to unite with the conservative governors who summoned us to Altoona, in helping to strengthen the arm of the President, and to increase his disposable force. . . .

And now, my dear Sir, the sober truth is simply this, — 1st, I read the President's proclamation in print on the morning of the 23d, with as much surprise as Judge Parker did, though perhaps with more pleasure. 2nd, I did not either formally or informally, directly or indirectly, at any time, move or suggest that the governors should interfere with the position of Major Genl. McClellan or of any other officer of the army or navy. Nor do I believe that any such motion was proposed by any one else. I heard none, whatever, concerning that or any other General. But, if you ask how so great a blunder has been made, I can only reply that when people seek to make a point against their neighbors by a sort of eavesdropping, by attempting to penetrate the private conversations of gentlemen and to betray their confidential speech, great blundering if not something worse, will always be close at hand. They will usually contrive to report just what they hoped to hear.

Another letter on this subject he wrote to a man who had sent him a clipping from the *Boston Courier* to the effect that "our own Governor, indeed, can be proved to have declared in New York, a few days ago, that the government should not have a man

from Massachusetts, until the change in the command of the army was effected."

I had a conversation with Mr. Thurlow Weed in N. Y. some two weeks ago, in the presence of Mr. R. M. Blatchford and his son, and Mr. Andrews, surveyor of the port of New York. I blazed away pretty roundly at the destruction of our Mass. soldiers by reason of the jealousy and rivalships of generals which prevented a cordial coöperation with Pope — thus sacrificing men and the cause. And I did tell Weed, who was just starting for Washington, that *I* wd not consent to raise soldiers for such a fate; and that Massachusetts wd at least know who should own their graveyards. Genl Hooker was the only man of the Army of the Potomac who seemed to try to win a victory. He *always* does his best; and is never equalled by any other. I told Weed that, if they needed to change commanders as the condition of gaining efficiency, Jo. Hooker was their man.¹

I thank you for yr kind interest. But do not fear for me. I know my official duties too well to flag or waver a hair's breadth. And I know my moral duties, as a man, too well not to avail myself of all proper opportunities to use the personal influence I may have with men like Weed and the Pres etc., etc., to aid in curing the terrible evils under which we have been suffering, almost to the destruction of our army and our cause.

¹ In Andrew's original draft of the letter, but not in the letter as it was sent, the following sentence was inserted at this place: "I did *not* refuse, and never have refused to send forward our men; but I have tried to get them sent to other places than the Potomac, and have succeeded in getting 8 new regiments ordered to North Carolina."

Meanwhile the opposition based on quicksands did its best to maintain its ground. It had nominated for governor Brigadier-General Charles Devens, whose name was used almost against his will, and who, being in the field, took no part whatever in the campaign. Although the Democrats, who had made no nominations of their own, gave Devens their support, many of the moderate Republicans whose help had been expected stood aloof. The *Advertiser* was on Andrew's side, and in the Springfield *Republican* "Warrington," spurred on by the Laodicean tone of the editorial page, outdid himself in alternately deriding the People's Party and extolling Emancipation. As secretary of the Republican party he prepared a pamphlet entitled "A Conspiracy to Defame John A. Andrew," which did its part in making a ridiculous opposition even more ridiculous. When election day came, on November 4, the votes for Andrew and Devens stood, in round numbers, 70,000 to 50,000, — a victory which Andrew considered "relatively greater than that of 1860." Though this was the end of any organized movement against him of conservatives who were not Democrats, there remained, especially in Boston, a nucleus of bitter Hunker opposition, strong in influence and disposition to annoy, which only the long work of Andrew's five years' service finally conquered into approval.¹

¹ It was this nucleus which a few months later invited to Boston General McClellan, then recently relieved of his last command in the Union army, and ostentatiously did him honor. Their programme

Thus at last was Andrew justified. His zeal in laboring for the freedom of the negro had been

of entertainment included a sword-presentation, at which the speech was made by the editor of the *Courier*, and several private receptions, all on a magnificent scale. The managers of this undertaking spared no pains to make it appear that all the good society of Boston was bidden, and, what was by no means the case, was eager to do honor to the general who was also a gentleman, and to indicate their intention of ignoring the Governor and other high state officials on grounds social as well as political. The underlying motive of the whole thing was made perfectly evident by the systematic but fatuous attempt on the part of the opposition newspapers to make political capital out of what was supposedly a private visit.

These proceedings the uninvited watched with great amusement, deriving no small degree of satisfaction from their own absence from dinners and receptions at which the chief matter of talk was the fact that they were being snubbed. Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote to John M. Forbes : " I liked your spirited note vastly, and almost wished that I were Thor with his hammer to go round breaking the heads, not so much of idols as of the fools who are so abundant in their temples. Perhaps, however, I am almost too much amused by the silly people to want to brain them, — excuse the figurative expression. . . . As a general rule I would let a furore have its run. It is an admirable test to distinguish characters by. All the Simiæ display their prehensile faculty, perhaps hitherto unsuspected under the social garment." (Forbes, *Reminiscences*, privately printed, vol. ii. p. 218.) " Warrington," too, made of McClellan's visit a special occasion for merriment. " The sword bears an inscription : ' Pro rege sæpe, pro patria semper.' George Lunt, who made the presentation speech, undertook to translate this. . . . ' For the Administration when it behaves itself ; for the country always.' The general, who is supposed to understand Latin, and who is not such a fool as to be ignorant of the *animus* of the whole proceeding, on his part as well as on the part of the flunkies and the Tories, — the general, I understand, rather resented this imputation upon his classical knowledge and his common sense, and intimated in his reply that he knew, as well as Lunt, what the words meant in this case. . . . But enough of this thing, which will soon be over. Sheetings and shirtings will soon again absorb the attention and energies of Beacon and Mount Vernon streets. Only twenty-four hours more remain for baby-kissing and

never-failing, and in the events which brought about the end the opportunity of his position made what he did certainly not without effect. Whether it were great or small, his only care was that it should be worthy of his nature and his powers and of the Commonwealth of which he was governor. He now saw the way made plain before him for his next official duty, — the task of bringing the negro into the war as a soldier.

pitcher-presenting, unless the visit is protracted to allow North and Richmond streets to send up *their* babies (with their *mugs*) likewise. And why not? North and Richmond streets have more votes, and, for that matter, more brains, than Beacon and Mount Vernon streets. Ah, well! good-by, general. Luckily, you don't know enough to appreciate and laugh at the sublime folly of the rich and ignorant classes of the Trimountain City." — *Pen-Portraits*, pp. 290, 291.

CHAPTER X

THE NEGRO SOLDIER

"THE Lord hath established His Throne in the Heavens; and His Kingdom ruleth over all." He is the "Sovereign Commander of all the world, in whose hand is power and might, which none is able to withstand;" and to Him only belong ascriptions of glory, who is "the only giver of Victory." . . .

Rising to the height of our great occasion, reinforced by courage, conviction and faith, it has been the privilege of our country to perceive, in the workings of Providence, the opening ways of a sublime duty. And to Him who hath never deserted the faithful, unto Him "who gathereth together the outcasts of Israel, who healeth the broken in heart," we owe a new song of Thanksgiving. "He showeth His word unto Jacob, His statutes and His judgments unto Israel. He hath not dealt so with any nation."

Putting aside all fear of man, which bringeth a snare, may this people put on the strength which is the Divine promise and gift to the faithful and obedient: "let the high praises of God be in their mouth, and a two-edged sword in their hand."¹

With these words the Governor of Massachusetts led his people in returning thanks for the great

¹ Thanksgiving Proclamation, 1862.

mercy of freedom to the slave. He saw opened for the nation a greater opportunity than it had ever yet possessed; he was impatient that it should enter into the land of the new promise. The preliminary Proclamation of Emancipation had swept away the issue which was the origin of the Republican party, and by which it had won its victory in 1860. If it was to continue its leadership by virtue of great ideas rather than by the mere possession of power, it must discard old formulas and declare its faith in the negro freedman as an economic factor in the development of the nation. "We are now working out of the sentimental and the political periods in the history of anti-slavery effort," wrote Andrew to Charles Sumner. "We are working into the economical period. I trust that on the 1st day of January we shall find ourselves there."

In another letter to Sumner, written on Christmas Day, Andrew developed his notion of the opportunity and the duty of the Republican party.

I have no fear of "Hunkers," "Hunkerism," or reaction of any kind. If we were in the opposition, and that was in the lead, we could smash it any time. My only fear is found in the want of the exhibition of dauntless, persistent, constructive, business-like, working policy. Our Republicans have been so long in "Her Majesty's Opposition," that they seem to have a notion that you can carry on a government on the same principles and with the same methods with which an opposition is conducted.

A government should do much and debate little. When the opposition is attacking one act or piece

of policy, *do* another, and leave the old debate far behind. We can't be broken down by anything but our own incapacity for *doing the work*. While Seymourites¹ are carping about the Proclamation, we ought to be preparing the proof, which *shopkeepers* will appreciate, which men at arms will value, and then be working out, wherever there is a chance, the undeniable demonstration before their own eyes. We are not living in the same *century* now in which Pierce and Buchanan reigned, and yet, how much Lincoln and all the rest seem to be troubled by some difficulties, which would have been difficulties ten or even two years ago, but which are not now.

I declare to you, that much that I read and hear from public men seems to me as inconclusive and inapt, as it would be to sing now the "Tippecanoe and Tyler too" song of 1840, at a Faneuil Hall meeting.

Anybody can *think* and *talk* about building a house, but it won't go up without *tools* and *mechanics*. And no matter how much critics may blow and fume about it, the house *will go up*, under the hands of mechanics who wield the tools. That is our case. The Hunkers are powerless scolds — nothing more — if we are but good workmen, hunt up our tools, and use them with business skill.

The act of reorientation to which Andrew invited Sumner he let his annual message of 1863 show that he had already performed for himself. Without belittling in the least the value of what the State was doing in the war, he continued to throw

¹ Horatio Seymour, a Democrat, had been that autumn elected Governor of New York.

the emphasis elsewhere. When Vicksburg and Gettysburg were a half year in the future, he serenely assumed the ultimate triumph of the Union arms, and devoted the main part of his message to large schemes for the honor of his beloved Commonwealth in the glorious future that was before her. Chief of these, since it was by the power of her trained men that she must hold her own, was a plan for the expansion of Harvard into a University which should include a School of Agriculture and a technical school to be founded on the charter already given to the Institute of Technology.¹ In the closing section of the address, entitled "Massachusetts — Union — Liberty," he dwelt upon the adaptability bred by the Commonwealth in her sons, skilful in any industry in any quarter of the nation, loyal to the idea of nationality wherever they might be. To such men, with their energy and foresight, he addressed his closing words: —

Practical questions of grave and important moment are before the government and the people of the United States. A large number of poor persons, without capital save their ability to labor, with new motives to industry, subordination and good conduct, will claim an interest in the thoughts of statesmen. Near Fortress Monroe, in the Sea Islands of South Carolina, in New Orleans, and in its neighboring parishes, they have already tried the new-born gift of liberty, with success and honor.

In a few brief years, we shall have paid the national debt incurred during the present war, by

¹ *Vide infra*, pp. 233–236.

the enlarged value which freedom will have given to the property of the rebel states, the increased productive ability of freedmen over slaves, and their multiplied power to buy and consume the products of manufactures and the arts.

The people of America will have saved the Union, saved Democratic-Republican Liberty, both menaced by the same dangers, will have perpetuated the Government, magnified the Constitution and made it honorable, and will have crowned a great career of glory with an act of expedient Justice unequalled for its grandeur in all the history of mankind.

How imperative these "practical questions" had become was a fact that had been brought home to Andrew by an incident which occurred in the autumn of 1862. General Dix, the commander at Fortress Monroe, having first obtained the consent of the War Department, proposed to him to send to Massachusetts some three thousand negroes, for whom at the fort there was no possible means of provision. Their condition, as he represented it, was so wretched that many of them had already begun to go back to their masters to escape the privations of a winter in camp. The Governor, before replying, sent, with the permission of the Secretary of War, Dr. LeBaron Russell to make a personal examination of the case of the negroes at Fortress Monroe; through F. W. Bird he also obtained reports from the superintendent of contrabands there. From these investigations it appeared that the true cause of this dissatisfaction and suffering lay in the fact that

money for services rendered by the negroes during more than a year and amounting to more than sixty thousand dollars was still unpaid by the government. In spite of the good-will of General Wool and General Dix toward the poor contraband, subordinate officers had had their way with him without let or hindrance, and he had been "despised, swindled, and outraged." Under the circumstances as thus disclosed the Governor would not assent to General Dix's proposition, and Stanton, when the facts were presented to him, withdrew his sanction.

The Governor's supposed inconsistency in thus refusing to open his arms to a refugee contingent of the negro race made a good deal of talk, but it was plain that General Dix's plan did not even state the first equation of the negro problem. Accurate information about the condition of the negro was the first requisite, and desire for it took form in a petition of the Emancipation League, addressed to Congress and forwarded by Andrew, for the appointment of a commission to examine and report on the subject of "Emancipation as a tried and approved experiment." The second requisite, which in Andrew's mind was of equal importance, was the appointment of an additional Assistant-Secretary of War "to supervise and control the government and industrial organization of the freedmen." The necessity for legislation on these points was immediate, and, when Congress assembled in December, Andrew appealed to Sumner to put himself at the head of the movement to make the negro a wage-earner, as

he had been at the head of the movement to make the negro a freeman. His concluding words were: "Now, my dear Senator, these two things I have presented, are very great matters. They are not brilliant things, but of immense value, if accomplished. *Can't they be done? Will you try?*" When Sumner, with characteristic unwillingness to act on the prompting of another, ignored the suggestion, Andrew wrote again to him: —

You do not reply to my suggestion that Mr. Stanton should have an Asst. Secretary of War, to be the substantial head of a bureau having charge of the organization of the Industry of the freed people. My dear Senator, *this great, almost infinite interest, is now in mere chaos*. It will grow worse daily, unless practical measures are taken. Mr. Stanton's impulses and wishes are good; but he don't and never can give his time to the exclusive consideration of these details, etc., etc. It is wrong to expect it. He knows that better than I do.

Andrew's project of a Freedmen's Bureau came to nothing, but as a result of the beginning thus made, the American Freedmen's Inquiry Commission was appointed in March, 1863, its members being Robert Dale Owen, James McKaye, and S. G. Howe.

Among all the schemes for the good of the negro, that of arming him took the first rank. According to the gospel that the negro was a man, it was now incumbent on the nation to make him feel his manhood, and the quickest way to this end was to give him a rifle. Even if this method were a bit mechan-

cal, the fact of prime importance was that the results would be striking and immediate. Moreover, the nation needed fighting men, and every negro drawn from the Southern states to enlist was by so much a diminution of the Confederate resources. Indeed, not to make soldiers of the freedmen would, in view of the political and military state of things, have been almost impossible. Andrew put the case to Lewis Hayden, a Boston negro of ability and good standing, as follows:—

Every race has fought for Liberty and its own progress. The colored race will create its own future by its own brains, hearts, and hands. If Southern slavery should fall by the crushing of the Rebellion, and colored men should have no hand and play no conspicuous part in the task, the result would leave the colored man a mere helot; the freedmen, a poor, despised, subordinated body of human beings, neither strangers, nor citizens, but “contrabands,” who had lost their masters but not found a country.¹

It was to avoid this danger that the negro, in seeking the goal of economic independence, must take the roundabout and uneconomic path of military service.

From the time when, in the first weeks of the war, some negroes in New Bedford had made the Governor an offer to raise a company, the idea of negro troops had been vehemently discussed. To “carry Africa into the war” must be, the radical Republicans had said, the precursor of Emancipation. To

¹ December 4, 1863.

Lincoln it was strictly a consequence. Although the act of Congress approved July 17, 1862, gave the President authority to organize "persons of African descent" for military or naval service, he refused to sign commissions for Lane's Kansas regiment begun in August, as he had refused in the case of Hunter's South Carolina regiment, raised in June.¹ As to Butler's irregular troops at New Orleans, the General was too shrewd to put the Administration to any embarrassment on that score. When, however, Lincoln had set his seal upon the policy of Emancipation, he had by the same act declared himself in favor of arming the negro and ready to exercise the power that Congress had put into his hands.

This was the hour of Andrew's opportunity. In an interview with Stanton at Washington in January, 1863, he learned the plans of the Administration. In order to raise negro troops the first conditions were that the work be undertaken in places under Union control where there were negroes in considerable numbers. In three states, — South Carolina, North Carolina, and Louisiana, — these con-

¹ Lincoln's refusal in the case of the Kansas regiment was communicated by Stanton to Lane on August 23, 1862 (O. R., Series III. vol. ii. p. 445). Nevertheless, on August 25 Stanton gave Saxton in South Carolina permission to recruit colored regiments with promise of full pay as volunteers (O. R., Series I. vol. xiv. p. 377). In the latter case there is nothing in Stanton's order to show that the President was consulted. If he was, his consent must have been obtained on the plea of sheer necessity. The order explains that the permission is given "in view of the small force under your command and the inability of the Government at the present time to increase it."

ditions existed. In the first General Rufus Saxton had been laboring for three months, bringing together with much difficulty, to form the First South Carolina Volunteers, the blacks whom Hunter had been forced to disband in the preceding summer. To take charge of Butler's negro troops in Louisiana General David Ullmann had just been chosen, and he was endeavoring to pick up his non-commissioned officers among the intelligent blacks in New York. North Carolina was the only field still untouched. In that State there was neither a force of negroes to serve as a nucleus nor a "believer" to superintend the work. Andrew proposed Butler, who had been ordered "to report at Lowell," but Butler was at that moment out of favor with the War Department, and Andrew was in no mood to waste his breath in pleading for him. Another man might be found to assume the work, but there would still remain the difficulty of rallying the negroes to join a white army. If there were only a sample regiment of blacks, a "nest egg" which should cause others to form! Given the argument, now arrived at this point; given the debaters, Stanton and Andrew; and it is easy to see that the next move must be a proposition from Andrew to the effect that he, as Governor, should raise a negro regiment, the men to be enlisted as Massachusetts volunteers and to be secured first from the negro population of New England, and then, if need be, from Virginia and North Carolina. The advantages of such a course were obvious. The War Department, with all its good-will, was overcrowded with the work proper

to the prosecution of a great war ; it had no machinery either for raising the men or for selecting the officers of a regiment ; above all, it had no power of itself to issue commissions. All this machinery, on the other hand, was at the command of a governor. Moreover, that strong Northern sentiment in favor of negro troops which must be created along with the regiment itself could be created by no one with more certainty than by John A. Andrew in Massachusetts. Thus it befell that, at last, the Secretary put his name to an order authorizing the Governor to raise companies of artillery for forts in Massachusetts and other "corps of infantry for the volunteer military service," and containing the provision that such volunteers "may include persons of African descent, organized into separate corps."

Here was cut out for Andrew a piece of work after his own heart. He immediately sent the news to Boston and began to busy himself with the details of organization. Before he left Washington, it had been agreed between him and Stanton that all the commissioned officers were to be white men. Although Andrew had pleaded that a few lower commissions might be given to negroes, to afford an opportunity for promotion from the ranks, Stanton, mindful of the sentiment of army officers with which he would have to deal, was firm in refusal. In all other respects, and in the matter of pay by explicit statement, the status of the regiment was to be identical with that of all other volunteer organizations of infantry. It was to be numbered, in the regular

order of the Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, the Fifty-Fourth. Returned to Boston, the Governor lost no time. He already had in mind the two young men whom he wished for the chief places of command, and the letter which he immediately wrote to Francis G. Shaw of New York shows the plans that he had been revolving and the purpose with which he had made his selection.

JOHN A. ANDREW TO FRANCIS G. SHAW

Jan. 30, 1863.

DEAR SIR, — As you may have seen by the newspapers, I am about to raise a Colored Regiment in Massachusetts. This I cannot but regard as perhaps the most important corps to be organized during the whole war, in view of what must be the composition of our new levies; and therefore I am very anxious to organize it judiciously in order that it may be a model for all future Colored Regiments. I am desirous to have for its officers, particularly its field officers, young men of military experience, of firm Anti-Slavery principles, ambitious, superior to a vulgar contempt of color, and having faith in the capacity of Colored men for military service. Such officers must be necessarily gentlemen of the highest tone and honor; and I shall look for them in those circles of educated Anti-Slavery Society, which next to the colored race itself have the greatest interest in the success of this experiment.

Reviewing the young men of the character I have described, now in the Massachusetts service, it occurs to me to offer the Coloneley of such a Regiment to your Son, Capt. Shaw of the 2nd Mass. Infantry, and the Lt. Coloneley to Capt. Hallowell of the 20th



Hub. Anden.

Mass. Infantry, the son of Mr. Morris L. Hallowell of Philadelphia. With my deep conviction of the importance of this undertaking in view of the fact that it will be the first Colored Regiment to be raised in the Free States, and that its success or its failure will go far to elevate or to depress the estimation in which the character of the Colored Americans will be held throughout the World, the command of such a Regiment seems to me to be a high object of ambition for any officer. How much your son may have reflected upon such a subject I do not know, nor have I any information of his disposition for such a task except what I have derived from his general character and reputation, nor could I wish him to undertake it unless he could enter upon it with a full sense of its importance, with an earnest determination for its success ; and with the consent and sympathy and support of the opinion of his immediate family. I therefore beg to enclose to you the letter in which I make him the offer of this commission ; and I will be obliged to you, if you will forward it to him accompanying it with any expression to him of your own views, and if you will also write to me upon the subject.

My mind is drawn towards Capt. Shaw by many considerations. I am sure that he would attract the support, sympathy and active coöperation of many besides his immediate family and relatives. The more ardent, faithful, true Republicans and friends of Liberty would recognize in him a Scion of a tree whose fruits and leaves have alike contributed to the strength and healing of our generation. So also it is with Capt. Hallowell. His father is a quaker gentleman of Philadelphia, two of whose sons are officers in our regiments and another is a Merchant

in Boston. Their home in Philadelphia is a hospital almost for Mass. officers, and the family are full of good works, Mr. H. being my constant adviser in the interest of our Soldiers, when sick or in distress in that city. I need not add that young Capt. H. is a gallant and fine fellow, true as steel to the cause of Human Nature, as well as to the flag of the Country.

I don't want the offer to go begging; and if this offer is refused I wd. prefer its being kept reasonably private. Hoping to hear from you immediately on yr. receiving this note, I am, with high regard,

Your obt. Servant and friend,

JOHN A. ANDREW.

Captain N. P. Hallowell accepted forthwith the place offered to him, and, being at home on sick leave, was able to report for duty in Boston within a week. The other offer suffered more vicissitudes. Shaw's father, feeling the importance of the proposal, started at once to find his son, then in camp in Virginia. At first Captain Shaw declined, thinking himself unequal to the task; then, after much interchange of telegrams, he accepted, greatly to the joy of his father and mother.

We of this day and generation are by the circumstance of birth denied the full comprehension of what the Governor's offer meant to those families to which it came. Some hint of the powers of sacrifice which it touched to passion may be read in the note which the "mother of heroes" sent to Governor Andrew at the time when she thought her son's refusal final.

MRS. FRANCIS G. SHAW TO JOHN A. ANDREW

Feb. 6, 1863.

GOVERNOR ANDREW.

MY DEAR SIR, — I have just received a telegram from Mr. Shaw saying, "Rob declines. I think rightly."

This decision has caused me the bitterest disappointment I have ever experienced, and I cannot help writing to thank you from my heart for the honor you did my son, in the offer you made him. In your description of what you desired in the officers for the new regiment, flattering as it was, I recognized the portrait of my son. You said you should wish him to have "the assent, support and sympathy of his family." He had it entirely and their earnest prayers for his consent. It would have been the proudest moment of my life and I could have died satisfied that I had not lived in vain. This being the truth, you will believe that I have shed bitter tears over his refusal. I do not understand it unless from a habit inherited from his Father, of self-distrust in his own capabilities. His Father says, "I think rightly." When he left me Saturday, it was to advise him most earnestly to accept it. I am sure it is from no base worldly motives, and that is my sole consolation.

Excuse my troubling you with my griefs, but I wished you to know what a crushing trial it is to my maternal pride and love and also to thank you.

With sincere respect and esteem, believe me

Your friend,

SARAH B. SHAW.

It is pleasant to see from the brief remarks which Shaw put into his home letters after he had begun

work in Boston, how the young colonel and Andrew made friends. "I took a long drive with the Governor," he wrote, "and liked him very much. His views about the regiment are just what I should wish. We have decided to go into camp at Readville : as we think it best to plunge in without regard to outsiders." "I like the Governor more and more every day. He is not only a liberal minded philanthropist, but a man of real practical good sense, I think, and as kind-hearted as he can be." "As Charles Lowell says: 'It was worth while to come home, if it were only to get acquainted with him.'"¹ This friendly relation between himself and his young officers was an ideal that, in spite of the discouragement of circumstances, Andrew never lost sight of. Here chance brings to light and gives a permanent interest to one instance of it, in which on Andrew's part there was more than his usual tenderness toward the young hero, whom, by making him the leader of negro troops as yet unproved in courage, he was almost certainly dedicating to death.

The task which Andrew had set himself consisted first of all in overcoming the opposition which the idea of arming the blacks never failed to arouse. With an obstinacy which is hard to-day to understand, a considerable number of people in the North continued, even after Emancipation had become an

¹ Lowell was at this time also in camp at Readville, drilling the Second Cavalry.

These sentences are taken from letters in the Shaw Memorial Volume, privately printed.

accomplished fact, in refusing to succumb to the logic of events. This opposition varied from a knowing skepticism as to the negro's ability to fight, to a rancorous abuse of the radicals which exhausted the frantic vocabulary of the Hunker press. The best that could be said by the men who, believing that the policy of arming the negro would be a grave error, still intended to state the case against it fairly, appears in a letter written to Andrew by that sturdy old Democrat, General Dix, at the time of his proposal to ship three thousand negroes to Massachusetts. General Dix declared that the indisposition of the negroes to take up arms was nearly universal ; that he trusted no contingency would arise in any quarter to render the arming of them necessary ; that if the twenty millions of white males in the loyal states had not the courage and constancy, the indifference to personal suffering and sacrifice, to suppress the insurrection of the five millions in the states which had seceded, it would never be suppressed by other hands ; that a reliance on any considerable aid from the slave population of the South, even if the North could reconcile itself to the policy or morality of arming them, would prove utterly fallacious ; that it was time for the North to look the difficulties it had to encounter steadily in the face, — to know the true elements of its strength, and to discard all confidence in any other resources than those supplied by its own firmness, energy, and perseverance.¹ This high and dry attitude was less difficult to

¹ Condensed from a letter dated November 5, 1862.

deal with than the attempts of unscrupulous newspapers, — of which the following extract from the *New York World*, pasted into Andrew's scrapbook, is an example, — to stir up popular passion against those who wished to arm the negro.

Some infinitesimal Boswell, spying out the ways of Governor Andrew, confides to a Boston journal that he is eagerly stirring the spirit of the negroes of the Commonwealth up to enlistment, and that his fragmentary dinner daily cools among the papers on his very writing table. . . . By quitting these paroxysms of blended labor and luncheon for the seemly modes in which the magistrates of other not less important states dispose the graces and duties of life, the Governor may rid himself of certain chimeras for which it is pleasant to learn that his brain is not the responsible organ. . . . Do this shallow Governor and his supporters begin to learn that the grand movements of national destiny are not to be linked to their crotchets? Or will nothing but the event teach them that the prejudices of race are ineradicable, because implanted for wise purposes?

To these two divisions of the opposition must be added the army officers who saw in the plan a possibility of negro captains and lieutenants who should claim the social equality that belonged to their ranks. The bare thought brought terror; to preserve the integrity of the army became a higher duty than to preserve the integrity of the Union. The unfriendliness of all these factions, however, had this common weakness, — that there was absolutely no basis of fact or common sense on which it could

rest. It was a fabric of traditionary prejudices and vague fears. To destroy this fabric the only course was, as Andrew felt, action, — “doing the thing which men are discussing;” for, as he said, “there is little chance of opposition after a thing is accomplished and seems to be good.”

Doing the thing, — there was the rub. The raising of the regiment had been authorized, the field officers had been chosen, but where were the thousand negroes to be found? In Boston, from the negro colony on the north slope of Beacon Hill, barely enough men were collected to form one company. At New Bedford another company was organized from among the blacks whose offer of service at the beginning of the war Andrew had been obliged to refuse. Elsewhere in the State the negro population, small and scattering, could not possibly supply eight hundred able-bodied men. When Andrew appealed to Stanton to send men from Fortress Monroe and North Carolina, he found the Secretary unwilling. It was a case of turn and turn about from the state of things existing at the time of Dix’s proposal. Now, when Andrew was keen for all the negroes that he could put his hands on, and the laws of Maryland made it difficult to get them by land, Stanton positively refused to furnish transportation by sea. Thus it soon became plain that Andrew must draw his negro recruits from loyal states of the North other than Massachusetts, or from Canada.

For the task of finding them, which from its nature had to be done by private citizens and for

which large contributions of money were needed, Andrew called to his aid George L. Stearns, the friend and counsellor of John Brown and one of the foremost men in Massachusetts to urge the arming of negroes. Between them it was arranged that the work of raising the men and the money should be entrusted to a committee of which Stearns was to be chairman. In Boston, Amos A. Lawrence, John M. Forbes, Dr. LeBaron Russell, Richard P. Hallowell, and William I. Bowditch began at once to raise money; members of the committee in New Bedford and Philadelphia labored to bring in recruits; from New York, Francis G. Shaw sent subscriptions amounting to twenty-five hundred dollars. The most intricate part of the work, the drawing of negroes from Canada and the West, Stearns took upon his own shoulders, and by the first of March he was on his way to Buffalo with an examining physician.

The Governor's share in this work was now to see that his operations should get the War Department into no trouble with the governors of those states from which he wished to enlist negroes. The delicacy of the situation, as well as its absurdity, lay in the fact that these other governors, though themselves refusing to enlist the negro, still claimed him, as soon as he manifested his intention to enlist elsewhere, as potentially a part of their quota. Technically speaking, Andrew sent no Massachusetts recruiting-officers outside the State; practically, Stearns' agents went everywhere through the Middle States and even penetrated beyond the Mississippi. If a

governor protested, Andrew at once offered to withdraw the Massachusetts agents on condition that the remonstrant begin to recruit negroes on his own account. None of these proceedings Stanton could authorize, and though for the time being he was willing to ignore them, it was never possible to tell when his temper might change. "We may be shut down upon by the Secretary of War at any moment," wrote Andrew to Stearns, on March 31.

When Stearns' work was once under way, it was marvellous to see how the negroes came flocking to him and how quickly popular prejudice vanished. Writing to Andrew on April 30, he showed in a striking way the change that had taken place in the two months since he began his labors:—

I came here to get one hundred men and shall take thousands.

When I came most of the people were opposed to this policy, now the most inveterate Democrat favors and aids it.

The Railroads did not think me of any importance at first; now if they will not accept my offer I send by other roads until they come down and it does not take long.

We in Massachusetts thought to raise a Regiment of Black men. The Government will arm One Hundred Thousand with the approbation of the entire North.

My first efforts were secret and confined to the Blacks. Now the officers of all the large cities approve and encourage the work, as do all the citizens, and war meetings open to all and held in the most

public halls are daily urging the Colored men to come forward, often with assurances of support to their families.

I am permitted by Gov. Gamble to take men from St. Louis ; a prominent lawyer there accepts my agency, and the Govt. official at Cairo offers to aid me if I will send my Agent there.

All this, it should be added, Stearns had accomplished at a season when recruiting for regiments of white men was almost at a standstill, and without the payment of bounties, or, except for such negroes as actually had families living in Massachusetts, the inducement of State Aid. Since the supply of recruits showed no signs of diminishing, and since early in May the ranks of the Fifty-Fourth were filled, Andrew decided to raise another negro regiment, and Norwood P. Hallowell was transferred from the Fifty-Fourth to be its colonel.

Besides the Governor's general oversight of the Fifty-Fourth, as it went through the last weeks of its preparation, there were several details which came under his immediate care. In order that the chaplain might be of the same race as the regiment, a point of manifest importance, Stanton, at his entreaty, made an exception to the rule that no commissions should be given to colored men. The necessity of obtaining "believing men" for line and staff of the regiment totally eliminated the vexatious task of selecting officers partly according to the number of men they had recruited, and produced a body of officers, — young men all, their average age being

only twenty-three, — of the very finest stamp. As Andrew expressed it, he had obtained officers not only “in whom the men put faith,” but “who would put faith in the men.” He further exerted himself to secure for the regiment official promises that it should have precisely the same status as white troops. This meant not only a guarantee of pay as soldiers instead of as laborers, but an assurance that the regiment would be protected by retaliatory orders of the United States Government against the Confederate threats to deal with the men in it as if they were participants in servile insurrection. A letter to a negro in Newport shows the pains Andrew took to declare his confidence in the Administration on both these points.

When I was in Washington, on one occasion, in an interview with Mr. Stanton, the Secretary of War, he stated, in the most emphatic manner that he would never consent that free colored men should be accepted into the service to serve as soldiers in the South, until he should be assured that the Government of the United States was prepared to guarantee and defend, to the last dollar, and the last man, [to] all these men, all the rights, privileges and immunities that are given, by the laws of civilized warfare, to other soldiers. Their present acceptance and muster-in, as soldiers, pledge the honor of the Nation in the same degree and to the same rights with all other troops. They will be soldiers of the Union — nothing less and nothing different. . . .¹

To get the written word of the Administration in the form of a retaliatory order was, however, another

¹ To George T. Downing, March 23, 1863.

matter, and, lacking it, Andrew even went so far, it was reported, as to hesitate about raising a second colored regiment, and to threaten not to send forward the Fifty-Fourth.¹ The event must have made him regret his forbearance, for with the Administration negro troops were still on trial, and it was not till after they had proved themselves in the terrible sacrifice at Wagner and the friends of the Fifty-Fourth had become bitter at the delay, that Lincoln issued his order of retaliation.²

By the middle of May, when the regiment was full and ready to start for the front, public interest in it was keener than ever. Thousands visited Readville, where the mere sight of its ranks was enough to convert all but the most incorrigible Hunkers. On the day when the regiment was to receive its colors, extra trains were run from Boston to carry the crowds of people, both white and black, who were eager to be spectators. It was one of the most memorable scenes of Andrew's governorship, — a scene in which every detail that struck the eye, every act that was done, was significant. The lines of dark-skinned soldiers, the handful of white officers, the young colonel, married three weeks before, the Governor and his uniformed staff, the group of gentle men and women whose faith and whose labor

¹ "Warrington" in the *Springfield Republican*, June 25, 1863.

² July 30, 1863. "The Government of the United States will give the same protection to all its soldiers ; and if the enemy shall sell or enslave any one because of his color, the offender shall be punished by retaliation upon the enemy's prisoners in our possession." — O. R., Series II. vol. vi. p. 163.

had brought this thing to pass, and the four banners, a national flag, a state flag, an emblematic flag of white, presented by a society of colored women, and a flag having a cross upon a blue field with the motto, *In hoc signo vinces*, this last being a memorial to young Lieutenant Putnam of the Twentieth, wrought by his mother and sister and their friends, — at whichever of these one looked, he saw in it a symbol of the need and the glory of this cruel war. In the face of these things to be seen, the words spoken mattered little. The modest young colonel thought that the Governor made a “beautiful speech,” and that his own reply was “small potatoes,” and certainly no other man had Andrew’s gift to express with such direct appeal to his auditors’ sympathy the emotion which the sight stirred in him. Still, as with all his speeches of this sort, the spell lay in the ring of his voice, the warmth and earnestness of his manner, the frank abandonment of himself to the mood of the moment, — qualities which the printed page cannot preserve. One sentence expresses the feeling which dominated him, as it dominated the regiment he addressed and the encircling spectators. “I know not, Mr. Commander, when, in all human history, to any given thousand men in arms there has been committed a work at once so proud, so precious, so full of hope and glory as the work committed to you.”¹

Instead of going to North Carolina according to the original plan, the Fifty-Fourth was to become a

¹ *A Brave Black Regiment*, Luis F. Emilio, p. 27.

part of Hunter's command in South Carolina, where it would have better chances for seeing active service. The plan of its colonel that it should march down Broadway, — as somebody said, "All America looks on at a Broadway procession," — had to be abandoned, as offering too great a temptation to the rowdies of New York, and the regiment was to sail from Boston direct. The day of its march through Boston was in effect a repetition of the scene at Readville. Forming at the station at about nine o'clock on the morning of May 28, the regiment took a roundabout route to the State House, where it was joined by the Governor and his staff, members of the city government, and the committee of arrangements. Thence it marched down Beacon Street, and entered the parade-ground on the Common. There were gathered to witness the review, besides people of anti-slavery fame, such as Garrison, Edmund Quincy, and Frederick Douglass, whose son was sergeant-major of the regiment, men of political and military importance, and members of the committee on colored troops. The Common was crowded as on the Fourth of July. After the review, the line of march was formed for Battery Wharf. "Entering State Street, the band played the stirring music of John Brown's hymn, while passing over ground moistened by the blood of Crispus Attucks, and over which Anthony Burns and Thomas Sims had been carried back to bondage."¹ Everywhere along the line of march crowds had filled the

¹ *A Brave Black Regiment*, p. 32.

streets, and the general welcome to the regiment was hearty. If its officers were conscious of contemptuous glances from club windows on Beacon Street, the cheers which they received from the business men packed on the steps of the Exchange were a compensation more than sufficient. By the end of the afternoon the embarkation was completed, and the Fifty-Fourth started on its way to Port Royal, — and all that was beyond.¹

“I stand or fall, as a man and a magistrate, with the rise or fall in history of the Fifty-Fourth Massachusetts Regiment.” These words of Andrew, spoken at Readville, are the measure of his faith in the manhood of the negro. After he had labored for a quarter of a century, he was now able, thanks to the blue uniform, to compel acknowledgment of this manhood. The power by which he had achieved his triumph, over and above a governor’s opportunity to command money and men, was his supreme faith in the principle of liberty as the corner-stone of the American nation, and his human love for the negro as, in the words of the parable, his “neighbor.” By reason of this faith and this love devoted to the cause of a despised race, the two thousand negroes enlisted in Massachusetts in 1863 count in history for more

¹ By asking the editor of the *Boston Journal* to give a full account of the march of the Fifty-Fourth through Boston and by himself subscribing for a hundred copies to be sent to the President, the heads of departments at Washington, and the principal generals of the army, Andrew did what he could with “printed proof” to convince those who “cannot see it with their own eyes” of “the possibility of making the colored people useful as military instruments.”

than the thirty-six thousand armed elsewhere in that year. By this remnant was the tide of popular feeling turned ; by it was the bravery of the race proved in the sacrifice, otherwise valueless, at Fort Wagner ; by it was secured the rightful status of the negro soldier as entitled to promotion from the ranks, to full pay, and to full protection. To demonstrate to the negro that he was a man, and that he had a country, — these were the first acts of the wise statesmanship which adjusts opportunity to necessity ; after that must come the prosaic and difficult task of teaching him that he must also be a wage-earner.

The rapidity with which the work of organizing negro regiments spread is the best testimony to Andrew's far-sightedness. Early in April Adjutant-General Thomas was sent by the War Department on a trip to the Ohio and Mississippi valleys with authority to start the movement in connection with the armies of those regions. He did his business with despatch if not with thoroughness, moving rapidly from point to point ; by the end of the year he could report twenty thousand negroes under arms as the result of his initiative. In Louisiana and South Carolina, Ullmann and Hunter were diligent ; and to organize a negro brigade in North Carolina Andrew was able to secure the appointment of Edward A. Wild, the colonel of a Massachusetts regiment. In the North, Ohio and Rhode Island followed Massachusetts in raising a regiment each. So swiftly did events move that on May 22 the War Department

issued an order announcing the formation of a new bureau for the organization of colored troops. Thereupon Stearns gave up his work at Buffalo for Massachusetts, accepted under the new bureau a position as Recruiting Commissioner for United States Colored Troops, and made Philadelphia his headquarters. Thus, when the recruitment for the Fifty-Fifth was completed and the regiment left the State on July 21, Massachusetts could lay down the burden, knowing that there were officials properly designated at Washington to carry it for the nation.

In spite of this prompt withdrawal of Massachusetts, the prestige which had accrued to the Commonwealth was something of which she presently found herself unable to forego the advantage. In the fall of 1863, after the draft had brought in its scanty numbers and the deficit in the Massachusetts quota was a nightmare burden, when every man enlisted cost the State \$325 in bounty, besides his possible claim for State Aid for his family, — at this time Massachusetts sought to avail herself of the colored man as an asset. With much difficulty Forbes, who, on behalf of the Massachusetts committee had the matter in charge, wrung from Stanton the necessary order, and the assurance, equally necessary, that it should not be revoked. The new regiment was to be of cavalry, and a large number of the negroes for it were to be smuggled from Canada, with due regard to "Queen's neutrality." When this source of supply proved unexpectedly meagre, there was nothing for Massachusetts to do but to attempt to

draw recruits from Virginia and the District of Columbia, those being the only places where the United States had not its own agents at work. Even there it was necessary to resort to the methods of the underground railroad, for Stanton had given orders that every negro in the District of Columbia should be either pressed into service as a workman in the commissary or the quartermaster's department, or else enlisted to help fill the quota of the District itself. Thus when a Massachusetts agent tried to carry a handful of negroes into Maryland "to chop wood," half of them were stopped and sent back.

To remedy if possible this vexatious situation, the Governor appealed to the President. Adopting a tone of indignant surprise at the slight put upon his Commonwealth, he inquired "by what color of pretended authority people not charged with crime, and not being engaged in the military service, and being in the peace of the law, are thus subjected to hardship and wrong." "Suppose," he went on, "the passage of Germans or Irishmen seeking to buy land and make their homes in the great land states of the West was denied, and they were compelled to remain in New England, or New York, how long would such an embargo on population be endured by Illinois, and her neighboring states? A universal outcry would be heard, in which every man would unite who had an acre of land to sell." Andrew then proceeded with increasing gravity to remind Lincoln of the industrial contribution which Massachusetts was mak-

ing to the war, and the need of more workmen in her shops and fields ; “yet,” he concluded, “in the capital of the Nation federal officers forbid Southern refugees to come to Massachusetts, where there are work and wages for all.” This letter, the lofty tone of which was intended to deceive no one, was carried to the White House by one of the Massachusetts recruiting-agents. He explained to Lincoln that in Virginia were hundreds of negroes anxious to go to Massachusetts to enlist. “President Lincoln,” so the agent has told the story, “. . . only asked that Governor Pierrepont of Virginia, who then had the headquarters of his peripatetic Government at Alexandria, should write him a letter, stating that there were numbers of refugees in his bailiwick who desired to go North, and he would give his consent. The letter was obtained, Mr. Lincoln perused it, carefully folded it, as for filing, and wrote upon the back : ‘I understand from the within that there are a hundred colored men in Alexandria who desire to go to Massachusetts and enlist in the United States service. *Let them go !* A. Lincoln.’ The President never detailed anybody to count them.”¹

After this “letting down of the bars,” as Andrew

¹ Article in the *Boston Herald*, March 5, 1878. In the collected speeches and letters of Lincoln (vol. ii. p. 484) is printed the draft of a letter prepared by way of reply to Andrew. Lincoln’s impulse to say in plain words that what the Governor of Massachusetts wanted was soldiers, not immigrants, there expressed itself somewhat sharply ; but since his assumptions as to the demands of Governor Pierrepont proved groundless, for no quota was required of the “bailiwick” of Virginia, the letter was not sent.

expressed it, recruiting for the negro cavalry went on steadily, and early in May, 1864, the regiment was sent to the front. The same care had been spent upon it as upon the two infantry regiments. Its colonel was Henry S. Russell, a cousin of Robert Gould Shaw ; its lieutenant-colonel, Charles Francis Adams, Jr. After its departure, no more recruiting of colored men was done on Massachusetts soil.

To complete the tale of Andrew's labors in behalf of the negro there is now needed only the story of his long fight to secure for the colored regiments their full pay as soldiers of the volunteer army. It was a contest in which he had arrayed against him, in various degrees of opposition, Stanton, President Lincoln, and Congress, though of course his main antagonist was the Secretary of War. Looked at from the administrative point of view, it revealed both the executive and the legislative departments of the federal government as equally anxious to wash their hands of a matter that might be troublesome politically ; looked at from the humanitarian point of view, it might well have led one to doubt whether the negro had any friends whatever in the national capital, — whether he were not regarded as a mere stick to beat the South with. The pity of the whole matter was that when Andrew emerged from the struggle, triumphant but sore, at the beginning of the presidential campaign of 1864, he was ready to believe that the salvation of the country must be through another leader than Lincoln.

Of all the great men of the Civil War there was perhaps none whose character is more difficult to apprehend justly than Stanton; there certainly was none with whom men found it more difficult to deal. In Andrew's experience, Stanton's decisions — prompt, not to say precipitate — were so often reversed, in many cases through what seemed mere caprice, as to make it impossible to execute intelligently any one line of policy. The extent to which Lincoln interposed his tact and patience between Stanton and generals of the army, thereby preventing injustice and insuring some sort of continuity, is a commonplace of history. To perform a similar service for governors of states there was no one; upon those unlucky officials and their subordinates, between whom and the Secretary of War, it must always be kept in mind, the relation was one not regularly provided for by law but a thing of pure emergency, his eccentricities of judgment and temper fell heavily. Thus, since on Stanton's daily decisions depended the direction and extent of the work at the State House, and since there was nearly always a chance that he could be brought to overrule a former decision by one more favorable to Massachusetts, the state officials kept him in a constant state of siege. In this matter Andrew, by virtue of being honest, outspoken, and good-natured, had conspicuous success. "Now, my dear Secretary," he wrote at the end of one appeal, "you know I am always right — when I am earnest and resistant." At another time he thus consoled Harrison Ritchie,

who was smarting under brusque treatment from Stanton : —

. . . Neither does the impatient and inapt remark quoted in your letter from the lips of the Secretary of War disturb me. If I was present myself in Washington I should assume something of the sort to happen on each alternate interview — simply illustrating a tired, jaded and somewhat uneasy temper, and always sure to be ultimately compensated by “good things to come.” We always come out ahead when we are right, then we get along better with the War Department in all important things than other people do, usually.

In spite of all vicissitudes, such was the mutual regard between Andrew and Stanton that in the first year of the Secretary’s service in the War Department no difficulty occurred which was not successfully adjusted.

When, however, the negotiations about negro troops began in 1863, there came a change. Stanton protested his belief in the new policy, but for all his protests he would grant almost no request to Massachusetts made in the interests of the negro, until he was fairly pushed to the wall. Then, complaining of the “exaction,” he hedged about his permission with every possible limitation and condition. A typical experience of this sort the state officials went through in connection with Wild’s appointment to organize the negro brigade in North Carolina. Albert Browne, making a trip to Washington, had secured Stanton’s consent to Andrew’s

plan, — a renewal of the scheme which they had discussed in January, — and nothing remained but the preparation of the necessary order. Then Stanton was summoned to Ohio to attend a funeral in his family. On his return some days later, exhausted by the strain on his personal feelings and harassed by distressing news from the armies, he took back all that he had granted, and Browne had to fight the battle over again, with much less success than at first and to the great damage of his own and Stanton's temper. He returned to Boston "sick, tired, disgusted," and the lost ground had to be won back bit by bit through repeated requests for special orders. In this incident, although the combination of irritating and distracting circumstances was extraordinary, and although allowance must be made for the disturbing effect which Browne's personality sometimes had on Stanton as well as on other men, still at bottom the difficulty concerned the arming of negroes as a matter of broad and permanent policy. Perhaps, indeed, it was too much to expect of any but a "believer"¹ that he should consider the arming of the negro more than a left-handed and tentative affair. Stanton, as a Democrat, had all the prejudices of his party against the "friends of the negro." He was willing to take whatever the black man would give to the Union; he was not willing to render in return more than

¹ In recommending Wild to Stanton Andrew wrote: "But it needs a man always for the soul of any movement — even to trundle a wheelbarrow."

the least that would suffice. With a man wielding power so capriciously, and looking upon the negro as a convenience rather than as a "cause," it was inevitable that Andrew, now become the champion of the black soldier, should come into collision.

Upon the organization of the bureau for the recruiting of United States Colored Troops, Stanton referred to the solicitor of the War Department, William Whiting,¹ for a decision as to what pay should be given to "persons of African descent" for military service. This official, well known in Boston as a patent lawyer, was a Republican of a decidedly moderate stripe. After examining the law of 1862, under which the President was first given specific authority to employ negroes in the military service of the United States, he gave his opinion that the negro must be paid not as a soldier, but as a laborer. This decision was made public by an order of the War Department, dated June 4, 1863. "Persons of African descent who enlist under the act approved July 17, 1862, . . . are entitled to ten dollars per month and one ration; three dollars of

¹ Andrew, who knew Whiting well, had characterized him in a letter to Harrison Ritchie written a few weeks before the question of pay was first raised. Whiting, he said, "is very positive and self-asserting, — which it is his wont to be on all subjects, — but, that is very easy in the way of criticism. I think Carlyle was right in calling the Devil, '*The everlasting NO!*' Mr. Whiting has great keenness and clearness and subtilty of intellect, . . . but he is always maintaining his brief. Polite and even deferential, to others, he is always thinking of two things at the same time. One he tells you and the other he don't tell. . . . He is a master of the *Ars celare artem*."

which monthly pay may be in clothing.”¹ In explaining this order to Governor Tod of Ohio, who, having undertaken to follow Andrew’s example, was anxious to secure the same privileges for his regiment, Stanton wrote that the solicitor of the department, after a careful examination “of the acts of Congress,” had come to the conclusion that the negro soldier was entitled to no bounty and to nothing above laborer’s wages. “For additional pay or bounty colored troops must trust to state contributions and the justice of Congress at the next session. Upon this basis,” he added, in language which at best can only be called ambiguous, “the organizations have been made elsewhere.”²

When the news of Stanton’s order reached the Fifty-Fourth in South Carolina, it was received with incredulity and dismay. Shaw, in the last letters that he wrote to the Governor, on July 2 and 3, gave it as his opinion that the men “should be mustered out of the service, or receive the full pay which was promised them.” Andrew reassured him at once, in a letter which the colonel probably never received, bidding him tell the men that there was a mistake, and that “the Secretary of War will cause right to be done so soon as the case is presented to him and shall be fully understood.”

It was September before Andrew could find time for a journey to Washington to see to it in person that the promise made to Shaw was fulfilled. He

¹ O. R., Series III. vol. iii. p. 252.

² O. R., Series III. vol. iii. p. 420.

talked with Lincoln, Stanton, Chase, Seward, and others; they all admitted that in view of the order of the War Department of January, 1863, under which the Fifty-Fourth and the Fifty-Fifth had been raised, the case for the two Massachusetts regiments was perfectly clear. Nevertheless, Andrew was willing to waive their special rights for the sake of having the question settled with regard to the United States Colored Troops who had no advantage of explicit promise. To this end he suggested to Lincoln to require a general opinion from the Attorney-General, and to Stanton to ask for legislation from Congress. Either course would mean delay, but that Andrew felt was a lesser evil than that speedy justice to a few should stand in the way of later justice to all. Since he met with no opposition, and since, owing to the confusion produced in Washington by the disastrous news from Chickamauga, he was able at the moment to carry things no further, he returned to Boston feeling that he had made a sound beginning.

In the mean time, in order to relieve the men of the Fifty-Fourth and the Fifty-Fifth of the want which this delay would cause, for they had refused the pay offered them by the United States, the Governor made an effort to have the State step into the breach. It had become necessary, early in November, to summon the Legislature to an extra session. The opportunity thus offered Andrew took advantage of to recommend that, pending action by the federal government, Massachusetts should make good

the loss of pay which her negro regiments suffered, — a matter of six dollars a month for each enlisted man. He presented briefly and in legal language the argument on which he based the claim that all colored troops were entitled to the pay of volunteers. A statement of his line of reasoning less technical than that in his address, and better as to form, appears in the letter which he wrote three months later to Mr. George W. Smalley, who was then on the staff of the New York *Tribune*, and who had written to him for information.

I am sure, that the colored men have always been eligible to be accepted as *soldiers* of the Volunteer Army, if the President would accept them. I was sure that if there could have been any doubt about this, then the 11th Section of the 195th Chapter of the "Acts of 1862"¹ settled it conclusively in the affirmative. I was sure that the acceptance and muster in to military service, as a soldier, constituted the recruit nothing less, as well as nothing more, than a soldier; and that, whether organized under the auspices of the State Government, as State volunteers, or under the War Department, as U. S. colored volunteers, or in the army of the U. S. as regulars, or in the Navy as Marines, the laws which provide the payment and fix the terms of payment

¹ Chapter 195. An Act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels, and for other purposes.

Sec. 11. *And be it further enacted*, That the President of the United States is authorized to employ as many persons of African descent as he may deem necessary and proper for the suppression of this rebellion, and for this purpose he may organize and use them in such manner as he may judge best for the public welfare.

of our soldiers do of necessity apply to and cover the claims of all colored as well as all white men, — because those laws make no distinctions of color, and ignore all distinctions save those of rank, grade and arm of service.

If I am wrong then it follows that by the mere fact of African descent, a man is forbidden to be paid for any service, rendered under any form of employment or contract, in connection with the Army or Navy beyond \$10 per month, clothing inclusive, and a daily ration. Therefore the Navy is daily breaking the law; because the Navy pays its colored men precisely as it pays white men of the same grade. So too the Ordnance, and Quartermaster's Departments of the Army break the law, for they sometimes pay colored men even a dollar a day for labor.

The sections of the Act,¹ under which it is pretended colored soldiers are entitled to \$10. only, were interjected into the 9 mos. Militia Statute of

¹ Chapter 201. An Act to amend the act calling forth the militia . . . and for other purposes, approved February 28, 1862.

Sec. 12. *And be it further enacted*, That the President be and he is hereby, authorized to receive into the service of the United States, for the purpose of constructing entrenchments, or performing camp service, or any other labor, or any military or naval service for which they may be found competent, persons of African descent, and such persons shall be enrolled and organized under such regulations, not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws, as the President may prescribe.

Sec. 15. *And be it further enacted*, That all persons who have been or shall be hereafter enrolled in the service of the United States under this act shall receive the pay and rations now allowed by law to soldiers, according to their respective grades: *Provided*, That persons of African descent, who under this law shall be employed, shall receive ten dollars per month and one ration, three dollars of which monthly pay may be in clothing.

1862, apparently for the purpose of authorizing the President to cause the colored people coming within our lines, as those lines are extended by the progress of the Armies, to be employed, rationed, clothed and paid by lump, withdrawn from the enemy and made useful to ourselves. But, after sweeping into our net ten thousand "contrabands" of all qualities, ages and both sexes, suppose eight hundred are found fit for military service, are inspected, accepted, sworn and mustered into the Army, as a regiment of soldiers, then they cease to constitute a part of that floating mass of men and women, for which the necessities of war required such special provision, and they become and are henceforth *soldiers* of the U. S., exposed to all the hardships and perils, and subject to all the liabilities, and under all the limitations of Military Service, bound to possess and exhibit all the proper qualities of manhood, even at the peril of suffering the extreme penalty of death for cowardice before the enemy, — and therefore entitled to all the compensations, immunities and rewards of soldiers.

But whatever might be [the] result of the investigation so far as it affects other troops, *there is not a shadow of possible doubt* touching those two regiments of Massachusetts. . . .

See Secretary Stanton's order.

See their enlistment contract.

See the form of their muster roll.

See the form of their officers' commissions.

The Legislature agreed at once to the Governor's proposal, and Andrew appointed two special agents to visit the Fifty-Fourth and the Fifty-Fifth and to make arrangements to pay them. The Fifty-Fourth

had already three times been mustered for pay at the rate of ten dollars a month, less three dollars for clothing, and each time had refused. Now, when the offer of Massachusetts was made, they refused again. The spirit in which the regiments took their stand appears in a letter written from the camp of the Fifty-Fourth.

Imagine our surprise and disappointment on the receipt by the last mail of the Governor's address to the General Court, to find him making a proposition to them to pay this regiment the difference between what the United States Government offers us and what they are legally bound to pay us, which, in effect, advertises us to the world as holding out for *money* and not from *principle*, — that we sink our manhood in consideration of a few more dollars. How has this come about? What false friend has been misrepresenting us to the Governor, to make him think that our necessities outweigh our self-respect? I am sure no representation of *ours* ever impelled him to that action.¹

Although Andrew was at first considerably put out by the complete overthrow of his plan, he made the most of the uncompromising spirit shown by the men for whose character he had always claimed so much. Now more than ever he felt bound to obtain for them as soon as possible their money with their rights.

As the months went by, another spur to Andrew to act on his own account was the disposition of

¹ Quoted by Theodore Tilton in a communication to the *Boston Journal* dated December 12, 1863. See also *A Brave Black Regiment*, p. 137.

Congress, as shown in the debates on the bill "for equalizing the pay of soldiers," as it was called, to favor some halfway measure. In order not to reflect upon the justice of the decision of the War Department, it was proposed that the negroes should be given soldiers' pay only from the beginning of the current year. Furthermore, members sensitive to conservative criticism objected to retrospective action in the bill, and higgled over every provision that could hurt the tender feelings of loyal slave-owners or Union Democrats. "If the Governor of Massachusetts has made a promise unauthorized by law," declared Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, "let Massachusetts redeem it." Senator Lane of Indiana thought back pay unnecessary for negroes, "for no man in his sober sense will say that their services are worth as much [as those of white men], or that they are as good soldiers." Since it was probable that the result would be not a straightforward deed of justice, granting the negro soldier full pay from the time of enlistment, and since under these circumstances the clear rights of the Fifty-Fourth and the Fifty-Fifth were in jeopardy, Andrew resolved to divorce their case from that of the United States Colored Troops and to obtain for it a decision in a different jurisdiction, on its own undoubted merits. To turn to Stanton was useless, for he had taken his stand upon Whiting's opinion and was annoyed by Andrew's appeal to the state Legislature. The only course for the Governor, therefore, was to go over Stanton's head to the President. A request in

that quarter, which would certainly increase Stanton's ill-will, might also fail utterly, for Lincoln's practice was to yield to the Secretary whenever it was possible, reserving the exercise of his ultimate authority for critical cases. Nevertheless Andrew felt that he could do no less and still fulfil his duty. To make the claim of the Massachusetts regiments doubly strong, he chose as a test case that of the chaplain of the Fifty-Fourth, Samuel Harrison, whose application for pay at the usual rate of \$100 a month and two rations had been refused by the paymaster "under Act of Congress passed July 17, 1862, employing persons of African descent in the military service of the United States." Harrison's position as chaplain made it absurd to suppose that he either was employed or was to be paid under the provisions of the act in question, and offered Andrew the opportunity for making, in addition to a recapitulation of all his main arguments, an eloquent protest against the government's drawing a line of color where none had ever been drawn by the Christian church. This appeal to the President the Governor sent on March 24 to Sumner, charging him to carry it to the White House and himself read it to Lincoln, so that if it failed its failure should be not by miscarriage but "by the positive order of refusal of the President." "I mean," he added, "to use this case of the Chaplain for the entering wedge. I propose to follow up the rights of these people with diligence though with prudence."

In adopting this aggressive course and seeking to

make Lincoln declare himself, Andrew had entered upon the most exasperating stage of his contest. For good and sufficient reasons Lincoln was determined not to put himself on record. Since the whole matter of the pay of colored troops was before Congress, he did not choose by independent action to point the way for legislation to follow ; it was not a case in which he cared to overrule Stanton's decision ; and, finally, with the presidential campaign at hand, he was unwilling either to offend the conservative element in his own party or to put a new weapon of attack into the hands of the opposition.¹ Accordingly, in spite of the fact that on April 23 Attorney-General Bates, to whom Lincoln had referred Andrew's letter, gave a straightforward legal opinion which fully supported Andrew's contention in its broadest application, and which ended with the statement that "your constitutional obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed makes it your duty to direct the Secretary of War to inform the officers of the Pay Department of the Army

¹ Andrew's appreciation of this element in the situation appears in the story with which he pointed his remarks to Mr. Smalley in the letter already quoted : —

"When Judge Woodbury of the U. S. Sup. Court, gave an opinion in a case involving large questions of Constitutional law, a few days after the death of Senator Wright, of New York, and just before the National Democratic Convention which nominated Pierce for the Presidency, — in which Convention Judge Woodbury thought he had a prize ticket, — some one asked Mr. Choate, what were the grounds and reasons of the decision. His quick reply was, 'Oh ! principally the death of Silas Wright.' . . . If you see no point of application in the story I don't, — but if you do see it, so do I."

that such is your view of the law," — in spite of this strong prompting to action, Lincoln did nothing.¹

After waiting a reasonable time for the President's reply, Andrew made a second appeal. Indeed, the state of things in the Fifty-Fourth and the Fifty-Fifth left him no choice. From their officers came entreaties for some assurance to help keep their men in check, for, deceived again and again by false reports of action on the part of Congress, and constantly besieged by letters from the North which either asked for money or told of homes broken up and families gone to the almshouse (when even that refuge was not denied them), the soldiers were getting to the verge of mutiny. In fact, a part of the Fifty-Fifth one morning stacked arms, "in a sullen, desperate mood that expressed a wish to be marched out to be shot down rather than longer hear the cries from home and longer endure the galling sense of humiliation and wrong."²

¹ "Whilst it is true," declared the Attorney-General, "that the words of the twelfth section are broad enough to embrace all persons of African descent who may be received into the military or naval service of the United States, it is yet quite evident from the terms of the whole section, as well as from the promise of freedom held out to such persons who were slaves, in the thirteenth section, that in limiting their pay to \$10 a month and one ration, Congress had in view the class who were fitted only for the humbler kinds of service referred to, and not persons who, under the authority of other laws, might be appointed to positions requiring higher qualifications and entitled to a higher rate of pay." — O. R., Series III. vol. iv. pp. 273, 274.

² *The Negro as Soldier in the War of the Rebellion*, N. P. Hallowell, p. 17.

These regiments, sir [wrote Andrew to the President, after reciting their sufferings and their honorable conduct, and "demanding" their immediate payment], and others situated like these, stung by grief and almost crazed by pangs with which every brave and true man on earth must sympathize, are trembling on the verge of military demoralization.

Already one man of a South Carolina regiment raised under the orders of Major General Hunter with the same interpretation of the laws of Congress now given by the Attorney General of the United States, has suffered the penalty of death for the military offence of mutiny by refusing further obedience to his officers and declaring that by its own breach of faith the Government of the United States had released him from his contract of enlistment as a soldier. The Government which found no law to *pay* him except as a *nondescript* or a *contraband*, nevertheless found law enough to *shoot* him as a *soldier*.

In behalf of the sufferings of the poor and needy, of the rights of brave men in arms for their country, of the statutes of Congress, and of the honor of the Nation, I pray your Excellency to interpose the rightful power of the Chief Executive Magistrate of the United States, who is bound by his oath "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed;" and by its immediate exercise to right these wrongs.¹

This letter also Andrew sent to Sumner, with the request that he read it to the President and "telegraph result." Sumner replied that the President would "act promptly," but nothing was done. A day or two later Andrew forwarded to Sumner a letter which he had received from N. P. Hallowell in

¹ Andrew to Lincoln, May 13, 1864.

Boston, containing the latest news of the condition of the regiments. After a week he wrote again to Lincoln, this time quoting an opinion of William Wirt, Attorney-General in 1823, which bore on the case. Finally he asked George S. Hale of Boston, who was going to Washington, to make a personal appeal to the President. Though Andrew had lost all hope of stirring Lincoln to action, he was resolved, partly because he wished to put the blame where it belonged, partly because his fighting blood was up, to give him no peace.¹

Hale's report of the situation at Washington justified Andrew's fears. The Republican Convention was to meet at Baltimore within the week and this fact caused everything to be looked at through political spectacles. Sumner was so convinced of the futility of Hale's mission that he declined to take him to the White House, and Hale, writing to Andrew for

¹ In a letter which Andrew wrote to Thaddeus Stevens in the darkest hour of this contest, after reciting again all his legal arguments and imploring some action from Congress, he ended with the passionate words : "For one, I will never give up my demand for right and justice to these soldiers. I will pursue it before every tribunal. I will present it in every forum where any power resides to assert their rights and avenge their wrongs. I will neither forget nor forgive, nor intermit my effort, though I should stand unsupported and alone; nor though years should pass before the controversy is ended. And if I should leave this world with this work undone, and there should be any hearing for such as I elsewhere in the Universe, I will carry the appeal before the tribunal of Infinite Justice." At another time he wrote to Mr. Smalley : "The President and the Department of War have in the matter of colored troops and colored people exhibited an ingenuity of fatal, foolish and criminal stupidity. It is even more discouraging to suppose they *mean* right than to declare them wilfully wrong."

instructions, expressed his belief that Lincoln, expecting speedy action from Congress, would almost certainly be "more firm than the gospel judge in resisting our 'continual coming.'" When the Governor bade him nevertheless make his appeal to the President, he complied, but the result was what had been expected. Hale's letter to Andrew describing the interview gives as much as is known directly of the way in which Lincoln defended himself on this score, though in view of the Attorney-General's decision, his scruples as to "Constitutional powers" seem hardly an adequate explanation of his course.

. . . He intimated [wrote Hale to Andrew] that he had been pressed with much urgency by your Excellency upon the subject, but before the interview closed, spoke in high and laudatory terms of you. He said his wishes and feelings were in favor of paying the Colored troops, but that he did not act, as had sometimes been charged against him, upon grounds of moral right without regard to his Constitutional powers. . . . He spoke at much length, and with some warmth, and I have not attempted to give all that he said or that passed between us, but mainly to state his position. I perceived that he was decided and that there was no probability of varying his action at present. I suggested that the proposed Legislation might fail and asked what he would then do. He replied he should then have to take it up anew.

Even before Hale's report reached the State House, Andrew had received from Sumner a statement of the course upon which Congress had agreed, — a course timid and almost farcical. It granted to

all negro soldiers full pay from the first of January, 1864, but its duty to the Massachusetts regiments it dodged as effectually as Lincoln had dodged his. Instead of carrying the matter through to a satisfactory conclusion, it merely gave it a final impetus, — something between a kick and a shove, — putting the ultimate responsibility on the negro himself, who might attain his back pay at the price, if need be, of a lie. After three conferences on the part of the committee of House and Senate, a compromise had been agreed to by which it was provided that "All persons of color who were free on the nineteenth day of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, and who have been enlisted and mustered into the military service of the United States, shall, from the time of their enlistment, be entitled to receive the pay, bounty, and clothing allowed to such persons by the laws existing at the time of their enlistment. And the Attorney-General of the United States is hereby authorized to determine any question of law arising under this provision." Sumner denounced this arrangement as a "conclusion in which nothing is concluded." "The first sentence," he wrote to Andrew, "is nothing more than an 'identical proposition.' Of course all enlisted men are entitled to such 'pay, etc., allowed to such persons by the laws existing at the time of enlistment.'"¹ Stultifying as was this abnegation of its powers on the part of Congress, Sumner added, it was nevertheless the only way in which the vexed question could now be settled, and so,

¹ Sumner to Andrew, May 29, 1864.

taking comfort from the fact that the Attorney-General had already put himself on record in favor of giving full pay to the colored soldiers, he had yielded his assent. On June 15 the bill became law.

The other parties to the dispute — the Attorney-General, Stanton, and Andrew — were, for one reason or another, as much disgusted as Sumner at its inconclusive settlement. The Attorney-General, in particular, had good reason to be put out. Sumner, writing to Andrew, said that he found Bates “disposed to quiz the section which he is to interpret; but,” added Sumner, “he does not doubt that colored soldiers under our statutes are entitled to the same pay as white soldiers.” Sumner’s letter went on in the dialogue style of the *Congressional Globe*: —

“How could any different idea prevail?” he said. “The opinion of Mr. Whiting has caused a different opinion,” said I.

Atty. Genl. “Who is Mr. Whiting?”

C. S. “Solicitor of the War Department.”

Atty. Genl. “Oh yes! there is such an officer.”

C. S. “He has given an opinion on this question.”

Atty. Genl. “Has he? I was not aware of it.”

For a lawyer in this state of mind it was easy to maintain that the act of Congress in making him a judicial tribunal was unconstitutional, and thus the upshot was that the President asked the Attorney-General to give an opinion as he would have done if the law had not been passed, — that is, to do again precisely what he had done two months before!

The personal equation, which had appeared in Sumner's narrative of his interview with Bates, played a much larger part when he described his dealings with Stanton. The Attorney-General, in spite of legal quibbles, Sumner had found "amiable." "I wish I could say," he added, "that the Secy. of War was amiable. He was not. I thought his conduct on the occasion very reprehensible. This long controversy has embittered him towards our State and those who have persistently pressed the claim of the colored troops." The irritation which Sumner described undoubtedly existed, and in a man of Stanton's make-up never failed to be instantly excited and to show at its worst under the stimulus of the somewhat arrogant presence of the Senator from Massachusetts. Sumner's letter, together with two similar reports from Andrew's aides in Washington, capped the climax of a long succession of stories which the persons concerned always took care should reach the Governor's ears. The thing had degenerated into mere tale-bearing, and Andrew determined that it should stop. No matter how much to blame he thought Stanton, he would not now either himself make a personal quarrel with the Secretary or allow others to make one for him. His selection of Sumner as peacemaker between them may not have been wholly felicitous, but it was the best thing that he could do short of a face to face interview.

. . . I beg you [he wrote to Sumner] to avail yourself of some early and proper occasion to ex-

press to Mr. Stanton my great surprise at hearing as I do from various sources that he is displeased and incensed at me and all those who press this claim. I am surprised the more, because when I received his order to raise these troops Mr. Stanton's opinions and mine agreed about the law — so much so that not even a doubt was suggested by him. . . .

Again, Mr. Stanton has never to me proposed any change of opinion. He has just stood upon the opinion of Mr. Whiting. In conversation, he has not undertaken to defend that opinion. But he has not undertaken or professed to undertake to examine the question independently and for himself. . . .

Now does Mr. Stanton think that I ought to consent that an injustice so manifest to my own mind should remain unchallenged forever? Does he think I ought to *consent*, that the legal right of these soldiers should not even be inquired into? Is it the duty of the President and his Cabinet to follow forever the snap judgments of some subordinate officer? And is it the duty of others having rights affected thereby, and is it the duty of those who are the guardians of those rights never to challenge their investigation, nor to assert them?

Again, I know and have long known, from my personal conversation with Mr. Whiting, that he gave the opinion on which the Government has thus far acted, without knowledge of the real state of the case. He made a mistake. Perhaps it was a natural one. The best judges sometimes make them. Is the Solicitor of the War Department superior to all the judges even, — that his opinions are never subject to revision? And, if they *are* revised, *why* should Mr. Stanton be moved about it? Why, when I last talked with him he still professed to desire

that the colored soldiers' pay should be equal with the white man's. He preferred only that Congress should act upon it, rather than to assume to do anything about it himself; remarking at last, "*It is only a question of a little time.*"

Now, is Mr. Stanton really against paying these troops, while he has professed otherwise? I cannot think so. But if not, *What has he to be offended with?* The last word which ever passed between him and myself on the subject, was this, viz: — In reply to my remark that I was bound to follow up the rights of these men by a peculiar obligation, having *promised* them the pay of soldiers when they were enlisted. He replied, "*I hope you will fulfil your promise.*" Does he now hope that I will not do so? I have done nothing in a mere spirit of controversy, I have been impelled by [a] duty I could not put aside, though like Jonah I would have avoided going to Nineveh, if I could have avoided it, even at the hazard of being swallowed by the same monster which held the prophet in his belly. But I could not do less than I have done to remain alive.

I should be very glad to have every word of this letter read to Mr. Stanton, if you should think it best to do so. I have always been his friend, and I am ever free to say that I have never proposed anything to be done to Massachusetts which was not for the best. He has never yet overruled any one of my proposals without making a mistake manifest afterwards. He has sometimes overruled them but only to entertain similar ones afterwards when time had already told too much against us for success. And he has overruled propositions when made by me but has still entertained them subsequently when

made by others. He has done so when those others, not mindful as I am of the good of the great public, the rights and interests of all, have not observed the limitations which governed me so that by adopting their methods and acceding to their wishes he has permitted error and injustice, which I would have prevented. Now *I* say to *you*, what I dare to say to anyone to whom it might be proper to declare anything so personal, but what self-respect forbids me to say aloud and to strangers, that from the beginning, without fear, favor or affection, with as little bias as belongs to a mortal, I have constantly struggled to secure the best ends, and to use the best means. I grind no man's axes, I have none of my own to grind. I ask for nothing but for the public good. And it is a pity that Mr. Stanton should, as I know he sometimes does, fall into the hands of men seeking private ends or personal objects when he need not, and he ought not. And while, as one of the sworn servants of the public, I will ask for nothing which is not right, I will neither willingly submit to anything wrong. I will have no controversy until compelled, never, unless I am in the right and then I will not surrender.¹

But Sumner had no wish to beard the lion in his den. "I doubt if it will be advisable to approach Mr. Stanton on the contents of your letter," he replied to Andrew. "He is very sore, and behaves badly." Nevertheless, the Governor was persistently amicable. On June 30, writing to his private secretary, Henry Ware, who was in Washington, he said:—

¹ June 20, 1864.

The latest letter from Mr. Stanton to myself under his own signature was last month. In it he used these [words]: "It would give me great pleasure to oblige you in regard to Major Emery or in any other matter relating to the administration of military affairs in the State of Massachusetts," etc., etc. There has never been an angry word between us. He may be dissatisfied that I have gone over his head to the President, once or twice and succeeded in what I undertook. Still he is not such a mean and petty man as the "they says" would make him.

That Andrew, in thus persistently turning the other cheek, had skilfully blended the wisdom of this world with the gospel precept was proved when, a few days later, he went to Washington. He and the Secretary of War immediately reëntered upon their old terms of friendly intercourse. Together they drew up plans for work under the laws which had just been passed concerning naval credits and recruiting in the states in rebellion;¹ arranged that five thousand troops be called for one hundred days to do duty in the fortifications at Washington; and talked over the present state of the dispute which had engaged them for the last year, and of which the documents, for the second time, were spending a month on the desk of the Attorney-General. The question, though in its penultimate stage, was as good as settled, and at the end of the long controversy, the hard blows of which could not but leave their marks, the two men parted in amity.

¹ *Vide infra*, p. 140-146.

On July 15, the day after the encore of the Attorney-General's opinion had been delivered, Stanton caused the necessary order to be issued to the Paymaster-General; on August 1 a circular from the Adjutant-General's office directed commanders of colored troops to find out who of their men were free on April 19, 1861, "the fact of freedom to be determined in each case on the statement of the soldier, under oath, taken in connection with the most reliable information that can be obtained from other sources."¹ Though many of the more conscientious among the negro soldiers in the Massachusetts regiments now found themselves in something of a quandary, the way out was made easy for them by the ingenious form of oath drawn up by Colonel Edward N. Hallowell² of the Fifty-Fourth, by which they were required to swear that they "owed no man unrequited labor on or before the 19th day of April, 1861."³ "We must thoroughly respect," writes Colonel Norwood P. Hallowell, "the tender consciences of two or three men who could not in strict conformity with the truth and who did not make this oath, and who therefore never received their pay, but we have no harsh words for the many who were equal to the occasion by swearing to their freedom on April 21st [19th], or any other day. Those who were fugitive slaves, and hence in a legal

¹ O. R., Series III. vol. iv. p. 565.

² Edward N. Hallowell, at first Major of the Fifty-Fourth, was made Lieutenant-Colonel after his brother was transferred to the Fifty-Fifth, and Colonel after the death of Shaw.

³ *A Brave Black Regiment*, p. 220.

sense not free at the time specified, had overcome too many difficulties in their escape from the South, and in their efforts to avoid the slave-hounds in the North, to be seriously annoyed by this grotesque proposition to swear away their back pay by denying their freedom.”¹ The muster-rolls, with the word “Free” set against the name of each man who had taken the oath, were sent to Washington for approval; early in October the men of the two Massachusetts regiments were mustered for pay, and, for the first time since they had been in the service of the United States, they were offered the wages of volunteer soldiers from the time of their enlistment; at last, they accepted and were paid.²

¹ *The Negro as Soldier in the War of the Rebellion*, pp. 18, 19.

² A subsidiary struggle was that to secure the rights of promotion from the ranks for the men in the Fifty-Fourth and Fifty-Fifth. In March, 1864, Andrew, having received the customary recommendations from the colonel and the brigadier, commissioned Sergeant Swails of the Fifty-Fourth, who to all appearances was a white man, as second lieutenant. After Swails had served in his new position for some time, word came from Washington that his discharge as Sergeant was not allowed. Protests forwarded from the regiment, from the commanding general at Hilton Head, and from the State House were of no avail; even after a conversation between Andrew and Stanton, in which the matter was apparently settled, the discharge did not come. In December, Stanton seemed to have forgotten the conversation; some people said there were orders out from the War Department against commissioning negroes; others said that the Department meant “to let the matter drift, and to come to no special decision upon it.” Andrew himself wrote:—

“It is perfectly certain that there is no legislation necessary to secure the just promotion of Serg’t. Swails. It is only needful that the proper Commanding General should understand that he may discharge the Sergeant for promotion. And, it is equally clear that there is no regulation apparent of the War Dep’t. in the way of such

The triumph was Andrew's own. After three years of governorship he had learned what resources of power were his, both in position and in personal influence; in the case of his black soldiers, which made every possible appeal to him, — to his sympathy, to his sense of right, to his honor, — he could do no less than use them all. Use them all he did, caring not that people considered him a bore, — a fact of which Lincoln himself, in his story-telling way, gave him an outrageous hint; caring not for the enemies which his hard words made. He had in the end all the compensation that he wanted: the justice for which he had wrought was done.¹

discharge. There is nothing in the world to prevent it but a sort of ill-defined notion that when the law speaks of a man, a soldier, or a person, they can't possibly include a man of 'African descent.' I wonder *Scipio Africanus* is not struck out of the list of Roman Heroes, on account of his cognomen. Mr. Stanton will readily see the way to clear up all difficulties, so soon as he perceives what the point of the case is." In January, 1865, Stanton saw the point, and Swails received his discharge and was mustered in as second lieutenant.

¹ On account of the restriction — "free on the nineteenth of April, 1861," — imposed by Congress, the benefit of full pay from the time of enlistment accrued chiefly to the two Massachusetts regiments and the other colored troops raised in the North. No colored regiment recruited in the rebel states could hope to come under the provisions of the act. Therefore, inasmuch as the first orders for the raising of colored troops, which were issued by Stanton to Hunter and Saxton in South Carolina in August, 1862, promised full pay and rations of volunteers, further legislation was needed to redeem this promise. (See Sec. 5 of Ch. 57 of the Public Acts, approved March 3, 1865. O. R., Series III. vol. iv. p. 1223.) Since 1865 the War Department has given their back pay to all the negro soldiers.

CHAPTER XI

THE STATE HOUSE AND THE WAR DEPARTMENT

It is a fact of our national history that the Civil War put the separate states definitely and irrevocably in subordination to the central government, and no better illustration of the process of that change is to be found than in the relations of a governor to the War Department. In April, 1861, Andrew was War Minister on his own account; after the passage of the Enrolment Act in March, 1863, he was, in respect to the raising of troops, merely an official in Stanton's huge department, lacking only the outward emblem of a triple or quadruple military title. But Andrew was not the stuff of which to make a machine. No matter what was the nature of the restrictions put upon him, it was impossible for him to do work without putting vitality into it. His mind was always active, devising schemes to draw out more soldiers and to protect the rights of all Massachusetts regiments; his common sense was always protesting at red-tape and inefficiency in bureaus at Washington; his moral nature was ever up in arms at the frequent corruption and carelessness, which for him was always expressed in terms of lives sacrificed. Instances of his independent efforts in mat-

ters military — some made before the Enrolment Act and some after — are to be recorded in this chapter.

In 1862, the year of the “conditional patriotism” letter and the Altoona Conference, Andrew gave advice to the Department no less freely than in the first year of the war. Among the reforms which he tried to bring about was a reorganization of the surgical department of the army so that it could make some approach to adequacy in the care of the wounded after a battle. After the first fights in 1862, through the horrors of the Peninsular campaign, after the second battle of Bull Run, and after Antietam, the surgeons whom Andrew sent on to care for the wounded reported again and again instances of incompetent administration. After these last two battles the state of things was so unsatisfactory that the Massachusetts surgeons on their return united in a remonstrance to the War Department. This the Governor forwarded, and then, going to Washington, he disturbed the officialdom of the regular army with arguments for an army hospital corps, and for a system of furloughs for sick soldiers. He devoted “whole days” to the task of urging that the medical staff make a study of European methods, and adapt them to the needs of the volunteer army, though when he offered practical suggestions, he found himself, as he wrote, “making no agreeable impression.”

With the same energy he protested against the failure of the government to pay its soldiers promptly.

When, in response to a complaint on this head to Sumner, he received the confident assurance that no such evil existed, and that, for the past fortnight, soldiers had been paid at the "rate of a million a day," he promptly replied: "It is all nonsense. The pay department is behindhand and chaotic. *We know the fact.* And the neglect to pay soldiers, who ought to be the *last* neglected, does much to discourage the army, and it does more to dishearten the people, delay recruitment, and weaken the Administration, than a thousand traitors could do." The crisis was becoming, he said, serious enough to justify his appealing to the Legislature of Massachusetts for funds, — "which," he concluded, "I should do with reluctance, for I could urge it only upon the ground of the inefficiency and incapacity of the Federal Government." In 1863 he made the appeal; but when a bill embodying his suggestions was passed, the War Department refused to consent to the arrangement for which it provided.

Another direction in which Andrew reached out to advise the government in 1862 was the planning of a military campaign. The Confederates were importing overland from Mexico immense quantities of supplies. Refugees from Texas, seeing the importance of checking this traffic, and confident that their State could easily be won back to the Union, betook themselves with the consent of the War Department to the governors of Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts to state their case and ask for troops. Andrew's interest was strongly aroused, the more

so in that the plan offered opportunity of giving a command to General Frémont and of establishing a colony of Northern men who, besides working the rich resources of the State, should be pioneers of Emancipation. At the moment recruiting for the nine months' men was going forward slowly, and, as an inducement to enlist, the advantages of settling in Texas were immediately offered, though with considerable discretion and secrecy. One three years' regiment and seven nine months' regiments were designated for the expedition, the command of which the Administration gave not to Frémont but to Banks. On account of the special nature of the enterprise and the large numbers of Massachusetts soldiers involved, Andrew selected his friend William L. Burt, now one of his staff, who from the start had been keen for the expedition, to go with it as the representative of the state government. After a surprising amplitude of delay and preparation the force set sail early in December, and then it became known at the North that its destination had been changed from Texas to New Orleans. To dislodge Butler from his command there, where his high-handed treatment of foreign residents kept the State Department in constant hot water, had become a matter of the first importance, and a task, it seemed, which nothing less than a Major-General and an army of twenty thousand men could be sure of accomplishing. To keep up the pretence that the invasion was to be made as originally planned, a small force was ordered thence to Galveston. Only

three companies of the Forty-Second reached the city, and they, after seizing a wharf and holding it for a week without reinforcements, were forced to surrender. Otherwise, the Massachusetts troops in Louisiana found nothing better to do than to take sides with the faction of Banks or of Butler. Burt came home in disgust, and Andrew renewed his efforts with the War Department to have Banks' command restored to its original destination. He was sure that for an expedition to Texas many of the nine months' men, now stagnant in Louisiana, would eagerly enlist for three years. With the development of Grant's plans against Vicksburg, however, the day for the Texas expedition was past. It was therefore not surprising that Lincoln and Stanton had no ears for Andrew's unseasonable proposal, or that Stanton, with characteristic abruptness, should have "treated both Major Burt and the suggestions of the Governor with a degree of rudeness altogether unexpected."¹

By far the greatest of the labors in which Andrew engaged as the head of a sovereign State had to do with the defence of the coast of Massachusetts. His first plans² were rudely upset by the revolutionary contest between the Merrimac and the Monitor in Chesapeake Bay in March, 1862. When, to meet the changed conditions, he tried to place a contract for building a monitor for Massachusetts, the Navy and Ordnance Departments loudly protested, on the

¹ Schouler, vol. i. p. 412.

² *Vide supra*, vol. i. pp. 319, 320.

ground that the United States needed all the iron-clads and all the heavy cannon that the country was producing. Thereupon the Governor promptly arranged with a Massachusetts foundry to enlarge itself that it might take a contract from the Commonwealth for big guns, but the scheme was defeated in the state Senate by one vote. At the beginning of 1863, when men's minds were filled with the danger to the Atlantic seaboard from the Alabama and the two Confederate rams building at Liverpool, the Legislature, with great heartiness, voted for defence the sum of a million dollars to be spent at the Governor's discretion. The very next day the campaign began, when Albert Browne started for Washington to obtain the good-will and the advice of the authorities there. The opinions which he collected from the President, the heads of departments, and experts in the ordnance and engineering bureaus were greatly at variance, ranging all the way from the suggestion that the State should use the money to establish a foundry to the cheerful fatalism of a colonel in the ordnance bureau who remarked that before Massachusetts could provide herself with any effective means of defence "the dangers with which we were threatened from abroad would either have overwhelmed us or be past altogether." This discussion of ways and means was naturally concerned chiefly with Boston Harbor, and for its defence the principal means proposed were obstructions in the channel, heavy guns for the fortifications, and a vessel, either ram or cruiser, to meet the enemy at

close quarters. To arrange for the first was easy enough ; to obtain either of the others was next to impossible.

Nevertheless, Andrew, having made a successful opening at Washington, determined to ask for the impossible, and sent a letter to Lincoln requesting him to detail immediately an ironclad to protect Boston Harbor. He recited the amount of property, federal as well as state and private, including a shipyard where six ironclads were building, which lay at the mercy of any hostile vessel entering the Harbor ; he showed the ridiculous inadequacy of the present fortifications ; he made the most of the fact that " if I had not been interrupted last year by the Navy Department, in preparations to build an ironclad war steamer, the State of Massachusetts would now have such a vessel in her own possession ; " to clinch matters he concluded with the declaration that " if it is a question of pecuniary consideration to the federal government, I am ready, and hereby offer to buy such a vessel from the United States and to pay for it immediately in cash." This patronizing offer, the preposterousness of which was as apparent to Andrew as to any one else, was a part of his system of attack upon the government. Writing to Ritchie, who, as a man of patience and tact, had succeeded Browne at Washington, he said in explanation of his policy : —

The grand aim to be kept in sight by us is to keep up the *stir* we have now excited in Washington. *We can't* do much ourselves about the forts,

about guns for the forts, nor about an iron-clad. But, by "establishing a raw," and irritating it, and by offering our *help*, cap in hand, we compel an active zeal and efficient prosecution of the proper work of the U. S. Govt., through its own agents and officers. . . . For two years we could excite no *feelings*. We got polite letters and learned essays. Now, they begin to stir. Lt. Col. Alexander has been sent to inspect all the minor ports, Genl. Cullom¹ to Boston and New Bedford, Major Blunt [in charge of the forts in Boston Harbor] has received five Parrott guns and has mounted one of them, Sec'y Chase has visited the forts in person, P. M. Genl. Blair unites, Asst. Sec. Fox unites, Sec'y Wells unites, the President actually moves and so does Halleck . . . and the Sec'y at War who usually jumps first, now shows his teeth, at the very thought of activity among others whom he has usually caught napping.²

This system of attack, though successful in producing activity, could hardly be expected to induce in the people on whom the "raw" was established kindly feelings toward the Governor of Massachusetts. Stanton chose to be offended because he had been consulted by neither Andrew nor the President; Sumner, who had gone to the President at Andrew's request, was annoyed because Andrew had sent Ritchie to his aid. The Senator informed the staff-officer that his presence was entirely unnecessary; he himself "had called at once upon the President . . . and . . . in fact the whole matter had already been attended to." The long-suffering Pre-

¹ George W. Cullum.

² May 4, 1863.

sident, as Sumner explained to Ritchie, and indeed the whole Administration, "looked upon the solicitude of the people of Massachusetts, and that of your Excellency concerning the coast defences of Massachusetts as the manifestations of a needless alarm. . . . The President had said, that if each State on the seaboard were to be seized with a similar panic, and the Government were to attempt to attend to their unreasonable requirements, the result would be such a diversion of our resources from the main object of attacking the enemy, that we might as well give up the war."¹

These complaints, however, mattered little to Andrew, so long as the government did what was in its power. Being soon satisfied that that power was little, he contented himself with what he could get in the way of stronger earthworks and plans for the speedy obstruction of the harbor in case of need. The ironclad was as far off as ever; the only hope of guns was in purchasing them abroad. At this juncture came a letter from John M. Forbes, who was then in England on a secret mission from the United States Government to effect a purchase of the Confederate rams. To him the subject of coast defence had always seemed of supreme importance, and when he sailed he had known that Andrew was moving in the matter. Convinced of the serious stage in the relations between England and the United States, he had lost no time, as he now informed the Governor, in contracting for three Blakely guns for

¹ Ritchie to Andrew, May 11, 1863.

the State of Massachusetts. The upshot was that, after some six weeks of negotiation, which included reports and recommendations of the United States engineering experts, examination by reliable committees of business men of Forbes' estimates and of the many risks involved, and an authorization from the Governor's Council to use one quarter of the million dollars in the purchase of guns abroad, Mr. Forbes placed an order with Captain Blakely for twenty-two guns, all of good size, at least one half of which were to be delivered within three months. Perhaps in no other undertaking of Andrew's term as governor was it necessary, in the language of Wall Street, to harmonize so many conflicting interests as in this, to move ahead only when the ground was secure, and yet to risk something for the sake of speed. On a larger scale, it was a repetition of the early preparations of 1861, in that it was done in the face of opposition and disbelief, and of the possibility that the event might prove it to be effort wasted. Wasted indeed, it proved to be. All the talk and writing about steel jackets, eleven- and nine-inch calibres, and advance payments, belongs to the limbo of the Civil War, together with the obstruction of wire which General Cullum proposed to stretch across the channel of Boston Harbor between Forts Winthrop and Independence. There, too, belongs the interminably long letter, full of shrewd comments upon Sumner, Stanton, and other men in Washington with whom Andrew had learned how to deal, which the Governor sat up till two o'clock

in the morning writing to Harrison Ritchie, and which he himself declared was not intended for posterity. For posterity all that remains of this toil is the fact that it was hard work well done.¹

In 1863, the government was brought face to face with the consequences of its course in the summer of 1862. Instead of having filled up its old regiments, as it had hoped to do by means of the first call (July 2), it had acquired many new regiments, of full ranks, it is true, but raw. This result was due partly to the "town-meeting" difficulty and partly to the fact that the duty of recruiting for old regiments had been taken away from the states and given to army officers detached for the purpose, who, being under no necessity of filling a quota, and lacking the facilities for recruitment which the state possessed, produced results inevitably small. The second call (August 4) for 300,000 militia had yielded everything to the caprices of the volunteer, and helped to establish more firmly his prejudice against entering old regiments. Thus at the beginning of the spring campaign of 1863 the volunteer army consisted, — omitting the regiments raised under these two calls, — of three years' regiments

¹ Before the end of the war earthworks had been thrown up by the federal government at various points on the Massachusetts coast, and Boston Harbor had been strengthened by a few guns and by a system of harbor obstruction capable of being applied at a moment's warning. The scheme of getting from England the heavy guns without which Massachusetts could hardly be said to be fortified at all was only in part successful. Owing to delays of various kinds in England and then owing to the close of the war, few of the guns ever reached Massachusetts.

whose ranks were in many cases less than half full and whose term of service was barely half over. The only possible remedy was a draft, and for a draft Congress provided by the Enrolment Act.

In the conscription which took place in Massachusetts under the Enrolment Act, the Governor's part at first was merely to explain the law and to exhort men to submit to its necessity. When, however, early in July the drafting began, great responsibility was suddenly put upon him. Almost with the first drawings rioting broke out in New York, and rumors were abroad of trouble in Boston. On July 14, while the Governor was performing his honorary part in the exercises of Commencement Day at Harvard, he was called back to Boston by news that the danger was immediate. He forthwith despatched orders to the forts in the harbor and to Readville to bring troops into the city as soon as possible. The number available was not large, for in the forts a guard had to be left for the prisoners, and at Camp Meigs the only regiment with full ranks was the Fifty-Fifth, which, of course, could not safely be employed to put down a riot of free white American citizens. Nevertheless, by nightfall some three hundred soldiers reached the city, and these, with what militia could be collected, were turned over to the mayor of Boston that they might act in concert with the police. Meanwhile threatening crowds were gathering; but, as Andrew afterward said, he was three hours ahead of them. The armory on Cooper Street, about which the most turbulent throng collected,

was well defended by the militia company of light artillery which had its headquarters there and by a reinforcement of men from Fort Warren. With one of the pieces loaded and pointed at the large door against which the rioters were beating, the men waited in silence, listening to the ominous tumult without. When at last the door was broken in, the officer in command gave the order to fire. The killed and wounded were dragged away in the darkness, their names and number were never known or asked for, and the night's riot was at an end. The next day was spent by the authorities in securing more troops and in perfecting details of action, and under this demonstration of readiness the remnant of the opposition disappeared. The Governor's preparations to meet trouble in other cities of the State were no less complete, but they were not needed, and conscription went on without further difficulty.

The work of the Provost-Marshal-General's office, which had been instituted to manage the draft, included also the estimating of the proportionate quotas of the states of the Union. When the ratios had once been ascertained, it became necessary, in order to equalize the burdens for the future, to reckon *pro forma* quotas to represent the first call for three years' men in 1861, and the second call of July 2, 1862. Under the first of these calls no quota had ever been assigned ; under the second, the number of 15,000 had been fixed for Massachusetts in personal agreement between Andrew and a represen-

tative of the Adjutant-General's office.¹ Now the Provost-Marshal-General's estimate, issued July 29, 1863, made the first Massachusetts quota 34,868, and the second 19,080, — computations which produced a deficiency to date of over six thousand men. Such a reckoning was a severe blow to the pride of the State. There was apparent injustice in it, too, for when the war fever was at its height in the early summer of 1861 Andrew could easily have furnished six more regiments, and had been prevented only by the peremptory refusal of Cameron. The Governor was able to show, however, that the Provost-Marshal-General's estimates took no account of the men who had enlisted as volunteers in 1863 before the draft, and that this number was large enough to cancel the deficiency. Beginning with the call of October 17, 1863, for 300,000 men, demands for more troops came in close succession. On February 1, 1864, the sum was raised to 500,000, the quota for Massachusetts under the two calls being 26,597. Another call on March 14 demanded 10,639 men; another on July 18, 21,965 men; another on December 19, 1306 men. The total of these quotas from October, 1863, to the end of the war was thus 60,507 men.

In raising this sum the chief dependence was upon volunteers. The number of men credited to the State by conscription was comparatively small, the draft of July, 1863, having produced about 6700

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 30. The quota under the call for the nine months' militia was 19,080.

men, and that of May and June, 1864, about 5000 men.¹ The task now set for Andrew was like that before a man with a jug of molasses to empty. The stream of volunteers, which at first had poured forth with such a wonderful rush, had lately been flowing more and more sluggishly ; yet it was necessary to extract the full quantity to the last drop. Recruits must be obtained by the offer of large bounties and the employment of professional "runners" or "brokers," an unscrupulous class of men upon whom a sharp watch needed to be constantly kept.² The

¹ The first sum includes 3600 men and the second 1600 men who paid commutation money, and thereby escaped service.

² The system employed by the Provost-Marshall-General's office maintained, through the provost-marshals and the recruiting agents appointed by them, the line of federal authority unbroken from the War Department to the soldier, and thus put some slight check on corruption. Nevertheless, Andrew, firmly persuaded of the advantages which the State possessed in securing volunteers, obtained an exception for Massachusetts, by which the premiums of \$15. and \$25. offered to recruiting agents were constituted a fund to be paid to the city and town authorities, who employed an agent to recruit for them at a rate per day. The selectmen, employing unauthorized and unscrupulous brokers, were fleeced of both money and men. In June, 1864, they met in convention to air their greenness, and their grievances against the State Adjutant-General's office, from which they had received their first instructions, but which had no authority either to prevent or to remedy the evils under which they suffered. Worse still, the bureau at Washington, getting only incomplete returns through its own local provost-marshals, was continually finding fault at the slowness of recruiting in Massachusetts, and reporting deficiencies in her quota. It became plain that Andrew's effort to maintain the prestige of his State was of no avail against the centralizing tendency of the war. The end of the matter was what should have been its beginning ; the towns saw that it was to the provost-marshals that they were really responsible, and at last came to employ only recruiting agents authorized by them.

federal government was generous with its money, paying \$302 for a new recruit going into an old regiment, and \$402 for a veteran who reenlisted after having served nine months or more. For bringing in a man of the first class, the recruiting agent received \$15; for a man of the second class, \$25. In November, 1863, the Legislature at a special session raised the state bounty from \$50 to \$325. Of course the mainstay of the State was what was the mainstay of the great armies, — the veteran volunteer. All through the year 1864 the regiments which had been organized in 1861 returned one after another, each six months or so before its full term of service had expired, and were showered by the stay-at-homes with demonstrations of profuse gratitude in which were mingled in due proportion thanks for favors past and hopes for more to come, and it was seldom that the handsome bounty failed to draw them back into the service. Besides the veterans who reenlisted in old regiments, there were enough to form four new regiments of infantry. These, indeed, were all the infantry recruited in Massachusetts in the last eighteen months of the war, for the only kinds of service for which new recruits would volunteer were cavalry, of which two regiments were raised, one white, one colored; and heavy artillery, the 3200 men who enlisted in which were received by Stanton with some impatience. If further proof be needed of the straits in which the State found herself, it may be gathered from the fact that she counted up to her credit every man who would join

a brigade band, every soldier in the regular army who would reënlist as a Massachusetts man for the sake of the Massachusetts bounty, and every disabled veteran who would enroll himself in the Reserve Corps for guarding hospitals and other safe places. Against these last two classes of volunteers the Governor protested more than once in Washington, but as long as other states accepted them gladly, he had no choice but to do the same.

Besides these methods of getting recruits, the exigencies of the situation made it necessary to resort to extraordinary means, of which those most worth mentioning are the importation of mercenaries from Europe, the securing to the credit of the State of a large number of men who had enlisted in the United States Navy since the beginning of the war, and the recruiting of colored men in the states in rebellion.

The first experiment in bringing men from the countries of Europe to help fill the quota of Massachusetts was made early in 1864, when men in Boston, encouraged to the speculation by the large bounties, brought over more than two hundred "voluntary immigrants" from Prussia and Switzerland. In spite of the blandishments of brokers and the rigors of the medical examination, one hundred and sixty men were thus secured to Massachusetts and sent to the front. Encouraged by this success, the same speculators a few months later imported three shiploads of men, with hardly a word of English among them. The number actually enlisted from these two importations made a total of 907,—a

sum by no means small when the difficulties are considered of filling the quota of a State like Massachusetts. Whether the gain were large or small, the arrival of these shiploads of foreign mercenaries — for such in effect they were — was of enough importance to attract attention outside the State. The enemies of Massachusetts showed the fact in its ugliest light; the ministers of the countries from which the men had come beset Seward with complaints; Stanton's quick tongue was active at the Governor's expense; the men themselves, who, on their way to the front, were somewhat roughly handled and preyed upon by runners, had a grievance; those of them who, failing to pass the surgical examination, had to betake themselves to civil employments, complained of broken contracts; the colonels of the regiments to which the foreigners were assigned, though differing in opinion as to their adaptability for service in some respects, were unanimous in declaring that their ignorance of English was a fatal weakness. The Governor had spared no efforts to have the strangers put under the command of officers who spoke German, and for this reason had sent the first contingent to the Twentieth, which, as originally composed, contained two companies of German-Americans from Boston. The fortunes of war, however, from which this regiment suffered probably more than any other in the whole volunteer army, had left little of the German element in it, and these new recruits, from failing to understand the orders given to them, were mas-

sacred like sheep in one of the early days of the Wilderness. It is true that in the beginning the Governor's only part in the importation had been to accept the recommendation of a committee that the experiment was worth trying. When once the men were Massachusetts soldiers, however, the whole responsibility for having procured them, as well as for their behavior as soldiers, was of course charged upon him. In self-defence he had the partners in the enterprise make reports to himself and to the State Department at Washington, demonstrating their scrupulous dealings; he listened to and endeavored to remedy the complaints of the men; to the public he tried to minimize the importance of the whole thing. Though technically he won his case, the State had undoubtedly suffered a loss of prestige for which the small number of men obtained was no compensation.¹

To obtain the right to credit against her quota men who had since the beginning of the war enlisted in the United States Navy and to recruit colored men in the States in rebellion, Massachusetts required Congressional legislation, and, during the long session of 1864, she was much in evidence at Washington as the chief mover for both measures. The vigor with which she pressed her claims, together with her stubbornness in behalf of the rights

¹ After being dismissed from the army in 1865, these Germans again made formal protest in Washington, claiming, in particular, their right to a volunteer's bounty; and just before the expiration of Andrew's fifth term, the special commission appointed by the War Department to investigate their case completely exonerated the State of Massachusetts.

of the negro, whose status as a United States soldier was being discussed at the same time, gave her a somewhat uncomfortable notoriety on the floors of Congress. It was no uncommon occurrence during debates on these bills for unfriendly senators and representatives to produce reports from Fry, the Provost-Marshal-General, which gave Massachusetts large deficiencies in quota. The State, they claimed, being hopelessly behindhand, was pushing these bills as the only means by which she could hope to obtain relief. If Massachusetts were behindhand the reason certainly was a good one. From the beginning of the war, the seafaring towns of Massachusetts had contributed largely to the navy, in many cases more generously than to the army, and yet, in utter disregard of this fact, they were expected to furnish a full quota to the army. Since Lincoln, to whom the governors of the seaboard New England states appealed,¹ had no power to remedy the injustice, the deficiency in the quota of Massachusetts kept steadily increasing. When at last, in July, 1864, Congress enacted the necessary legislation, Andrew posted to Washington and had a commission appointed of which he was chairman and of which the other member was ex-Governor Clifford of New Bedford, the city to which the largest number of naval enlistments was to be credited. The business of this commission was to prepare, under rules drawn up by Andrew and Stanton, and to vouch for a complete roll of the men who had enlisted in the navy in

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 48.

Massachusetts. In the Adjutant-General's office a large force of clerks worked day and night for six weeks or more, in verifying and recording the names submitted to them for credit by the seaboard towns. In the dreary and stagnant summer of 1864 the presiding over this piece of routine was the Governor's chief occupation. As a result, some sixteen thousand names were credited to Massachusetts, and her record was lifted beyond all cavil.

Meanwhile, the great need of the State still was more men. Since her own military population was exhausted, the problem was to find some means of enlisting outside the State men who should be credited to her quota. The black men of the North had already been gathered in; it was now necessary to turn to the black men of the South. The proposal now brought before Congress to allow the several state governments to engage in competition with the federal government and each other to draw negroes from Dixie Land was one which the Massachusetts men who urged the scheme could support with many arguments. The North had the money, the Southern states already conquered had the men; the law of supply and demand should be allowed to have its way without let or hindrance. Here was a cause which was a worthy successor to the cause of arming the Northern negro. As, in the annual message of 1863, Andrew had championed the one, so now in 1864 he championed the other. He set forth the industrial situation in Massachusetts in much the same terms that he had used when he urged Lincoln

to "let down the bars;"¹ he recapitulated the old arguments, which now had a new application. He declared of Massachusetts that "every man she might thus induce to join her ranks would be one civilian saved to the national industry, one soldier added to the army of the Union, one the less possible victim of rebel conscription, one Union man of the South enjoying, in the form of a Massachusetts bounty, some compensation for the waste and want with which the rebellion had visited him."

The long delays to which the bill permitting loyal states to recruit in the South was subject, besides making its supporters impatient, caused them to attach undue value to it as a panacea. When at last, in July, 1864, it became a law, Andrew, full of hope, lost not a day in acting. A state system of provost-marshals, modelled on the national system, was inaugurated, with agents at Washington, Fortress Monroe, New Berne, Hilton Head, Vicksburg, and Nashville, where camps were established to receive recruits brought in from the surrounding country. Commissioners of recruitment were appointed to adjust the respective claims of the Massachusetts towns to these recruits, and a large committee of men interested in arming the negro undertook to raise subscriptions and to give general oversight to the work. In spite of all these preparations, many practical conditions, some of which the enthusiasts who had urged the measure had not taken into account, worked against the success of the enterprise.

¹ *Vide supra*, pp. 92, 93.

In the first place, the estimate of the number of negroes available, being purely theoretical, was excessive. In Virginia and along the coast most of the men willing to volunteer had already enlisted. In Georgia and Alabama, where the field was good an almost insuperable obstacle was the opposition of Sherman, the general in command. Observing the facts about him, he came to the conclusion that the freedman's first lesson should be the duty of supporting his family at home. To enlist him in the army was, in its practical effect, like selling him to another plantation, — he was no longer responsible, and the care of his family fell to the government. Moreover, Sherman hated all brokers, and would have none of them about his army. The character of the brokers, indeed, was everywhere the chief obstacle to the success of the plan, for Stanton's attempt to have as few agents as possible from each state and to provide for strict supervision came to naught. The sum total of honesty among them was probably as small as in any set of men to be found outside prison, and the conditions under which they worked were such that no state could properly protect itself against their corrupt practices.¹ According

¹ A letter, dated October 19, 1864, from Albert G. Browne, Senior, who was Treasury Agent at Beaufort, S. C., to Andrew, describes another scandal for which these brokers were responsible: —

“I wrote you a hurried note in regard to the manner of enlistments here. It is a disgrace to all concerned. The poor negroes are hunted like wild beasts, and besides, there are few sound, able-bodied men among them. There is a perfect panic throughout all these islands. Old men and invalids have taken to the bush through fear

to the report of the United States Provost-Marshal-General on November 1, 1864, when the system had been in operation nearly four months, there were 1045 men employed in this business, the actual sum of whose labors was 2831 recruits in camp.¹ Even in the case of Massachusetts, notwithstanding the great care taken, one of the six agents was ultimately proved to have been frightfully incompetent, if not rascally. In spite of small results at first, the work went on to Andrew's general satisfaction, and after January 1, 1865, the number of men enlisted, especially at Vicksburg, was somewhat larger. At

of the conscription; one poor fellow jumped overboard at St. Helena last week and was drowned.

"I have been among the families of these poor creatures, and I can conceive of no greater terror and distress on the coast of Africa after a slave hunt than I have seen. They have been pursued and fired at by cavalry. I was informed that a d——d black-hearted, black-coated pseudo Chaplain, now turned negro broker, tried to procure bloodhounds wherewith to hunt contrabands. One of these scamps called on me a few days since to furnish him an *easy chair*, he having a '*weak back*.' He was strong enough to hunt poor niggers. He had no encouragement to ask again, I assure you. Do not, I beg of you, give countenance or aid to this iniquity, this 'agreement with hell.' Most of those engaged in this business are doing so from mercenary motives.

"General Saxton, whom I respect for his genuine love of justice, protests against the whole scheme. He says he enlisted *all* the able-bodied men; once in a while a strong able-bodied negro will turn up, but the large majority are infirm; four fifths of those recently enlisted will either be discharged or hospital patients within a few months. A facetious friend says there are here but two kinds of negroes, '*the bust and the robust*.' None but the '*bust*' remain. I am very confident that there have been some outrageous frauds practised on the poor negroes and that many concerned are making money out of it. . . . I have read the above hasty words to Genl. Saxton, and he confirms all I have said about negro hunting."

¹ O. R., Series III. vol. iv. p. 931.

last, however, the persistent hostility of the army and Stanton's declaration in his annual report that recruiting in rebel states was a failure had due weight with Congress, and on the evening before Lincoln's second inauguration, in the last hours of the session, it repealed the act passed eight months before. Beyond all question much less good was accomplished by the act than its supporters had expected; beyond all question it hastened what in time was sure to come,—the meeting between the unscrupulous Northerner, whether broker or carpet-bagger, and his victim. Nevertheless, men like Andrew, who had continued to find value in the work, took the action of Congress in no good part. But within a month it had all ceased to make a difference.

Long before the day of Appomattox, Andrew's difficulties on the score of quota were over. After the addition of the naval credits he could even afford to protest against using the money of the State in bounties to benefit veterans of the regular army and members of the Veteran Reserve Corps. As it was, Massachusetts came out of the war with a good surplus above her army quota, even when the gain from naval credits is left out of account. The result was especially gratifying in view of the relatively small proportion of her population which could bear arms. "Massachusetts will do her duty" had been Andrew's confident claim from the beginning of the war, and the event proved that he was right.¹

¹ According to the figures published by the War Department

Nevertheless, on Andrew's part, the success was not obtained without a price. His long struggle to maintain the rights of Massachusetts told upon even such buoyancy as his ; it became harder and harder for him to be patient with the shortcomings of officials in Washington. The result is described by Bird : —

I think he carried his impatience of what he considered the inattention or incapacity of others to the extent of injustice. Thus, in regard to our Senators and Representatives in Congress, he not only seemed to assume that they all had the same capacity for work that he had, but he often seemed to forget that none of them had the power, which he had, to call to their aid any number of assistants in the details and drudgery of their public duties. Hence, I think he was often unjust in his complaints, that his calls upon our Senators and Representatives were not promptly responded to ; and, not very unnaturally, it turned out that these complaints, freely expressed in moments of impatience and repeated at Washington, often exaggerated by persons whose prejudices or interests led them to put the worst construction on such utterances, produced feelings too much like alienation between the Governor and some of our best public men.¹

(O. R., Series III. vol. iv. pp. 1264-1270), the total of individual enlistments in the army which are credited to Massachusetts (excluding 5318 men who were drafted but paid commutation money) is 146,730. The proportion of this sum which represents men whose names occur more than once, either for good or for bad cause, it is impossible to determine. To this number must be added that of the men who served in the navy, which is now given at the Adjutant-General's office of Massachusetts as approximately 32,000.

¹ Boston *Commonwealth*, February 8, 1868.

The pity of this "alienation" lay in the fact that in the new era of peace now at hand Andrew's proper place was among these men in Washington. His record of local service to Massachusetts was made up; the great problems of the renewed national life attracted him, and in that field the need of him was great.

CHAPTER XII

THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN OF 1864

AT the end of three years' experience as war governor, Andrew had come to have pretty definite opinions about the Administration at Washington, and when in the spring of 1864 the time for the opening of the presidential campaign drew near, he was forced to decide in what degree these opinions should influence him in regard to Lincoln's renomination. In order to understand Andrew's position, it is necessary to attempt to gain the contemporary and transient view of the President that men had in 1864, — as if, for example, we should undertake to make an estimate of Thackeray when *Esmond* was yet to be written. As seen in the summer of this year, none of Lincoln's great policies had received the justification of success. His act of Emancipation, unequivocal as it was, could not be an ultimate fact until the Union arms had conquered the entire South ; in military affairs, his selection of Grant for the supreme command had not yet borne fruit, Grant's Wilderness campaign having proved as great a discouragement as McClellan's Peninsular campaign had been ; in politics, Lincoln's efforts to hold the balance of power among the factions of which the Republican,

or Union, party was composed had not yet produced unity of purpose and action. The party, like his Cabinet, still retained its composite character, Whigs, Free-Soilers, and War Democrats each standing separate. Moreover, the President's habit of yielding now to one and now to another faction seemed to men like Andrew to prove that his acts were not his own, but dictated by the clique whose turn it was to be conciliated. Thus they interpreted him as above all a politician, and were inclined to feel that if the country were saved, it would be in spite of him, not because of him. This tendency to administer the affairs of war according to the light of political exigencies, — as in respect to the pay of the black troops, — Andrew had suffered from many times, and this tendency, together with the lack of any more definite and consistent policy than could be expressed in Lincoln's own homely phrase as "pegging away," formed the basis of the doubts which Andrew and his friends had as to the wisdom of Lincoln's second candidacy.

The usual way in which these doubts were stated was in the expression that Lincoln "lacked the essential qualities of a leader." To comprehend this objection, which to us seems so astoundingly wide of the mark, we must realize that whenever a New Englander of that generation uttered the word "leader" his mind's eye was filled with the image of Daniel Webster. Even those who called the fallen statesman "Ichabod" could not forget his commanding presence, his lofty tone about affairs of state,

his sonorous professions of an ideal, his whole *ex cathedra* attitude. All these characteristics supplied the aristocratic connotation of the word "leader" as required by a community in which a considerable measure of aristocratic sympathy still lingered. Of the broad democratic meaning of the term the world had as yet received no demonstration. That Lincoln was in very truth the "new birth of a new soil," Lowell, with the advantage of literary detachment, was one of the first to discover and proclaim, both in his political essays and in the splendid stanzas of the *Commemoration Ode*. Andrew and his friends were like the men of old who, having known Saul beforetime, and beholding him prophesying, asked: "Is Saul also among the prophets?"

Besides these men of "Massachusetts ideas," other individuals and groups stood in the way of party harmony. Chase and his adherents and the partisans of Wade and Henry Winter Davis distrusted Lincoln; the radicals, particularly in Missouri, were bitter against the Blair family;¹ in New

¹ The bitterness of the Radical hatred of the Blair family may be inferred from some remarks of "Warrington" in the *Springfield Republican* of February 4, 1864. "I have no idea that the Blairs can maintain their ascendancy during another administration. If the people consent to take Lincoln, they will insist beforehand that copperheadism under the name of Blairism shall be 'eliminated' from the Washington councils. It is the uncertainty which prevails among earnest and radical men as to what Lincoln will do with this family of Maryland serpents, which makes the opposition movement to Lincoln so formidable, and I regard the Frémont men as fully justified in taking any measures short of the last resort, a bolt, to defeat and put down their influence." Whatever opinion Andrew may have had of the Blairs' conservatism, there is nothing whatever to show that

York there was hostility to Seward, Weed, and their following. The nomination of John C. Frémont at Cleveland by the extreme radicals was an open defection. Nevertheless, the causes of opposition were so diverse that no common ground could be found for union, and when the Republican nominating convention met at Baltimore early in June the sentiment of the delegates in favor of Lincoln carried everything before it. The most that the discontented were able to accomplish was to obtain the insertion in the platform of a demand for a more harmonious Cabinet. This, to their thinking, was little enough; and since before the convention they had considered its meeting in June "premature," they were now more than ever of the same opinion. They contended that if the convention had been held two or three months later the course of events would in all probability have made harmony possible on quite a different basis.

Some such cause of union among the disaffected the events of the summer seemed in very truth to bring forth. Save for the destruction of the Alabama, the Union arms prospered neither on land nor on sea. A great weariness of war and a great longing for peace spread over the whole country. Such waves of popular feeling are among the curious phenomena of our national life; the suddenness with which they rise, carry all before them, and subside,

he joined in the attempt to displace Montgomery Blair from the Cabinet. The Governor was always on good personal terms with both him and his father.

causes the foreigner or the superficial observer to charge the people of our Republic with an inconceivable fickleness. In this crisis of the Civil War the cry for peace seemed irresistible. The newspapers were full of discussion of ways and means; they debated whether Lincoln should offer Jefferson Davis peace on the simple basis of a restored Union, or whether he were not bound by his Emancipation Proclamation to include in his terms the freedom of the blacks. Jaquess and Gilmore, two flighty persons described by Nicolay and Hay as a preacher and a novelist, had gone to Richmond on an improvised peace mission of their own, and returning, had told Lincoln the story of their inconclusive negotiations. Then, travelling about from state to state, they repeated their tale to the several governors thereof; later, at the most critical moment of the whole summer, namely, about August 20, their narrative was given to the public in the September number of the *Atlantic Monthly*. Horace Greeley, too, a veritable incarnation of the nervous sensibility of the American people, rang the changes on the cry for peace in the New York *Tribune*, and the influence of his name caused the same demand to be heard in unexpected quarters. When at last he had fairly driven the President, as the only means of silencing him, into letting him make overtures to the Confederate quasi-commissioners over the border at Niagara Falls, the blame for his failure was laid upon Lincoln, and men declared that the Administration had refused to meet the rebels halfway.

Among the managers of the Republican party this fit of national nervousness caused deep concern. The Administration stood for a war policy; the opposition, taking advantage of the moment, would naturally declare itself in favor of peace, even with McClellan as its candidate; unless a victory in the field should come to Lincoln's rescue, his election was as good as lost. The only alternative of the party was to forestall the Democrats in moving for peace. To Henry J. Raymond, editor of the *New York Times* and chairman of the Republican National Executive Committee, a victory at the polls seemed worth the greatest sacrifices. He had advocated in his paper, as Forney, another shrewd manager, had advocated in the *Philadelphia Press*, an offer of peace in the unqualified terms of a restored Union. Such a proposition, which left the question of slavery to be settled later by convention or other arbitrament, it was believed Jefferson Davis could not safely refuse. At any rate, the Republican party, by thus lighting ship of its Jonah, the negro, would stand a fair chance to ride out the storm. This course Raymond urged upon the President in a remarkable letter dated August 22, and, together with other members of the executive committee, in personal conference a few days later. Significant of the seriousness of the political situation is the draft of a note of instructions which Lincoln prepared for the conference in case it should be thought wise for Raymond to undertake a mission to Richmond similar to Greeley's errand to Niagara Falls. On July 9,

the terms which Lincoln had stipulated for to Greeley were "the restoration of the Union and abandonment of slavery;" on August 24, in the experimental draft of instructions, the most that he asked for was that "upon the restoration of the Union and the national authority, the war shall cease at once, all remaining questions to be left for adjustment by peaceful modes."¹ As to the difference between these two propositions, Rhodes remarks, "if the conversation of Jefferson Davis with Jaquess and Gilmore had sunk deeply into his soul, the change was one of words and naught in essence."² That is to say, feeling safe in assuming that the South would accept no terms of peace which included the restoration of the Union, Lincoln was willing to make this change of words, for the sake of the men who were trying to rally the Republican Union party about a peace standard.

Here, then, was the nation driving headlong toward peace by negotiation, and the man who should guide it apparently behaving as if he thought that the only way of safety was in giving the team its head. This was the opportunity for union among those who distrusted Lincoln or his advisers and those who, whether Republicans or Democrats, were

¹ Nicolay and Hay, vol. ix. pp. 188, 220.

² *History of the United States*, James Ford Rhodes, vol. iv. p. 520 "... you may 'emancipate' every negro in the Confederacy," Davis had declared, "but we will be free! We will govern ourselves! We *will* do it, if we have to see every Southern plantation sacked, and every Southern city in flames!" — Quoted by Rhodes.

for war to the end. Moreover, since even after yielding to the panic for peace the members of the national committee admitted a doubt of being able to carry Lincoln through, there was reason to hope that some other candidate who took the opposite stand might have as good a chance of success. If Lincoln and Frémont could be induced to withdraw, if a new convention could be held and a new candidate nominated on the strength of his "war record," he might be able to shake the country out of its fit of nervous depression, and, by rallying the war spirit about himself, lead the party on to a victory at the polls which would be as good as a victory in the field. Thus the first object of the men who met to put this scheme into effect was to seek out all those to whom the words "truce," "armistice," were things abhorred. This committee was composed largely of men in New York, but from the start Andrew, Forbes, and a few other men in Massachusetts were in touch with it. The first move which Andrew on his part made was to communicate with Horatio Seymour, the Governor of New York, a Democrat who was a strong supporter of the war and who, by reason of difficulties with the Administration at the time of the draft riots in the summer of 1863, was opposed to Lincoln. The letter with which Andrew began his negotiations is characteristic; even in such delicate business as this he could not do otherwise than take the straight and open course.

JOHN A. ANDREW TO HORATIO SEYMOUR

August 11, 1864.

MY DEAR SIR, — It is suggested to me by Col. Jaquess, who is making a tour among our states in order to communicate to their Governors his observations and reflections on his recent trip to Richmond, that you would consider it of some possible public advantage if we two should attempt to form a more personal acquaintance, and consider some aspects of public affairs in a frank and confidential conversation.

Accordingly I take the liberty of addressing you, both as the Governor of the State of New York and as an eminent citizen (having like myself grave duties and a similar sense of their responsibility) and of freely declaring that, without forgetting a probably very wide difference of opinion on some questions of the first importance, I still feel that it would be very becoming in us to meet and to consider in a perfectly friendly way, and in the confidence of gentlemen, whether we might not unite to strengthen the arms of our National power, and thus help to “conquer a peace” by the use of means fitted to increase the glow of the general hopefulness, warm and invigorate the patriotism of the people and thus avoid many of the evils which naturally flow from a merely mechanical and legal enforcement of duty and from that sadness of heart which usually settles on a people after long experience of war. I will, if that should be agreeable to yourself, go to New York next week, — say on Friday or Saturday, and meet you at such house in that city as you may suggest, with a view to an informal and confidential talk on these subjects, to be just as full and just as restricted as you may think the best.

If on the whole you think it would not be useful, I pray you to simply say so and let the matter drop. I do not desire, either by silence, speech, presence or absence, to embarrass any gentleman — though by neither am I likely to be embarrassed myself.

I am respectfully and obediently yours,

JOHN A. ANDREW.

Seymour accepted the invitation, but preferred to come to Boston. Accordingly he one day walked into the Executive room at the State House, and the two governors had a long talk, which, in spite of their fundamental differences of opinion, their fundamental sincerity made frank and cordial. In Seymour, however, as Andrew soon found, the principles of the old Democracy were too much a habit of mind to suffer him to overstep the strict lines of party, and the interview had no practical result.¹

¹ Henry Lee was fond of telling the story of this meeting : —

“As I entered his room one afternoon he said to me : ‘Colonel, who do you suppose has been here ?’ ‘I cannot tell, Governor ; all sorts of people come here. I have no idea.’ ‘Well,’ he said, ‘I have had the most curious and unexpected interview. I was sitting here busy with my work ; some one knocked at the door. “Come in,” I said, and there entered a gentleman unknown to me, who introduced himself by saying : “Governor, I am Mr. Horatio Seymour, Governor of New York ; we are governors of contiguous states ; I have read all your speeches ; I do not agree at all with your opinions, but I like you because you have convictions, and I can get along with any man who has convictions. Now, Seward has no convictions ; I cannot get along with him, so I have called to talk matters over with you.”’

“‘Well, we had a two hours’ most interesting conversation, and it seemed to me as if he had been carried away by the subtlety of his own intellect. I believe he is quite sincere, although he and I differed on every point. It was altogether a surprising and interesting interview. Rising, he said : “I must go, but you are frequently called from Boston to Washington, and the next time you must take

At New York, in the mean time, the movement was gaining momentum. At a meeting of the committee on Thursday, August 18, it was decided to send out a circular letter enclosing a petition for a call for a new convention to be held at Cincinnati on September 28. As the object of the proposed convention was expressed, — “to concentrate the union strength on some one candidate who commands the confidence of the country, even by a new nomination if necessary,” — the emphasis was put upon the need of rallying the elements of the party who were in favor of war, rather than the desirability of Lincoln’s and Frémont’s withdrawal. The inclination toward one or the other of these courses among the men who were at the bottom of the plan was probably affected by their personal likes and dislikes; the animus of the New York group was directed against not Lincoln but Seward, the Massachusetts men were frankly opposed to Lincoln. Still, in spite of these considerations, the first care of all was for the welfare of the party, and there were too many uncertainties in the future, — the chances of battle, the attitude toward the war taken by the Democratic convention, which was to meet in Chicago on August 29, the possibility of a strong move on Lincoln’s part, — to permit any man thus early

Albany in on your way so that we may finish our talk.”’ — *Random Recollections*, by Henry Lee, in the *Newton Circuit*, June 19, 1896.

Such is the form into which the story settled after thirty years of telling; its errors of detail (showing, at least, that Andrew kept well the secret of the rendezvous), and its Thucydidean speeches need not invalidate its main point.

to commit himself to either course. Not to involve people unnecessarily, the circular letter was signed only by John Austin Stevens, an active Republican from the formation of the party, and Secretary of the National War Committee, which succeeded the Union Defence Committee. It was mailed to Union men of every sort in the North, with the request that they send replies to Mr. Stevens. To learn their opinions and to act upon them, arrangements were made for a meeting to be held at the house of David Dudley Field in New York on Tuesday evening, August 30, by which time the tendency of the Democratic convention, if not its candidate and platform, would be known. Meanwhile, the responses which began to come in from newspaper editors and men in political life expressed general discouragement at the situation and a feeling that the only hope was in a new candidate.¹ Henry Winter Davis was keen for the movement and promised to be at the meeting; Chase and Butler, as possible candidates to supplant Lincoln, were to be present only by proxy; Sumner, declining to come for the same reason, put himself in Andrew's charge. "I see no way of meeting the difficulties from the candidacy of Mr. Lincoln," he wrote in a "private and confidential" letter on the day before the meeting, "*unless he withdraws patriotically and kindly, so as to leave no breach in the party.* Will he do this?

"I can imagine a patriotism, which setting aside

¹ These letters, and others on the same subject, to the number of forty or more, were printed in the *New York Sun*, June 30, 1889.

all personal considerations, and looking singly to the good of the country at this trying moment, should insist upon another appeal to the people in Convention. . . .

"You know well that I have always regretted that the Republican Convention was called at so early a day. Its action seemed to me ill-considered and unreasonable. If it were regarded as merely temporary, then its errors might be corrected by another Convention, which, with the concurrence of Mr. Lincoln, might nominate a candidate who would surely be elected.

"Let me know by telegraph if I can be of service and I will try to meet you."

At the meeting on August 30 the replies to the circular letter were read, and, by means of these and the propositions advanced by the various groups represented, the committee explored one possibility after another. The men present were one and all sincerely devoted to the cause of the Union; moreover, there was too much political wisdom among them to permit their giving adherence to a candidate whose power of unifying the party might prove imaginary. Accordingly, when their work was seen to have been merely that of exploring blind alleys, they were ready to accept the other alternative, and to try to put Lincoln through. Discouraged as many of them were about Lincoln, they were forced to admit that with him lay advantages of position which might, after all, render him less a forlorn hope than any eleventh-hour candidate. To this end he must be

turned away from Raymond's panic-infected statistics and made to heed the men who would tell him that the real remedy for popular discontent and the means of carrying them all on to victory together was not peace but war.

These conclusions, as Andrew accepted them, appear in a letter which he wrote on September 3, four days after the meeting. To get a still further expression of opinion, Horace Greeley for the *Tribune*, Parke Godwin for the *Evening Post*, and Theodore Tilton for the *Independent* had written on September 2 a joint letter to the loyal governors asking for replies to three questions: "1. In your judgment is the reelection of Mr. Lincoln a probability? 2. In your judgment can your own State be carried for Mr. Lincoln? 3. In your judgment, do the interests of the Union party, and so of the country, require the substitution of another candidate in place of Mr. Lincoln?" Andrew replied at once.

JOHN A. ANDREW TO HORACE GREELEY

September 3, 1864.

In reply to your first enquiry, I am obliged to confess that I have no such means of knowledge or belief in the subject as to enable me to form an intelligent opinion of the probable result of the approaching Presidential election which would be instructive to gentlemen of your political intelligence. I trust that zeal and energy, however, on the part of the faithful who mean to preserve Liberty and the Government, will enable our Cause to win, irrespective to a great extent of the merits of all

candidates. Mr. Lincoln *ought* to lead the country. But he is essentially lacking in the quality of leadership, which is a gift of God and not a device of man. Without this, his other qualities, as an able and devoted magistrate and most estimable citizen, leave it necessary for us to make a certain allowance for a measure of success which, under the more magnetic influence of a positive man, of clear purpose and more prophetic instinct, would surely be ours.

To the second, I reply that Massachusetts will vote for the Union Cause at all events, and will support Mr. Lincoln so long as he remains the candidate.

Third. Severe reflection for ten days past, during which my attention has been constantly challenged by the subject, leads me to apprehend that, great as was the political blunder committed by the Republicans of tendering a political issue (which they could have compelled their opponents to take the burden of doing) and great as was the error of putting up our candidates as lay-figures for every marksman to make his target, while for three months we could not return the fire, — still these mistakes may be more easily borne than to attempt a remedy. Correction is impossible. Will the attempt to change front be a probable success? If any other man did now attract the spontaneous and united support of loyal and patriotic men, my answer might be, to yield to a suggestion which would then seem providential. As it is, I cannot venture, myself, without knowing what I do not know of opinion elsewhere, to advise the experiment.

It was now in order to organize the movement whereby Lincoln and the radicals could come to an understanding. This was the easier because, after

the nomination of General McClellan as the Democratic candidate for the presidency upon a peace platform, the Republicans, in order to make a square issue, must needs come out in defence of the war. John M. Forbes, who had remained in New York for the purpose, now undertook to bring into line every man who might be rallied to Lincoln. In a long conversation with Bryant of the *Evening Post*, he put the case forcibly, with the result that at the end of his interview he felt convinced that the *Post* would no longer withhold its hearty support from the Republican candidate. On the same day, September 2, from talk with War Democrats, friends of McClellan, Forbes got a pretty shrewd notion of the kind of fight that the opposition would put up. The man who had led the Army of the Potomac against the Confederates would be in some embarrassment as the candidate of a peace party, and the position which he would be forced to take in his letter of acceptance would "put him fairly on the pedestal of the statue of Janus looking both ways." The next morning the newspapers reported the defeat of Hood's army by Sherman and the capture of Atlanta. How absolutely this success was to turn the scale in Lincoln's favor one could at the moment only guess; still a victory so opportune must be made to serve the new movement to the utmost. Forbes dashed off a letter to Andrew urging immediate action. Quoting Grant's phrase, which had already become a household word, he declared that it was now plainly their duty to "fight it out on this line;" to this end he proposed

“a quiet meeting of influential men from the West and Penn. to meet in New York whose *first object* should be to organize a vigorous political campaign and whose advice will be followed by Mr. Lincoln on some important points necessary to give us a certainty of success.” Chief among the points on which the President was to receive “advice,” was that of the danger of “half and half or whole negotiations with the leaders at Richmond.” “I have the best of reasons,” wrote Forbes, “for *knowing* that the question of sending formal commissioners to Richmond to talk Peace is only suspended temporarily, and *I have great fears* that it is only waiting some such success as we now have at Atlanta for an opportunity to negotiate. *Something should be written to-day to Washington that will hold back any such design* until the men whose success depends on the coming election can have some voice; I mean such men as Gov. Morton, Gov. Brough, some from Penn. and some in New York. Negotiation with the Rebels means defeat — until *they send* and even then it needs mighty sharp Dealers to play with the Devil!” On matters of local concern in New York Lincoln also should be set right, — particularly as to the importance of not displacing General Dix, who was commander there. These things must be accomplished, however, not through “anti-Lincoln” men, but through the regular Republican organization, and therefore ex-Governor Morgan and others of his stripe should be appealed to. “Such union as will give us a vigorous campaign, and such a keynote

given now by the Administration as will put it in most broad contrast with the Chicago platform," — these were the objects which the "quiet meeting" should be called to promote. "You don't need me for any such consultation," concluded Forbes, "but if I can do any good as a *Drummer up*, I will go to the world's end."¹ Andrew's reply ran : —

I cordially agree with your conclusions and thank you for your useful and interesting letters. I have most seriously reflected on the whole subject during the past two weeks or so ; and I have not been able to see how we were to find a candidate who could be substituted for Lincoln and command hearty, general and glowing support. That is, after all, the greatest trouble. But, what an unspeakably dull canvass ! It ought to be aroused. I wish you could have stayed in New York longer, have visited your friends who congregate at the Union Club and others, seen Raymond who is Chairman of the National Committee, and coöperated with all such men in getting a conference held there to enliven, invigorate and direct the canvass. Since, or if, we must have Lincoln, then the men of motive and ideas must get into the lead, must *elect* him, get hold of "the machine" and "run it" themselves. I wish also you could see Thurlow Weed. He is a power, a strange man of stranger reputation. But, still our people should not stand like cats in opposite corners, watching each other jealously, snarling but never trying to harmonize. It would be terrible, too, if

¹ For an independent effort on Forbes' part to influence the President against peace negotiations, see *Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes*, vol. ii. pp. 102–105.

Lincoln should remove Gen'l Dix from the command in New York. He *is the man* there. Butler would ruin us, if put in *his* stead. Moreover Gen'l Dix ought to be courted by the President. He would be far better for him in the Cabinet than Seward is, and would be better for us in France than Dayton. Some good men, not politicians, like you, should visit the President, in person, have frank talk, try to bring him out a little, by proposing to support and "put him through," by encouragement and friendship; and get him committed to a re-modelled Cabinet, at least, in his own mind.

After this coming week is over I think I may have some time which I might give to rendering a little help. I will then gladly go with you, if possible and desirable and do all my share of work to the extent of my poor power.

This letter was written on Sunday, September 4, and already Andrew's plans were forming. His first move was to arrange for a war meeting in Faneuil Hall to celebrate Farragut's victory at Mobile Bay and Sherman's at Atlanta. The people were aglow with a renewed confidence in the Union arms, and it was well to strike while the iron was hot, and before the cold water of a possible defeat should be dashed upon it. The response was all that could be desired. The hall was packed; Andrew, in his most eloquent impromptu fashion, struck one quick blow after another. Man of peace as he was, he declared that for the last few days he himself had been seized by the "cannon fever." A ringing letter from Edward Everett was read, and speeches followed from Wilson, Sumner, and Boutwell.

Meanwhile, arrangements for the meeting in New York on September 12 were progressing. To enlist further support, Andrew wrote to the governors of Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana, urging them to join him in Washington, whither he intended to go from New York. His purpose was still to check the peace arguments of the Republican managers. The momentum that Andrew and his friends had gained from their labors of the past two weeks continued to carry them on in the same direction; they did not yet reckon in their calculations upon the difference that the fall of Atlanta must make. "It is almost clear," Forbes had written to Andrew on September 5, "that Raymond is in one of his fits of despondency and can see no way out except by diplomacy, and Lincoln is so naturally timid that he will incline the [same] way." With this danger in mind, Andrew framed his letter to the governors.

It seems to me of the first importance that the President should be rescued from the influences which threaten him — from those who for want of political and moral courage, or for want of either faith or forecast or of appreciation of the real quality of the public patriotism, are tempting and pushing him to an unworthy and disgraceful offer to compromise with the leaders of the Rebellion. I want the President now to take hold of his occasion, and really lead, as he might, the country, by exhibiting in the person who wields its highest power, the genuine representative of democratic instincts and principles. The Chicago Convention has opened

the way for patriots to take higher and clearer ground than ever. . . .

In the spirit of the national instinct, of the idea of democracy, of popular liberty, I would spurn the bare suggestion of ceasing hostilities *now*, — and the very thought of dealing with the rebel chiefs for peace. But I would seize the occasion for appeal to all the people, both North and South, against the assassins of Liberty, and the enemies of this our government. Thus may we carry the elections in the North, and ultimately reach the misguided and oppressed real democracy of the South.

To Frank Howe, Andrew wrote of his plans more intimately.

I am most heartily glad that you will go with me to Washington. It is a lonesome place for me always. Plenty of work — plenty of company — plenty of hard knocks, mingled with much polite attention oftentimes — some things to please one's vanity (if he can be tickled with the straws so many grown-up boys admire) — all these I get in Washington. But still it is a tiresome and lonely place unless I have some one with me who, like yourself, I feel sure of; who has some feeling for me which is not wholly after the manner of the world, and before whom I need not always be a governor, but can rise to the better estate of a man. . . .

I have worked like a beaver these last few days and nights, leaving off never before 12, until last evening; and sometimes not sleeping over five hours at night. I have finished my Address for Springfield. I have spoken and presided at the greatest and most enthusiastic Faneuil Hall meeting I have seen for years. Thousands were unable to enter the hall,

such was the crowd. I made a fifteen or seventeen minutes' speech, — called good, — beautifully received, — and I was personally received by the audience with cheers and welcome to my heart's full content. Still — still — a set of hunker politicians inside the Republican party are every moment on my track, and will spare no pains to injure me in the Convention next week. I cannot — shall not — be here to protect myself. I leave all that to Providence and many devoted and ardent friends. . . .

It is my purpose in visiting Washington to help keep the Government up to the tone of our Faneuil Hall meeting of last Tuesday night. I have decided, in company with men in politics and out of politics whom I believe in, that in order to prevent the catastrophe of Liberty, we *must* take hold, put Lincoln through, guard and protect him if we can, lash ourselves to the mast, and confront the gale. No time remaining to be lost — no effort can be spared. I hope to see Gov. Morgan, and to meet some good men, whom you may select — say half a dozen like Dr. Lieber — on Sunday.¹

The address for Springfield of which Andrew spoke he delivered on the next day, Friday, at the first annual fair of the New England Agricultural Society. Its theme was the place in the New England farmer's life of knowledge and ideals.² "I had a great success at Springfield, in my address," he wrote to his wife, "in the vastness of the audience, the manner of its reception and the freedom of spir-

¹ Andrew to F. E. Howe, September 8, 1864.

² Of this speech Andrew wrote to F. P. Blair: "It was an affair not in my line of customary thought: and . . . it was not quite easy in writing it to get on to the track."

its in which I was at the time of its delivery. I think I have never done better, and never got into magnetic relations with an audience more perfectly. For all which, I am very thankful." In New York, where he arrived on Saturday, the hours were filled with talking and conferring. On Sunday he went to Staten Island, at the invitation of George William Curtis, to dine with Forbes, and Sydney Howard Gay, of the New York *Tribune*, remembering, after his wont, to call upon the Shaws. On Monday morning the "quiet meeting"¹ was held, and in the afternoon Andrew, Forbes, and Howe started for Washington. They had their frank talk with the President; Andrew showed him letters from Governor Brough of Ohio and Governor Yates of Illinois. By this time, however, the running of the tide was so strong that no effort of any man could either stay or speed it. The effect of Sherman's victory and of the declaration of the Democratic convention that "the war

¹ On September 20, Thurlow Weed wrote to Seward of this meeting that "the conspiracy against Mr. Lincoln collapsed on Monday last. It was equally formidable and vicious, embracing a larger number of leading men than I supposed possible. Knowing that I was not satisfied with the President, they came to me for coöperation; but my objection to Mr. Lincoln is that he has done too much for those who now seek to drive him out of the field. Their last meeting was early last week at the house of Dudley Field. It was attended by Greeley, Godwin, Wilkes, Tilton, Opdyke, Curtis Noyes, and twenty-five others of the same stripe."

This letter is quoted by Nicolay and Hay (vol. iv. p. 366). They make the same assumption as Weed, not taking into account the fact that after the meeting of August 30, the "conspirators" had no thought of compelling Lincoln to withdraw, and that the meeting of September 12 was conceived for the express purpose of supporting him.

is a failure " already stood revealed in the splendid vote of Maine and Vermont. Ballots and bullets — primary forces both — declared that this was a war for Union and Liberty. The Radical dissenters must needs accept Lincoln as their leader ; Lincoln must needs adopt in a measure their programme. Both parties hastened to the compromise. The resignation of Montgomery Blair was matched by the withdrawal of Frémont ; Lincoln's assurance that peace negotiations were an impossibility was as superfluous as the assurance from the other side that the proposed convention at Cincinnati had long since become a vanishing absurdity. In all this Andrew's part may not be separated from the rest. "I have worked very hard here," he wrote at the end of his ten days' stay in Washington, "on many matters, state, national, civil, political, and philanthropic ; and have done some good." For all that, he would have been the last person to affirm that, at this desperate crisis of the national life, he or any other man was of account when the will of the people was roused to manifest itself.

The story of this incident in the politics of the Civil War is important for those who would comprehend how slowly his generation came to understand the man who was in very truth its leader. To unfriendly critics, Lincoln's course in the summer of 1864 seemed shifting and timid, guided by the suggestions of his latest caller ; to the student who may now follow in published documents the record of his thoughts from week to week, the revelation is one

of firm purpose, guided by unselfish devotion and by a knowledge of the whole situation such as no other man possessed. At the time, only the few men nearest to him could apprehend this fact; for posterity it is the common and priceless heritage.

In the campaign which now entered upon its last stage of public meetings, with their direct appeals to voters, Andrew was asked by the Republican National Committee to speak in the State of New York. He accepted willingly, and a programme was arranged for a week's tour, beginning at Albany on October 17, and extending west to Buffalo. Over the first speech he labored severely, writing it out in full. It contained a huge mass of quotation, — planks of platforms, examples of the "deadly parallel," testimony of Union generals as to the importance of a victory for Lincoln at the polls, and toward the end favorite bits of poetry; but the characteristic which should make a written speech superior to one delivered *ex tempore* — organic unity — it lacked. In fact, it was the last effort of an exhausted vitality. Andrew read it only once; then at two or three towns he spoke, after his old fashion, desperately lashing his energies to achieve the sharp pull through a fifteen or twenty minutes' impromptu speech. At Lockport he was forced to give in. He was attacked by what he described to Mrs. Andrew as "a recurrence of my old nose-bleeding trouble." Complete rest for a day or two, no more speech-making, a slow journey back to Boston, he said, were the doctor's orders. "I have attended most immense meetings,"

he went on, making little of his attack, his mind still running upon the stir of the last few days, "spoke with great earnestness, in the open air, and what with the labor of travelling and the physical effort and brain-work involved in speaking I suppose I sent the blood too freely to my head. — I only delivered my written speech *once*, and that was in Albany. The other meetings were mass gatherings, immense in numbers, in enthusiasm and display."

Make little of this illness as he might, Andrew knew, from its likeness to the attack which he had had in December, 1860, that it meant danger. All the more serious was this second warning, coming after four years of incredible strain, with no suspension of duty lasting longer than a few days at a time. The knowledge of the risk which he must run in holding office for another year may well have made him look back with some regret at the opportunity which had been offered him before the State Convention met of gracefully yielding his place to another. At that time the friends of the candidate next in line, Alexander H. Bullock of Worcester, the Speaker of the House, reviving the hopes which they had relinquished the year before, had been active and impatient. Bullock, however, would not listen to their schemes, and so at the convention Andrew received a unanimous nomination. For many reasons he was glad to serve a fifth term. Though with the war plainly drawing to a close the difficulties of administration which he had so successfully met

would be sensibly diminished, he knew that he better than any one else could finish off the many loose threads of business between the State House and Washington. Moreover, he was influenced by a natural desire to round out a term that should carry Massachusetts through the war without break in the continuity and devotion of her service to the Union, and by the insistent demands of the friends on whose judgment he had come to rely that he should keep his place. Now, after this warning from an over-taxed body, matters stood differently. Still, it is no light thing to give up work which one loves and which seems to need one. Andrew was, as he repeatedly said, a "drafted man;" therefore he would not seek exemption.

The need of avoiding excitement¹ prevented Andrew from speaking in Faneuil Hall at the last meeting of the campaign, the night before the election.² He was forced to content himself with a letter to

¹ The pressure upon Andrew to address meetings was unceasing all through his administration, and almost every such application had so far been refused on the ground of lack of time. In January, 1865, Surgeon-General Dale, as his medical adviser, furnished him with a sufficient answer to all applications, in a note, in which he reminded the Governor "how anxiously I have watched the condition of your health for the last four years," adding: "I have felt it my duty from time to time to caution you. . . . The manner you perform the proper duties of your office is sufficient to prostrate in time the strongest constitution. I therefore peremptorily . . . forbid your speaking in public, or engaging in any duties, save those strictly pertaining to your office, and this with a moderation in accordance with the anxiety and care daily devolving upon you."

² At this meeting George B. Loring, for many years a Democrat, first announced himself, in company with Caleb Cushing, as a Lincoln man. To some one high in Republican councils Andrew wrote urging

the chairman, which was admirably suited to be read aloud. The result of the election was no less than had been expected. The vote in Massachusetts stood : for the Lincoln electoral ticket, 126,742 ; for the McClellan electoral ticket, 48,745. Lincoln's majority was 77,997, Andrew's majority being less by 1906 votes. The moral effect of the victory is expressed better than any figures can give it by Andrew's telegram to Frank Howe : " We have knocked down and stamped out the last Copperhead ghost in Massachusetts." It was a national victory, a greater triumph than any won by feats of arms, and the Governor, determined that it should be celebrated as such, ordered a salute of a hundred guns to be fired on Boston Common. He wrote to F. P. Blair, Senior : —

A weight seems lifted from my heart. I seem now to myself to *see through*. The vote is an earnest of the virtue and intelligence of the People and a proof that the country is and must hereafter remain true to Liberty, to Democratic ideas, constitutional, Republican government, to its own honor and renown.

I hope sincerely that the President will be inspired by the invigorating power which ought to flow into the heart of a man, placed as he is, — out of the popular heart and from the testimony of such a

that this "youthful convert from hunkerism" be kindly treated, for, said he, —

" While the lamp holds on to burn,
The hardest hunker may return."

Loring afterwards said that the first men to congratulate him on his change from the Democratic party were Sumner and Andrew.

universal popular conviction. The work of the next four years is a great one. It involves the restoration of order, government, society in all the rebel states, and their reconstitution on the basis of Liberty as opposed to Slavery. How much patience, faith, courage, manhood, intelligence, practical sagacity wedded to the inspiration of high ideas, how much of the spirit of genuine leadership is demanded by this great occasion.

At this milestone in national affairs, it was natural that Andrew should thus look forward. It was natural that his friends, too, should try to plan for him the part which he should take in the great work which the future had in store, and for which his position and his abilities fitted him. He had made a place for himself in the councils of the Republican party and of the Administration; with the people through the length and breadth of the land his name stood for the highest-hearted patriotism. Such a man belonged not to a single state, but to the nation.

The difficulty, however, was to find in the larger field a place in which Andrew could serve. A senatorial vacancy he would probably have accepted, in spite of his limited means; but as the expiration of Henry Wilson's term drew near, Andrew refused to allow his name to be used against that of his old friend. Nevertheless, the eagerness of some of his supporters, who preferred to regard what they believed to be his secret wish rather than to act according to his declared instructions, brought him

into almost open candidacy against Wilson. The Governor, exceedingly annoyed at this apparent indication that he was acting in bad faith, sent a sharp notice to check the mistaken zeal of his friends. After that, Wilson's candidacy was unimpeded and his election sure.

The other opportunity for Andrew on which his friends reckoned was the chance that he might obtain a place in Lincoln's Cabinet upon the reorganization which was likely to take place after the fourth of March, 1865. The need of changes in the Cabinet was, in the eyes of the radicals, a chronic condition so long as it contained Seward, the man to whom, now that Blair was gone, they were most opposed. To them the Cabinet appeared, as Andrew said, like a "happy family" of presidential aspirants," consisting of "merely able representatives of different sections [of the country] or different wings of the party." Since the lack of "intelligent unity" which they deplored was of Lincoln's own choosing, as his best means of keeping in touch with the whole party and also of having never more than a partial opposition to his plans, it is extremely doubtful whether at any period of his whole term he seriously proposed to himself to part with Seward; nevertheless, the possibility of the change was one of the things which the slate-makers in Massachusetts who were interested in pushing Andrew took into their calculations. Other elements of uncertainty were: whether or not James Speed of Kentucky, who had become Attorney-General on the

resignation of Bates in December, had accepted the place permanently, or merely as a stop-gap ; whether or not, in order to make place for a New England man of "New England ideas," Gideon Welles of Connecticut, who was considered the most antiquated member of the Cabinet, in politics if not in years, would retire; and, finally, who was to become the permanent Secretary of the Treasury. As for Stanton, "I trust in God," exclaimed Andrew, in a tone of despair rather than of hope, "that some one will take Mr. Stanton's place as Secretary of War, who will reorganize and methodize that Department. If the war goes on 6 months longer the cause will be in the utmost peril, as it now stands.¹" On the whole, however, it was taken for granted that Stanton would remain, from sheer lack of any person who could begin to take his place. One other element of uncertainty there was, — the degree of heartiness with which the members of the Massachusetts Delegation in Congress would recommend for the Cabinet a man who, practically unknown four years before, now had a fame and a position equal to that of the best of them.

The beginning of the Andrew boom, to use the colloquialism of politics, for a Cabinet place was on January 6, 1865, when John M. Forbes, who was living in Washington at the time, read in the morning newspaper that William Pitt Fessenden, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, had been nominated as Senator by the Republican caucus of the Maine

¹ To W. L. Burt, February 6, 1865.

Legislature. Forbes at once wrote to men of influence in different parts of the country, proposing Andrew's name for the vacant place. Though from all of them he met with a gratifying response, Andrew himself put a firm veto upon the plan. If there were need of him in the Cabinet, he was willing to serve in his own line as Attorney-General, but he knew his limitations too well to venture so far afield as the Treasury. The question was hardly closed before it was opened again by the rumor that Sumner could receive the appointment as Secretary of State. The origin of this report was with the Blairs, who were still enough in the President's confidence to make the bit of news at first highly credible. Knowing their implacable hatred of Seward, one suspects that their overtures to Sumner, of all men, were guided more by the hope of making him the instrument of wreaking vengeance upon their enemy than by any abstract motives of patriotism. Be this as it may, Sumner was easily persuaded that his chance was good, and his desire for the position was certainly great; on the other hand, Andrew's friends felt that if a place were to be made for a New England man, the person to fill it was not Sumner but Andrew. When the news reached the Governor, he straightway sent Forbes an emphatic letter refusing the use of his name for any position whatsoever, unless it became perfectly clear that Sumner was unlikely to be given one. As it soon appeared that the reports of the Blairs, to which Sumner alone gave full credence, were the chief basis of the Sen-

ator's hopes, Andrew's friends continued to push his name as an alternative. Sumner, elated by the favor which Lincoln was at this time showing him, felt that the very mention of any other name might be injurious to his own chances, and that Andrew should be satisfied with the senatorship which would be left vacant. Therefore, when Forbes and W. L. Burt urged him, since his chances were quite uncertain, to help them unite the Massachusetts Delegation upon Andrew as an alternative New England candidate, it was not unnatural that they should be met with a swarm of objections. A further hindrance to unanimity for Andrew among the Massachusetts Delegation was the guarded aspirations of two of the Representatives for the still unfilled place of Secretary of the Treasury. In recognition of the claims which were made for Andrew, and by way of keeping him out of their own field, members of the Delegation suggested that he should be given charge of the Freedmen's Bureau which was about to be created, — a suggestion so plausible that Andrew at first was strongly tempted by it. His friends, however, were not to be caught by such bait, and indeed Andrew himself was fully as shy of it when he realized how completely the new office would be subordinated to the Secretary of War.¹ Thus in Washington Andrew's candidacy for a Cabinet position was far from prospering as its supporters had hoped.

¹ Andrew also received later, through Sumner and Wilson, the offer of a United States District Judgeship, but would not accept it. For another offer, see *infra*, p. 291.

Elsewhere the suggestion of Andrew's name was heartily welcomed, particularly among the New York group of Republicans with whom he had acted in the preceding summer. A memorial signed by many names of influence in New York was presented to Lincoln by ex-Governor Morgan, who had himself declined the President's offer of the Treasury seat. Other petitions to the same effect came from all parts of Massachusetts, — from the Legislature, from the state officials, from men in Boston whose names stood for conservatism in politics and soundness in trade. Sumner, beholding these tokens of high approbation conferred upon another than himself, was more than ever piqued, and not even the remonstrances of his two best friends, S. G. Howe and F. W. Bird, could persuade him to jeopardize his own illusory chance by coming out frankly for Andrew. Forbes, Bird, and Howe therefore presented Andrew's name to Lincoln as a duty which they were charged to perform, but without much hope of success, for they had neither Sumner's assent, nor any formal expression of opinion from the Delegation. They renewed their efforts when the selection of McCulloch for the Treasury ended the hopes of those members from New England who had had an eye on that place; but as it now wanted only a few days to the inauguration, men generally agreed that there was no longer any chance of a Cabinet change by which Andrew could be affected.

This attempt to obtain for Andrew a place among Lincoln's advisers, fruitless as it was, is nevertheless

of interest as showing the high position in the nation which men of all parties recognized as belonging to him. His chances, as he himself felt, were probably never very great, for it is unlikely that Lincoln had intended Speed's appointment as Attorney-General to be merely temporary. Great or small, however, they were considerably impeded by his own steadfast restrictions that his name must not be used to interfere with that of Sumner or any other man from New England, and must not be used for any other place than that of Attorney-General. The lack of united support from the Massachusetts Delegation may have contributed somewhat to his failure; it was of greater importance in revealing the existence of a breach between him and them which was constantly to grow wider. This fact was no surprise to Andrew; indeed, Sumner's coolness he had predicted from the first. High as Andrew stood in the nation, he must henceforth find his supporters elsewhere than among the men who had preceded him from Massachusetts into the field of national politics.¹

¹ Many of the letters from which is built up the narrative of these schemes to give Andrew a national position are so rich in human interest as to demand preservation, at least in the semi-oblivion of a footnote. Here the curious may take their fill of the gossip details of these intricate affairs. The first letter concerns the plan to run Andrew for the senatorship against Wilson; the rest deal with the subject of the Cabinet position.

F. W. BIRD TO WILLIAM CLAFLIN

January 16, 1865.

DEAR CLAFLIN, — I daresay the three you name are against Wilson, with a few others who can never breathe freely so long as a

shoemaker is in the Senate of the U. S. . . . The worst of it is, that a few gentlemen known as friends of the Governor and *supposed to represent him* are active in opposition and thus it is feared a contingency may arise w'h will place him in a position of antagonism to Wilson. Then, all the Bullock men help on the division, thinking that anyhow it must help him. There is not the slightest foundation for the impression or suspicion that the Governor directly or indirectly encourages the opposition. On the other hand, he says, to me and to every body, that he thinks it would be bad faith (after giving Wilson to understand, up to the last, that there would be no opposition), to raise one now, and added to me — "I should feel if I allowed my name to be used against him, that I was doing a — — — mean thing." You know how it is with the Governor — he does not feel called upon to contradict every thing that is said about him; but I am sure I represent his position fairly in what I have said. — You can show this to Wilson and assure him that he has nothing to fear and will stand better in the end when it is known that no weapon turned against him could prosper.

Y'rs truly,

F. W. B.

. . . Since writing above, I have learned what justifies me in saying more strongly that Andrew is for Wilson's election and hopes all through him, "in his inmost" as he often says, that the opposition will be withdrawn.

The letter from which the following extract is taken was written immediately upon the appearance in the papers of Fessenden's resignation.

JOHN M. FORBES TO F. P. BLAIR, SENIOR.

January 6, 1865.

. . . The question of a new Secretary, then, ought to come up immediately. Why would not our good Governor be the right man in the right place? He has foreshadowed his present intention of not running again for his present position. You know how well he combines efficiency with perseverance, tact and decision. He possesses the entire confidence of the community in which he lives and the whole country too as a man of strong will and of unbending integrity. He has more than almost any other public man that enthusiasm which magnetizes other men. If you agree with me, perhaps you will take such measures as seem to you best to bring his name before the President for consideration in connection with the Treasury. . . .

P. S. A friend to whom I showed the above says that Gov. Andrew ought not *for his own sake* to be asked to take so hard a place as the Treasury. True! but he, for his own sake, ought to go back to his profession and family, from both of which he has been practically divorced for four years. But no man has a right, and no man less than John A. Andrew, would plead to have exemption.

The following is a statement once for all of Andrew's own position.

JOHN A. ANDREW TO W. L. BURT

February 6.

I understand that it has been said informally, but on apparent ground of authority, to Mr. Sumner, by my friends Mr. F. P. Blair and Judge Blair, that Mr. Sumner can, if he will, receive the appointment of Secretary of State from President Lincoln, in March. I am not ignorant that many gentlemen have suggested the idea of placing me in the cabinet, in some position or another. You are aware that, unless Mr. Lincoln thinks it would benefit the service and strengthen his cabinet, I do not want to be in it — that I would personally prefer no place at all, unless he should think it best to offer me that of Attorney General. My sole thought is that it is important to have some person representing the same tone and class of opinions which I do, near the President and in the councils of his advisers. And I am sure that in the four years to come, there is no place where a lawyer can do so much good as in the office of Attorney General. I feel that I do not regard any of these things from the point of mere personal ambition. When I look at them in their direct relations to myself, I *dread* and *reluct* at all places of public responsibility. When I think only of the cause and the People, I am willing to serve where my lot may be, whenever the opportunity seems to open a way of usefulness. That is the whole of it.

Now — Sumner and I cannot both go into the Cabinet. If he *can* go into the place of Secretary of State, I will not be a candidate for any place. Please see him at once and also Messrs. Blair, both of them and ask for an explicit statement. If it is true that Sumner can be appointed, and if he will accept, then announce to them my unequivocal refusal to be a candidate for the cabinet. I am just as clear about this as I was in refusing to run against Wilson for the Senate. Both the Blairs are my friends. They will not favor any man against me in any spirit of unkindness or of indifference, they will do it only for reasons of public policy. I sincerely hope Sumner will be Secretary of State. . . .

In the last sentence of the following letter, Andrew served notice in advance upon men of the Seward group that, in the event of his receiving an appointment at Washington, he meant, as heretofore, to stand alone, acknowledging obligation to men of neither wing of the party, — “whether C. Sumner or T. Weed,” as he explained to Frank Howe, in whose care he placed the letter for delivery.

JOHN A. ANDREW TO THURLOW WEED

February 6.

. . . Perhaps I should find I had missed my vocation. But, I have will, patience, faith, good temper and a clear purpose. From boy to man, for thirty years, I have been looking and working in one direction. When I cannot *see*, I do not the less *believe*. I am conscious of no very great personal ambition. Still I enjoy public life, if it is only *active, working and useful*. And, while I am far from sure that I should not serve better others and myself, by going at the end of this year into private life, and waiting *until* (and always remaining there *unless*) a clear call like that of 1860 may command me to try my hand again, I am still ready to report for duty as a drafted man, if others who can judge fairly think it best I should. I do not perceive how I can be of any special use compared with many others, in any of the cabinet places, unless in the one I have named.

I think that the wishes of the Senators and leading members of the Ho. Repr. from N. E. will decide the President whom he will select from the Eastern States. The Senators from Mass. have not so far as I know, ever indicated any special confidence in myself for any national appointment. I have always warmly supported them. So there is no personal motive, of which I am aware. But, I am pretty sure, that, certainly in the case of Mr. Sumner, who is perhaps the leading Senator from New England, any support of myself for the Cabinet would be slow. Therefore I think any movement in my favor would be uphill work. I think the truth is, I am too obstinate, and insusceptible to external influences by great men to be very acceptable in Washington.

The next extract is from Howe's answer.

FRANK E. HOWE TO JOHN A. ANDREW

February 7.

. . . Weed went to Albany last night — Now I would not have the Old fellow have that letter for anything.

It's too frank, too much of you in it for him to have in his power — It admits a greater weakness than really exists in our Senatorial delegation towards yourself, and old W would be sure to use it in Washington, where he goes next week, if it could in any way aid *his plans*. — I think he will be here over Sunday — you could say all this to him, which if he repeated, no one would believe, or you could write most of that letter to him without danger.

As you gave me the privilege to withhold it I do so until I hear from or see you. I think Burt or Bird would be afraid to have that letter in his hands.

Andrew replied at once that the letter had been approved by Bird, Burt and Stearns, and that as for Weed he had no fears. "I wrote it carefully for that gentleman's eye and use. He can't do any harm with it if he tries."

JOHN M. FORBES TO JOHN A. ANDREW

February 7.

I suppose you know my views about your position. Having led Massachusetts and by her help led the nation through the dark days of the War — your personal and family interests and perhaps your Fame (if you care for it) will be most surely promoted by going back to your profession for the next *three* years, whatever may happen later, and while your temperament and principles will not let you refuse to work or fight whenever the best blows for the country can be struck, it seems to me your friends ought to be very careful how they *push for any office* for you. I for one consider it *coming down* from your present high position before the country — if you *take any office* — ; unless as President (to speak right out) you can never stand higher than you do to-day — and the petty politics which have to govern appointments would in the Cabinet for the coming four years either wear out your patience or make you more enemies than friends. So much for your personal or even your political interests — *I think them better served out of Washington than in it.*

But I do think your appointment to one of the first class places in the Government would give just such a tone to the whole Civil Administration as the *discovery* during the past year of Grant, Sherman, Thomas and Farragut have to the Army and Navy. It would revive the confidence of the nation and do much to settle the War. Nobody would dream of compromise, not even Seward himself if you were there ! but to warrant this personal sacrifice on your part and make it *effectual*, it seems to me the appointment ought to come

rather as the result of public sentiment than at the urgency of your personal friends who may be supposed in any degree to reflect your views or wishes. This consideration alone will make me timid or rather *careful* in moving when the right time clearly comes.

JOHN A. ANDREW TO JOHN M. FORBES

February 9.

. . . I am something of a lawyer ; and I know I could "run the machine," as Attorney General. I *am* anxious that a man of *my style* should be in that place. If something better should be offered Judge Speed I should be pleased to have that office offered myself. But even then I should prefer to fulfil my contract with the People of Mass. and serve out my term as Governor. . . .

February 10.

I . . . am entirely of your opinion, that it is best *for myself* to get back into the law. . . . I sincerely hope and trust that they will never talk *Navy* to me. I should be wholly in the dark, should not understand the details of its contract business etc. etc., for a long while, and should always be too much in the power of various subordinates.

My own opinion is clear that it is best for me to owe nothing to the Massachusetts Delegation — excepting only Mr. Ames. He has always been my sincere friend. Some of the others have always acted as if they did not wholly relish my good fortune in getting along well in the conduct of affairs. Mr. Hooper, however, has always been very kind, considerate and helpful, and has never evinced any want of cordiality.

If the Freedman's Department could be wholly independent — which it can't be — I would be willing to try to administer it. But — under Stanton certainly — and under almost any one else — I should be entirely hopeless of success. I should not be afraid but that I could manage well enough with Stanton, personally, — but such are the defects of his intellectual and moral constitution both, that one can never know what he will, or won't, do, — nor can his assurances be depended upon. For many reasons, I have always stood up for him "against the crowd." Not because I did not see his limitations, — but, because I knew well enough his place could not be, or would not be supplied by any better man, on the whole. Still I have long known that the criticisms of Montgomery Blair were not without foundation. . . . P. S. I hope, most of all, that none shall have the chance to say I or others for me, and with my concurrence, have *pushed* my name with the President for anything.

Forbes' interviews with F. P. Blair and his son and with Charles Sumner are reported in the next two letters. The frequent apologies which Forbes makes for suppressing in part one of Andrew's letters are due to the fact that the Governor had bidden him read it all to Sumner. This letter has unfortunately not yielded itself to the most careful search in the public files at the State House, in Andrew's private files, or among letters preserved by J. M. Forbes. The remarks about Sumner were, however, evidently much the same as those which Andrew had made to Thurlow Weed.

JOHN M. FORBES TO JOHN A. ANDREW

February 11.

I acknowledge yours of 9th read last night and which I read the whole of to the Messrs. Blair, and am on my way to Sumner's now.

They both state that they have been entirely misunderstood as to having said that "Sumner could have the State Dept." — Their position is that for the good of the country Seward and Stanton, who hang together and ought to *hang* together — being Allies — should go out; but they do not pretend to have any assurance or any very confident expectation that it will be so. They hope it will be so.

They intend to urge upon the President to put either Sumner or you into the Cabinet, whichever is practicable; they know nothing of the chances of Speed's going out or going elsewhere, but as he was suddenly put in on the emergency of Bates' resignation, it is always possible that there may have been some understanding with him that his place was to be temporary; but have no other means of judging beyond what is open to all. In short like the ways of Providence those of the Pres. are "inscrutable" . . .

Finally the Judge strongly advises me not to read Sumner the last paragraph of your private letter in which you attribute to him slow and cold support. . . .

February 12.

I wrote you hastily after seeing the Blairs and not finding Sumner in time got Sumner here to dine and also had before me yours of Friday.

I read him those letters to Majr. Burt except the last page, . . . telling him I only read him part of that confidential Letter.

He disclaimed any wish to compete with you for a seat in the Cabinet — doubted whether he wanted one *this year*, having some more speeches to make in Senate or elsewhere, and thought it not best for *you* to leave Massachusetts this year to Deacon Hayden [the Lieutenant-Governor]; spoke of carrying out your contract with

the people of Mass., of their choosing you because you were so much needed *this* year — expressed great admiration for Boutwell for *any* place and for Hooper for Treasurer — wanted to put his holding back on the ground of your best interest being not to come, and somewhat of your duty to the people. On the whole he justified fully what you said of his slowness to support you, and I was tempted then and there to show him your last page and tell him his talk fully corroborated your letter, when I found that your unselfish withdrawal in his favor failed to make the impression Mr. Blair expected — but I concluded to give him time to think of it.

So I told him *you* and *we* in Massachusetts felt fully entitled to weigh your interests and duties — that I admitted the difficulty and delicacy of getting our Delegation to unite upon you for a place while the Treasury for which two of them were competing was open — but that this would probably be settled one way or the other soon and I wanted him to consider carefully whether he was ready to come in, *when that* delicacy was removed, to Mr. Blair's proposition *pure et simple* — namely to unite all our strength to have one of two things presented to the President — namely *either you or him* in the Cabinet.

I saw he was not ready to say yes to this, and so asked him to *think it over* and be prepared when Mr. Bird returns to say *Yes* or *No* — and so I left it. . . .

February 18.

Dr. Howe and Mr. Bird having tried their hands on Senator Sumner without any prospect of uniting him with our Delegation upon any man of Massachusetts ideas, and the Representatives being occupied with the Tax Bill, we without waiting for a formal meeting with them waited on the President and presented certain papers with which we were charged. We felt that we had no right to omit this duty not only to the Memorialists but also in view of the possibility of some unfortunate appointment from N. England. We wished to feel that we had at least entered on Record our protests against putting into the Cabinet any but strong men at this crisis.

Govr. Morgan presented a N. York memorial this morning and Mr. Blair intends to put in his *vote*, for he says the people of the North are now voting on the Cabinet. The Prest. said nothing. We put to him in our talk in the strongest light that you sought nothing and that we represented those who want you there against your own interests, for the *good of the Nation*.

I only hope the Pres. will believe us, but he is so beset by office seekers and self seekers that it is quite doubtful if he can appreciate your position.

I intend to take occasion to explain to our Delegation your *im-pregnable* position — which must commend itself to their judgment as well as to their feelings.

I think they all go for you (next to themselves !) and your unselfish suggestions ought to unite them on you.

Your letter of instructions read — it is a consummate synopsis of political morality, and if it dont melt some of the Politicians to whom we mean to read it (or such parts of it tomorrow as Dr. Howe and Bird think expedient), their hearts must be hard and their heads soft.

February 26.

Nothing very new about Cabinet work except that Fessenden treats it as a settled thing (in private talk) that McCulloch is to be his successor ; — so I suppose our Massachusetts aspirants are out of the case here and our Delegation ought to be very amiable.

You will have heard from Bird and Howe that they suppressed the parts of your letter, in reading it to Sumner, which might have galled him, and gave him only the generous or rather Magnanimous parts. If he had not a hide thicker than "*An Allegory on the Banks of the Nile*" this would have touched his sensibilities and brought him down, but it did not seem to reach him and I have not been near him since.

I have read the same elegant extracts to Boutwell and Hooper, who seem to appreciate them properly. Boutwell seems to have no wish for any thing but the Treasury, and knows how hard a seat that almost broken Bench might be. . . .

Nobody now seems to think that there will be a change, except in the Treasury and the Interior — the last geographically conceded to the West. . . . I consider the chances of any Cabinet questions affecting you so very small that I hope you will feel like running on here this week to see the great Coronation — no — Inauguration — if you do I hope you will come and stay with me, as Willard's is crowded and I can at least make you comfortable here.

F. W. BIRD TO CHARLES SUMNER

February 27.

DEAR SUMNER, — We have seen the President and presented the case for Gov. Andrew briefly, but on the whole satisfactorily. I have no confident expectation of success, and have no anxiety about it. I have done my duty, feeling all the while that as a matter personal to Gov. Andrew it has been anything but a kindness.

I must say, frankly, that while I concede the largest liberty to every member of the delegation, it has been very mortifying to find such a state of feeling existing among them, pardon me, but I must say it, most painful to learn the existence of such suspicions and opinions as you expressed towards Gov. Andrew at our first interview. I am thankful that I shall in time feel less keenly what I wish I could forget.

Ever faithfully yours,

F. W. BIRD.

CHAPTER XIII

DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE COMMONWEALTH

THE story of Andrew's work as war governor is that of a life so crowded with the details of military administration that one becomes incredulous as to the very existence of matters of civil administration. Nevertheless, the domestic affairs of the Commonwealth for this period of five years were taking their ordinary course and demanding from Andrew the attention which in times of peace they demand of other governors. Judicial officers,¹ trustees of charitable and reformatory institutions, a host of other officials great and small, must receive appointment at his hands; that inconvenient survival, the Governor's Council, must be consulted and must give its "advice and consent;" that lumbering engine of democracy, the General Court, must be watched and delicately manipulated, to the end that with what wisdom it should enact might be mingled the minimum of folly. There were manifold duties of a representative nature, too, which took him the length and breadth of the State to college commencements, reform schools, lunatic asylums, prisons, and county

¹ Andrew's only appointment to the Supreme Court was that of the late Horace Gray.

fares. Tiring as these excursions were, it was impossible for him to make them perfunctory. To him they were a valuable opportunity for establishing between him and his "people" the human touch by which the virtue of democracy was renewed in him. Over and above these occupations of the hour were the hopes and dreams for the future, the large plans in the field of education and commercial development, in pondering which he found rest from his daily drudgery. Many incidents in the story of the domestic affairs of the Commonwealth from 1861 to 1866 are of interest here; some even show Andrew in a new light.

The task of choosing fit men for civil appointment was, in its way, as great a responsibility for Andrew as the selection of suitable officers for the volunteer regiments. On the careful thought which he devoted to this task, whether the office were great or small, Bird has made some interesting comments.

No magistrate could apply himself more carefully, laboriously and conscientiously, in filling any responsible position, to find the right man for the right place; and while, in making appointments, he forgot himself absolutely, if it was possible for a human being to do so, — literally, as he used to say, never making an appointment to suit himself, — and while it always rejoiced him to oblige his friends, still, no importunities of the dearest friends could induce him to make an appointment or recommend a measure which did not accord with his sense of public duty.¹

¹ *Boston Commonwealth*, February 1, 1868.

In all his appointments Andrew kept well within party lines, considering, as Bird remarks, "the triumph of the Republican party as essential to the national safety as he did the triumph of our arms in the field. Hence, every civil appointment made by him as Governor, without a single exception, unless my memory fails me, was that of a pronounced Republican. I do not recollect that he ever appointed a commissioner, or an inspector, even, of one of our almshouses, from the Democratic party."¹ Still, though a candidate for office must be orthodox in politics, he was never discriminated against on account of his religious affiliations. "We were amused, at one time," writes Bird,¹ "at the reply he made to a complaint that he had appointed too many Unitarians as trustees of one of our schools of reform. 'Perhaps so,' said he; 'I will make it right when the next vacancy occurs. I will appoint a *Roman Catholic*.' And he did."

Not one of Andrew's friends, says Bird, when their expectations were disappointed in the case of any applicant, ever doubted his honesty or his independence.² The failing which they most frequently

¹ Boston *Commonwealth*, February 1, 1868.

² Of Andrew's vigorous way of disregarding the politician's motto that a public man ought to refuse a request as if he were conferring a favor, E. P. Whipple says: "It was hard to say to an applicant for office, as he is reported once to have said, 'Sir, I have patiently listened to all you have urged in behalf of your claims, and I must frankly tell you that your chance of getting the place is about as great as your chance of being killed by lightning on the top of Mount Washington in January.'" — Eulogy on John Albion Andrew, delivered by Edwin P. Whipple, in Music Hall, November 26, 1867.

blamed in him was strictly the fault of one of his virtues ; he was incorrigibly eager to give men of doubtful reputation another chance. This deliberate putting of the interests of the State in jeopardy for the sake of the ultimate regeneration of some weak brother Andrew was evidently able to justify to himself on the ground that the State was made for man and not man for the State, but many of his frank advisers unceasingly protested. The expostulation that follows, made one month before Andrew left office, came from one of the frankest of them.

My dear Governor, if the Lord forgives knaves, he is equally forgiving to honest men, why will you therefore surround yourself with —— and —— and —— and a host of others to your great moral and mental woolgathering and to the disgust of your friends who are at least indifferent honest. I fear this bad appointment when you had a State full of honorable disabled officers to select an Inspector General from has cost us our Militia and you a benefaction you might have left on going out of an office you have filled so gloriously in spite of your crazy optimism.

Your old blackguard,

H. L. Jr.¹

Such optimism, crazy or not, was part and parcel of the man. There is little reason to believe that remonstrances had any effect on him. His reply to them all would have been that which he made when standing up for his rights against Butler : “ Those

¹ Henry Lee, November 29, 1865.

who disapprove of my decision must find a remedy in choosing another for Governor."

The body established by the Constitution of Massachusetts and known as the Executive Council was originally elected from among the forty senators of the General Court, but the system whereby nine seats were left vacant in the Senate every year that their occupants might be given the empty honor of being tail to the executive kite was found not to work well, and in 1855 the State was divided into eight districts, in each one of which a councillor is elected by popular vote. The office is not one of great dignity, for, since the function of the Council is limited to a veto power, the real responsibility for executive acts lies with the governor.¹ Thus it was not surprising that the five Councils with which Andrew had to deal were made up of men who, though earnest, were rarely of first-rate ability, and were generally disposed to magnify their office. They did a good deal of work for the Governor: the task of examining applications for pardon from prison they took off his hands, according to custom, and, especially at the beginning of the war, standing committees of the Council were of great service to him in going into

¹ Ex-Governor Clifford, in a letter commiserating Andrew on the subject of the Council, told a story that illustrates the restricted functions of this peculiar body. At a session of the Council in the term of Governor Levi Lincoln, a verdant member, bored with the debate, arose, and "moved to adjourn." "Governor Lincoln looked up with a jovialike dignity that terrified the new member and replied: 'The honorable councillor seems to think that this is a legislative chamber. When I do not desire the presence of the Council I shall dissolve the sitting.'"

such matters of detail as the auditing of military expenses. When, however, these men met together to advise and consent, — their session coming, in busy times of year, almost every afternoon, and lasting from one to three hours, — it is easy to believe that Andrew went into their comfortable chamber with little zest. His constitutional obligation to consult them collectively, Browne remarks, “not only with regard to all matters of pardon, but with regard also to almost all matters whatsoever of administration, whether of finance or appointment, was a great drain upon his patience. But there were certain advantages in it,” the systematic secretary goes on to say patronizingly, “which he was quick to appreciate. Chiefly, it methodized in his own mind the reasons for his acts. The necessity oftentimes of expressing reasons to the Council, and the liability at all times to be called on to express them, compelled him to avoid altogether that vagueness of thought which accompanies the actions of most men.”¹ The strain on Andrew’s patience was sometimes too great to be borne; then the Council was likely to receive in full force the pent-up irritation of the day, as an anecdote of Bird’s seems to show.

A claim was referred to the Council for payment of the balance of a bill for army wagons which had been disallowed by a previous Council. Personal controversy had arisen between the claimant for the payment and one of the Councillors, the latter being one of the Governor’s most intimate friends and

¹ Browne, p. 56.

valued advisers. The matter having been referred to the committee on accounts, they came to the conclusion that the balance was equitably due and so reported to the Council. One gentleman of the committee espoused quite warmly the claimant's side of the controversy with the former Councillor, and he was cautioned not to make any disparaging allusions to that gentleman in the discussions that might take place before the Governor. Being an orator of the "spread eagle" persuasion, he forgot the caution, and almost in the first sentence of his speech assailed very severely the ex-Councillor. This roused all the Governor's personal loyalty, and with a terrific explosion of wrath he instantly suppressed the offender, seizing the papers, taking the case into his own hands, and adjourning the session. The blow was so sudden and crushing as completely to stun the soaring declaimer. Upon recovering, however, he was furious at this invasion of his rights. And well he might be! But there was no help for him. The matter could not be brought before the Council without the permission of the Governor, and when there, no motion could be made and no vote taken unless proposed by him. Upon consultation it was agreed that the matter should be brought again before the Council, and I was requested to negotiate with the Governor that he should be absent and allow the Lieutenant-Governor to preside. To this he readily agreed. The claimant got his money, and the erring Councillor remembered the incident. [It] taught him never to attack the Governor's friends.¹

The Executive Council, whatever else might be said of it, showed tractability, — a quality which is

¹ Boston *Commonwealth*, February 1, 1868.

conspicuously absent in legislative bodies. Moreover, with a legislature Andrew was even less adapted to deal than with a council. He was the last man in the world to pull wires, to whisper a word in the ear of a recalcitrant senator or representative. Then, too, he was all for speed and efficiency; he could not wait for the slow performance of a deliberative body, in which the proper exercise of the functions of democracy seems to count for more than the result to be attained. In time of peace he might have submitted to this necessity with merely a murmur or two, but in the stress of war he had no patience with debate and division. Here was the emergency of the country; what was a democracy good for if it were too much Constitution-bound, too little humanized, to be able to reckon with exigencies and exceptions? Such an attitude, it is needless to say, was no lubricant to allay the natural friction which exists between the legislative and the executive branches of a government. "Warrington," with his expert's¹ knowledge of governors and legislators, once remarked, on the occasion of a refusal by the General Court to make a small increase in the stipend of Joe Spear, "who has worked day and night, doing probably three or five times as much as ever messenger did before": "The fact that he was the governor's messenger did not help the matter any. I have never yet known a governor popular to the legislature, or a legislature popular

¹ With the exception of the year 1861, "Warrington" was clerk of the House throughout Andrew's term.

with the governor, — at least after the first year of the gubernatorial term.”¹ “Indeed,” says Chandler,² “it is a remarkable fact, that while an unquestionable majority of the people were in his favor, a majority of the Legislature was really opposed to him, although not venturing upon any direct collision. A leading member of the House and of the party, at the session of 1862, told me that Governor Andrew ought never again to be a candidate for the office of governor; that his reelection was impossible.”

Even at the risk of making too much of this opposition, one is tempted to tell the story of some of the consequent embroilments, for never was Andrew's behavior more characteristic. In the session of 1864 the chairman of the Finance Committee of the House had lost no opportunity for finding fault with the Governor's financial management during the preceding year. These attacks, “made with perhaps more than the usual assurance of that gentleman,”³ naturally operated to prejudice the representatives against the Governor's policy, particularly as no contradiction was made either on the floor of the House or from the Executive Chamber. Thus it came to pass that, when a loan bill appropriating ten million dollars as a bounty fund was to be framed, a clause was inserted in it which provided that the Finance Committee of each branch of the General Court, “by concurrent action” with the Governor and Council,

¹ *Springfield Republican*, May 3, 1862.

² p. 28.

³ F. W. Bird, in the *Boston Commonwealth*, February 1, 1868.

should have a voice in deciding how the scrip should be disposed. With this provision the bill passed both branches and was presented to the Governor for approval. To say nothing of the personal insult to Andrew, such an excursion of the Legislature into the executive field was of doubtful constitutionality. Although the Legislature had thought to have things its own way by not sending the bill to the Executive Chamber before the last day of the session, Andrew was not to be imposed upon ; he wrote a veto message which, though brief, pointed out to the Legislature the egregious mixture of governmental functions which it had wished to make. This veto message, as it happened, was the third which the General Court had received from the Governor within twenty-four hours. The first, that of the so-called "Jury Bill," was intended to put a quietus upon a grossly unfair piece of temperance legislation ; the second indicated his disapproval of the ingenious way in which the legislators had presented themselves with a bonus of a hundred dollars each at the end of the session. It was clearly the time for some reprisal, if the General Court was to show its spirit ; accordingly, the second bill was, in legislative language, "placed upon its final passage, notwithstanding the Governor's objections," and, having received the requisite number of votes in each branch, became a law ; the necessary clause appropriating the money for the bonus was added to the general appropriation bill, which was the omnium gatherum of the last days ; the loan bill was left buried under the Gov-

ernor's veto ; and the usual committee was sent to the Governor to announce that the General Court had finished its business and to request that he prorogue the session.

In their eagerness the greedy legislators had overreached themselves, for the general appropriation bill was still without the Governor's signature. The way in which Andrew improved the opportunity has been told by Bird, who, as a member of the Council, witnessed the scene.

It was Saturday. The members were impatient to leave for their homes, and those from a distance had commenced drawing their pay from the Treasury. The appropriation-bill not having been signed, the Governor notified the Treasurer that he had no legal right to pay a dollar to one of the members, and that if he had made, or should make, any such payment, he (the Governor) would hold him personally responsible. This brought matters to a "deadlock." Had the appropriation-bill been signed, the members would have taken their pay and left the two houses without a quorum, throwing the responsibility of the failure of the loan-bill upon the Governor. . . . But they had no notion of going home without their pay. "What are you going to do?" I asked the Governor, as we sat looking each other in the face, waiting for something to turn up. "Do? I am going to let those fellows know that *we* run this machine! They have had their way all winter abusing us, and now I am going to have mine! We have got to carry on this government, and they must pass a loan-bill that will enable us to do it. Not a man of them shall get his pay, nor will I prorogue them,

until they have passed a loan-bill such as we have agreed is necessary."

Learning that a committee was to wait upon the Governor to inform him that the two branches, having finished all the business before them were ready to be prorogued, I suggested to him that perhaps he had better put upon paper what he intended to say to them. "No!" he said; "I am going to say some things that I don't want to go upon paper." The committee entered, and made the customary announcement. Whereupon His Excellency pronounced the most savage philippic, I think, with which those ancient walls ever resounded. He told them that he would not sign the appropriation-bill, and they could not get their pay until they had recalled the loan-bill, which was in his hands, had reconsidered it, and had inserted such provisions in it as he indicated.¹ . . .

The Committee made their bow and retired. It was a bitter pill, but there was no alternative. The chairman of the Finance Committee, concluding that the better part of valor was discretion, had early in the day deserted the House, ingloriously leaving his associates to extricate themselves as best they could from the dilemma in which he had involved them. The House recalled the bill, inserted the provisions demanded by the Governor,¹ and reënacted it. Both bills were then approved by the Governor, and the long agony was over.²

¹ Bird, trusting to memory, had forgotten Andrew's veto of the loan bill, and the point of his objection, namely, that a deliberative body should not attempt to participate in the functions of the Executive. Andrew's demand was for the omission of the words: "and a committee of the legislature, consisting of the Committee on the Treasury of the Senate and the Committee on Finance of the House of Representatives, by concurrent action."

² *Boston Commonwealth*, February 1, 1868.

A difficulty of a similar nature involved the Governor and the General Court in the last days of the session of 1865. The usury laws of the State forbade the charging of a higher rate of interest upon money than six per cent. In his message of 1861 Andrew had recommended that this restriction be removed so that the law should be more in accordance with the financial practice of the country ; but though he repeated his recommendation from year to year, the borrowing class opposed it, preferring to hold on as long as possible to the financial advantage of the law. With the progress of the war, however, the State was forced to increase its rate of interest, for the competition of the United States Government, which was paying seven and three-tenths per cent., told heavily against it. The last days of the session found the two branches of the General Court wrangling over the proposal to make the higher rate of interest legal in Massachusetts. As "Warrington" explained to the readers of the *Springfield Republican*, "the quarrel . . . was between the commercialists, who control the Senate, and the agriculturists, who control the House. The Senate recommended the repeal of the laws, knowing it would not be disagreeable to the Governor, and the House fought it as long as it could."¹ After two separate conference committees had tried to bring the houses to an agreement and failed, the General Court, having finished its other business, asked to be prorogued. The Governor sent a curt

¹ May 27, 1865.

reply to the effect that the financial arrangements for the current year were extremely unsatisfactory, and that he must have the power, in case of need, to offer more than six per cent. If the House would adopt the Senate bill, legalizing for one year the rate of seven and three-tenths per cent., he would prorogue the Legislature. The House knuckled under at once. It concurred with the Senate as rapidly as legislative forms would permit, and the session was prorogued.

Such amenableness on the part of the lower branch at the first hint of discipline naturally gives rise to the reflection that the Legislature of 1865 was not one of those bodies which prove the supremacy of the representative form of government. Its other follies were perhaps even worse than this one, and the Boston *Advertiser*, in reviewing the session, shook its head dismally over the legislative decline in the last two years. The General Court of 1865, it declared, had fallen fully as low as that of 1855, — the picnicking body which the Know-Nothing movement had brought into power; and in order to preserve it from continued bathos, Andrew had been obliged to keep up “a running fight of veto and explanatory messages.”¹ Resenting this direction, the General Court had retaliated in acts of petty spite. A committee of the House, appointed to compare the salaries of the military officials whose pay was fixed by the Governor with those of men in similar positions whose pay was fixed by the Legislature,

¹ May 19, 1865.

came back with a terrible story of excessive salaries lavished by Andrew on the members of his "family," and "glaring inconsistencies" between these sums and those which a discriminating and impartial deliberative body saw fit to bestow. The report recommended that steps be taken to repeal the bill under the provisions of which, ever since the beginning of the war, the Governor had fixed the salaries of the members of his General Staff. The frenzy of persecution was so strong in the House that no one was willing, by taking Andrew's side, to risk the imputation of being friendly to the Governor. So he was obliged to come to his own defence. In a sharp letter to the chairman of the special committee he called attention to the errors in the auditor's report upon which their inferences had been based, proving to them by an exhibition of the true facts of the case that "the inequality lies in precisely the opposite direction to that assumed by the Committee." Andrew's vindication (save the mark!) of his honesty was complete; needless to say, it did not ingratiate him with the House.

Of the twelve measures vetoed by Andrew during his five terms, two were passed by the General Court over his veto. One of these was the "salary grab" of 1864; the other was the bill making the usual decennial redistribution of towns and cities into congressional districts. A clause in the redistributing bill provided that the representative elected must be an inhabitant of the district which chose him. Though this restriction was by no means new,

it was one the constitutionality of which had been much discussed, and Andrew, being of opinion that a State has no right to superadd qualifications to those imposed by the Federal Constitution and by Congress, refused to sign the bill. His veto message contained many citations of high legal authority, and pointed out, besides, the absurdity of the restriction.

I cannot think [he said] that Daniel Webster was more familiar with the Plymouth District and its people, merely for the fact of his legal domicile in Marshfield, where he spent a few weeks of the year, than he was with the people and interests of the Boston District, where he had resided for years, and where were the seat and centre of his political, social, and business life. Nor can I think that the transference of the town of Quincy from one District to another, rendered John Quincy Adams any more or less fitted to represent either the one or the other of them.

Nevertheless, the apologetic tone of his message, his insistence on the necessity of discharging his duty according to the dictates of conscience, made it plain that he felt himself to be urging what the General Court would consider matters of fine-spun theory. When his arguments were brushed aside as if they were cobwebs, and the bill was promptly passed over his veto, he probably was not surprised.

A piece of legislation in which Andrew had little part beyond recommending it in his annual messages of 1861 and 1862 was the repeal of what was known as the Two Years' Amendment. One result of the

Know-Nothing movement in Massachusetts had been the adoption by the Legislatures of 1858 and 1859 of a Constitutional Amendment providing that no person of foreign birth should be permitted to vote until after two years of residence in the United States subsequent to his naturalization. Even before the amendment was ratified by the people a reaction against it had begun to set in, and after the beginning of the war, when the significance of regiments of Germans and Irish formed to defend the land of their adoption could not but impress itself upon even the bitterest member of the American party, pure sense of shame, if nothing else, demanded the repeal of the oppressive discrimination against citizens of foreign birth. The act of repeal was passed by the successive Legislatures of 1862 and 1863, and the popular vote upon it was, as Andrew declared it would be, "all one way."

The first act of the Legislature to provide money for the war expenses of Massachusetts was at the special session of May, 1861, when a Union Fund of \$3,000,000 was established. This was increased in the next year by \$600,000, and at the same time an act was passed requiring the payment of interest on the indebtedness of the State to be made in coin. Thus at the beginning the good faith of Massachusetts was assured to all. The money needed for the payment of State Aid, an annual sum of considerably over \$1,000,000, was raised by taxation. In payment for the heavy guns purchased for coast defence, loans were issued in 1863 and 1864 to the

amount of \$888,000, and for state bounties in 1863 to the amount of \$200,000. In 1864, when the term of enlistment for men in the regiments of 1861 expired, and the quota of the State could be filled only by the payment of large bounties, the General Court authorized the creation of a Bounty Fund of \$10,000,000, the interest at five per cent. to be paid in gold. In carrying into effect this financial legislation Andrew, wherever discretion was given him, relied upon the advice of John M. Forbes, Henry Lee, Jr., and Samuel G. Ward, the representative of Baring Brothers, for he recognized his own inexperience in such matters. Nevertheless, when the attempt was made during the session of 1864 to provide him with a legislative committee whose advice he must take concerning the disposal of the Bounty Loan of \$10,000,000, he resented the interference with his constitutional powers and defended himself, with what success has already been told. The events which followed the adjournment of the General Court showed the need of his having power to act unhampered and in accordance with the best financial advice that he could obtain. In the early summer the premium on gold mounted as high as 185. Under these circumstances the Governor and Council decided not to attempt to sell the bonds, but to obtain what money was needed by means of temporary loans at a higher rate of interest.

I opposed [Andrew wrote to John M. Forbes] . . . the issue from our Treasury of five per cent gold bearing scrip, and strained the law to make

short six per cent currency scrip instead, — because no one will ever pay any large premium for gold bearing scrip, even when gold was nearly three to one, — and I wanted to save the Commonwealth the enormous premium gold would have cost us. Six per cent in currency is about half what our interest account would have been. Moreover, I thought it poor policy for Massachusetts to become a needless competitor in the gold market, and thus help to increase the inflation.

We sold what we could at a hundred and fifteen quietly when gold was much higher than it now is. At present prices of gold we are selling some for a hundred and five and paying off our loan to the banks. Had we piled it onto the market last year, we should have crushed the price down nearly to par, high even as gold was ruling, — so unwilling were people to bid any price corresponding to that of gold, especially when the United States scrip was offering such temptations.¹

In consequence of this success, the Legislature of 1865 yielded to Andrew's desire that the War Fund of \$10,000,000 established in that year should bear interest at six per cent. in currency. His plans for disposing of the bonds show that, having brought the State safely through the trials of the preceding year, he considered himself entitled to take its financial interests into his own charge. The letter to Forbes just quoted continues: —

By the way, when we get ready to issue our six per cent currency bonds, I think I must take hold of the thing myself. I have hitherto appointed a

¹ March 13, 1865.

committee of the Council on Finance to confer with the Treasurer, and to keep the more immediate oversight of those things in which the Governor and Council have the responsibility. That, however, is a rather clumsy way. And since our Treasurer is not a practical man of finance, I want, if I can, to find out the best method of feeling and of manipulating the market, the best agency or *modus operandi* of popularizing the loan and getting it rapidly absorbed — and to endeavor to impress the Treasury, personally, both with snap and with discretion, desiring earnestly to bring things up as tight and snug as may be before my year is out. Can you make any suggestions in this connection? And who are the best people to talk with likely to be competent and willing to help with good ideas or otherwise?

The letter which Andrew wrote a few months later to the Treasurer of the Commonwealth shows him taking the work in hand.

JOHN A. ANDREW TO HENRY K. OLIVER

June 30, 1865.

MY DEAR SIR, — Have you not prepared any *statement* for the newspapers showing the conditions and wants of the Treasury? We cannot get along without putting a certain snap and energy into the business of dealing with the money market. Somebody must take up the matter, use the press and influence public opinion. Ours is the best security by far offered to lenders. But they don't know the facts, and they don't even know how to find them out. I have *surprised* some of them myself by showing them the figures.

Now there ought not to be a reading old woman

on the top of the hills of Savoy¹ who by the 4th of July does not know all about it.

Why *don't* we have a voice in every newspaper in the state, worth a thought or a look. I used this instrumentality for three years in aid of volunteering, but in doing so I only got a realizing sense of what every Pill Doctor and vender of Patent Clothes-pins comprehended and acted on long ago. We want six millions and a half of dollars to fund our debt. Having that we can dry up for a generation.

Fervently yours,

JOHN A. ANDREW.

Andrew's summing up, in his last message to the Legislature, of his management of finances may serve as summary here.

The policy of the Executive department as regards its financial operations, has been, not to force our bonds upon the market and thereby diminish their value, but to dispose of them in such a manner as would realize to the State the most money. Consequently the State has had a large floating debt, bearing five, six or seven three-tenths per cent. interest (according to date of deposit,) for some three years past; and by adapting the rates of interest to the needs of the State, no serious difficulty has disturbed its financial operations — since the Legislature at its last session increased the legal rate of interest, none whatever. During the past two years, the State has sold eight million six hundred thousand dollars (\$8,600,000) of its five per cent. gold-bearing interest bounty fund scrip, in dollar and in

¹ A tiny town among the Berkshire hills.

sterling bonds, at an average rate of 103 per cent. ; while at the same time United States ten-forties, bearing the same interest, have sold at an average not exceeding ninety-four per cent., these bonds being, like all United States bonds, free from taxation. The City of Boston five per cent. bonds, which, in 1864, sold at five per cent. above the State bonds, are now selling at less price than we obtained for our last sterling bonds, thus showing the policy of the Executive department in its financial operations, to have been judicious and successful. . . .

The Governor and Council had these duties: 1st. To provide for the wants of the Treasury, so that its obligations should be promptly met. 2d. To prevent all depreciation of the credit of the Commonwealth, and to that end maintain the price of her securities. 3d. To procure money at the least expense. 4th. To fund the floating debt, necessarily created in time of war. In their opinion all these ends have been accomplished.

One of the most striking examples of Andrew's independence of legislative opinion, even when it was backed by a large body of public sentiment, was his attitude toward the prohibitory law that was on the statute-books during his administration. Since its adoption in 1855 it was supposed to have operated successfully in towns and in the smaller cities, but the manner of its enforcement in a city of the size of Boston was altogether inadequate. Andrew was an ardent opponent of the principle of sumptuary legislation, and nothing would have pleased him more than that his administration should go down to history as one in which the law

was done away with. Nevertheless, recognizing the fact that it was his fate to be a war governor and that his first duty was to keep the State steady in the support of the national government, he took no active steps that might produce division on a local issue. All that he did in opposition to the friends of the "liquor law" was without reference to the principle of Prohibition, and was confined strictly to formal criticism of their attempts at further legislation. One reason why the law was difficult to enforce was that juries constantly failed to convict known violators of it, and in 1864 the party of Prohibition was able to put through the General Court a bill the object of which was to make ineligible for jury duty men who were connected with the liquor interest. The measure was so carelessly drawn, however, that Andrew was able to make short work of it, chiefly on the score of its verbal inconsistencies and ambiguities. In the next Legislature the fight was renewed. When the new measure, also, generally known as the "Jury Bill," came to him, he mustered all his resources of legal argument to crush it. It was defective verbally because the men who drew it up, being unwilling to name its precise purpose, had framed it to exclude from jury service all men engaged in occupations made criminal by law. The result was, as Andrew took great satisfaction in pointing out, that "whoever puts or receives on board a vessel or a wagon any smoked or pickled fish, for sale, not properly inspected or branded; whoever sells fruit or vegetables or nuts by other

than dry measure," and so on through a long list, was subject to exclusion. The weight of his objection he massed against the evident tendency of the bill, which gave to the Commonwealth the right of peremptory challenge, to create juries organized "not for the purpose of trying the accused, but for the purpose of convicting them." Andrew had too often been counsel for a friendless criminal, he had too often made use of every legal safeguard to protect the free negroes in Massachusetts, not to be thoroughly aroused at this attempt to abridge the fairness of trial by jury. The political possibilities of such an abridgment did not escape him. "The legislation of a Republic or a Democracy," he said, "can be . . . despotic. . . . We have seen slavery and politics strong enough in their combination to dictate laws not consistent either with statesmanship or humanity. And we have seen the humble citizen standing secure behind the shield of a free and independent jury — his sole defence against the power of an arrogant and passionate majority." His strong feeling on the matter he betrayed in the concluding sentences of his veto message.

With entire respect for the intelligence and integrity of other minds, I must for myself hold fast to this institution conservative of Liberty, maintaining it in its fair and harmonious proportions, as the product of ages, the fruit of wisdom and experience. Yea, maintaining it without variation or shadow of turning, even if I stand alone. If the right of fair trial by an independent jury for those accused of

crime shall ever be lost or become endangered in Massachusetts, I am not one of those who will be responsible for the catastrophe.

The blow which the Governor had delivered the Act in Relation to Jurors was such a staggering one that the friends of the measure were unable to rally enough votes to override his veto. Sore and angry as they were, they would have derived some comfort from their defeat if thereby they had obliged Andrew to take an open stand against them on the score of his opposition to the prohibitory law. In the last days of the session they set a new trap in such a way that they were sure he could not help springing it. A resolve was introduced in the Senate declaring "that it is not expedient or right in principle to authorize the sale of intoxicating liquors, as a beverage, by license." When this resolve should have passed both houses, the Governor would find himself squarely confronted with the necessity of refusing his signature to the resolve by reason of the sentiment which it professed. Andrew, however, did not wait for this exigency. He despatched a special message to the Senate, saying that, since the resolve was "only the expression of an opinion on an abstract proposition," his signing or refusing to sign it would mean that he had assumed the right of revising other people's judgments on matters of morality; accordingly, it would be useless to send it to the Executive Chamber. After that the supporters of the resolve quietly let the matter drop.

Still another measure of the legislative session of

1865 forced Andrew to take a stand against the leaders of the cause of Prohibition. By way of carrying out that control of the cities by the rural districts which seems to be a persistent characteristic of the prohibitory system, they introduced a bill placing the police force of the city of Boston under the control of the State. They proved to be not strong enough to carry the bill against the opposition of the Governor and the Boston members; neither could they prevent the addition of an amendment suggested by him which extended such a police system over the entire State, or the passage of the measure in that form. Though, if they could have foreseen this result, they probably would never have proposed the original plan, they were now estopped from protest because they could ill afford to be charged with not desiring an equal enforcement of the law. That Boston was not the only place where the statute was disregarded was plain, when after a half-year's work the constable whom Andrew had appointed to command the new police force—a volunteer officer with an excellent record—reported that of 1400 convictions of liquor dealers more than 500 were outside Suffolk County, and that the number of dealers discontinuing their traffic was 459 for Suffolk and 1353 for the rest of the State.¹ Thanks to Andrew's vigor in enforcing the law, when once the means were put into his hands, the working of the prohibitory system throughout the State was more nearly satisfactory when he left office than it had

¹ Report of the Constable of the Commonwealth for 1865.

ever been before. His method revealed, as it always must reveal, the radical fault of the system, and he doubtless took satisfaction in the thought that his active enforcement of the law as governor would make more effective whatever he might later be able to do as a private citizen to cause the statute to be repealed.

In the same year in which Andrew set the prohibitionists against him he also outraged the convictions of another portion of the community. In this case he was, if possible, still more obstinate, refusing to yield his ground even before the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth. In the month of December, 1863, a young man, Edward W. Green by name, in attempting to rob a bank in Malden, shot and killed the assistant cashier, Frank E. Converse. Having been arraigned before Judge Hoar of the Supreme Court, he pleaded guilty of murder in the second degree, and when the attorney-general refused to accept this plea, — for the victim had been shot down in cold blood, — the Court instructed Green that he must plead either "Guilty in the first degree" or "Not guilty." By the advice of his counsel Green accepted the first alternative, and was at once sentenced to be hanged. That it should be possible for a criminal to adjudge himself worthy of the gallows, — to commit suicide by process of law, — was utterly repugnant to Andrew. According to his thinking, the man capable of committing this murder was morally so diseased as to be incapable of assessing his deed at its ethical and still less at its legal valuation. Having found, as

he believed, a technical justification for this opinion in that provision of the statutes of Massachusetts which declares that the degree of murder must be determined by the jury, he delayed signing Green's death-warrant. In October, 1864, with the consent of the Council, he asked the Supreme Court for an opinion as to whether the Court should have allowed the prisoner to plead anything more than simply "Guilty." The reply was that the provision of the statute which he quoted had application only to cases which came before a jury, and that it was a well-established rule of common law that "a party indicted for an offence, however grave its nature, may enter a plea of guilty thereto, if he sees fit to do so." Since Andrew's doubt was not resolved, he asked the Council to commute Green's sentence to imprisonment for life; it refused. He thereupon made an investigation, which covered the manner of the trial, the mental condition of the prisoner, and every possible point of law, with the result that he was more than ever convinced of the validity of his contention. Therefore he persisted in his refusal to sign the death-warrant, his purpose being to prepare, as soon as he should find time, a statement of his points in legal form for presentation to the Council.

Meanwhile, as the months went on and Green still remained in prison, unchanged, many complaints began to be heard at the delay. Andrew's known hostility to the death sentence, and the fact that in his annual messages he had more than once recommended that it be done away with as "an intrusive reminis-

cence of more barbarous times," were now remembered, and the accusation was brought against him that on account of a private scruple he was violating his sworn obligation as Chief Executive of the Commonwealth. An attempt of the Senate, near the end of the session of 1865, to set on foot an investigation of all Andrew's pardons brought the matter still further before the public. Men wrote to him to inquire whether it were affiliation with the Masonic body that prevented him from signing Green's death-warrant; anonymous letter-writers vilified him and laid at his door the responsibility for a murder done in Roxbury about this time; handbills were thrown about the streets of Boston demanding that the Governor explain his refusal to hang "the Malden murderer." In this agitation a conspicuous part was taken by religious newspapers of the orthodox type, particularly the *Congregationalist*. Holding rigid views of punishment in this world as well as in the next, they had long regarded Andrew's opposition to capital punishment, as well as his desire for legislation permitting the innocent party in a divorce granted for adultery to remarry, in the light of manifestations of loose Unitarian doctrine. When, in April, 1865, Andrew presided over the first meeting of Unitarians as a national body, one of the subjects of debate in the framing of a constitution had been whether or not the organization should describe itself as "Christian." Between this fact and his refusal to sign Green's death-warrant his evangelical opponents saw a close connection, and

they accused him of seeking to impose his particular heresies on the Commonwealth. To all this hubbub Andrew made no reply. His back was broad enough, he said, to receive whatever amount of abuse might be heaped on it; for the rest, if no one else stood ready to give the criminal the uttermost protection, he would stand alone. He would make one more effort with the Council, no matter how long might be the delay. When he received through Bird a letter referring to some of the most intemperate newspaper attacks, he endorsed it as follows: —

I appreciate Doct. Hitchcock's kindness. I have not seen any of the paragraphs he alludes to. But, the man who writes as he indicates is "a liar, a scoundrel and a coward." If he is a minister, he is also a hypocrite. A man of decent honor wd come and ask me for my views before making such an accusation. — Suppose a case was argued before the full bench S. J. C., and the judge waited a year before deciding, what wd he say? — And yet, in my own practice I have known *two* years to elapse before a decision and after argument.

I work as hard as I can — so hard that I am getting sleepless from over-work. I began last Sat., for example, at the office at 7¼ and kept on till 6.10 with but one meal eaten, and one half hours rest for that. *I cant even get time to write out my points.* But, when I can I will. Yrs J. A. A.

A letter which he wrote a few days later replies to categorical questions.

July 6, 1865.

It is utterly untrue that I ever advised the Legislature to increase the facilities for divorce. I advised

the Legislature to empower the Supreme Judicial Court to enable a *divorced* person to marry again, when reasons sufficient in the Court's discretion exist therefor. And the very Legislature which refused to give that power to the Court did by special act or resolve do the same thing, or rather worse, for *four persons*. And yet it is plain to my mind that such discretion is safer with the Court, where *somebody* is responsible, than it is with the Legislature, where there are three hundred men, of whom it is not easy to hold even *ONE responsible*. It is a power properly *judicial*, and not legislative.

2. Gov. Banks signed the death-warrant of Desmarteau, not I. He violated and then murdered a little girl, just what was done in West Roxbury the other day. By some accident the execution was fixed for *Good-Friday*. I did not wish to disturb those Christians to whom that is the most solemn of all holy-days, being set apart to commemorate the *passion* of our LORD, by an execution. I asked the consent of the Council to postpone it. With that consent, it was postponed. No reason appeared why the law shd not be executed on the prisoner; and after carefully hearing and reading everything urged in his favor, I did not think it my duty to ask the Council to consent to defeat farther or delay the penalty.

3. In two other cases, not mentioned in this article, I have under a sense of my official duty signed the warrant for execution; and the penalty of death in both instances was inflicted. One of them was the case of a white man, a native of Massachusetts. The other, of a black man, — also I think a native of Massachusetts.

4. I do not belong and never belonged to the

society of Free Masons. I belong to no secret societies. They may be useful to others. They would be only hindrances to me. I neither oppose nor agree with such institutions. Let those who wish them enjoy them. I have no curiosity and no animosity in the premises. I for myself simply want to know nothing which I must not tell to others freely, if I choose.

5. As to Green — I am doing my duty. That is enough for me. And, I am willing, when the passionate gust of unreasoning (and mainly, I grieve to say, theological) feeling has passed by us, — to rest my whole reputation as a civil magistrate upon my conduct in that case alone. Let my credit for fidelity to duty and to the *law*, my moral and my intellectual judgment, my name and fame, abide that test alone. I will stand or fall — as God pleases — on that single test of the character of my civil career. At present those who publicly by speech and pen reproach me will not take the trouble first to learn the most accessible facts, nor to ask me about them. The presumption is that a sworn magistrate is acting according to his oath, and is doing right. They assume the contrary. Of course, I cannot reply.

6. Let me add that it is one of the “curiosities of history” that although I have passed through four annual elections unchallenged by the people on account of the heresies, as they are deemed, concerning divorce and the death-penalty, it now appears, when I am no longer a candidate that my attitude as a Unitarian (by presiding at the National Convention), has apparently called forth a shower of such demonstrations. Now, I am not very good, not very consistent. But, what I think it my duty to say, I speak out. I am nobody’s slave, though I am

the daily and nightly servant of the humblest and poorest citizen. And since the duty of my office demands me to declare my solemn convictions to the Legislature, I cannot conceal them ; nor does any modesty of opinion counsel reserve ; for I share those very opinions with some of the most experienced and most conservative of statesmen, living and dead.

It was not until the last week of Andrew's term that he finished the long-delayed opinion for the Council. Then, in order that this unhappy legal legacy might not be left to his successor, he delivered his argument and again asked that Green's sentence be commuted to imprisonment for life. By a vote of six to three the Council refused its consent. In March, 1866, when Governor Bullock had signed the death-warrant, Andrew had the case brought before the Supreme Court on a writ of error, and after the arguments had been heard, he published his opinion in the newspapers. The impressive words with which he concluded his prefatory statement show how firmly he held to his conviction.

Relying on the principles of law in the *Gardner* case (11 Gray, 438), I had, in two instances, issued warrants for the execution of the penalty of death. If the law is not correctly decided in that case, then those men were not lawfully executed. If the law is there correctly decided, an irresistible logic seemed to demonstrate the invalidity of the record against Green. I felt, therefore, a strong, and not unnatural, interest in adhering with consistency to the doctrine of that case. If it was not to be judicially adhered

to, with absolute logical consistency, then it was not safe to issue any more warrants for inflicting the punishment of death.¹

In spite of all these efforts, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its original decision, and the murderer, having been in prison for two years from the time of his sentence, was hanged.

This story of Andrew's resistance to the course of what he considered injustice is one of the best pieces of testimony that exist to his fearless independence. For him it was not enough to have every possible external sanction for ordering Green's execution. By temperament, by training, he attached no more importance to a preponderance of votes against him, whether in a popular election or in a decision of the full bench, than if it had never been recorded. His own conviction of right and wrong, — founded, in this instance, upon his twenty years' experience as a lawyer, — was his only ultimate guide. The abuse that was visited upon him fretted him greatly, for the wear and tear of hard public service had played havoc with his cheerful temper, but the thought of yielding his ground never once crossed his mind.

When the Governor was obliged to refuse invitations to any kind of celebration at a state institution, he never failed to express his regret that "the numerous labors and duties connected with the war have prevented him from bestowing that attention to civil institutions and from participating in civil

¹ See the Boston newspapers of March 29, 1866.

gatherings which in a peaceful time would have accorded so much with his tastes and desires." Yet few governors of Massachusetts have been more careful about visiting the state institutions¹ and none has succeeded, on the occasion of his visits, in leaving behind him an impression of greater personal interest in the inmates. Sometimes he came announced, sometimes unannounced ; generally he brought some one with him, — one of his children, a Councillor, or a member of his staff. Of course he almost always addressed the inmates as a body, but at almshouses, reform schools, and prisons it was his way also to make the personal acquaintance of men and women, boys and girls. Many a time he had himself shut into a man's cell alone with him, and once, by way of getting first-hand the point of view of a prisoner, he was locked up by himself for half an hour in a dark cell. It was his custom on Thanksgiving Day to go to the state prison at Charlestown. With the children of the State he won his way instantly. There is in existence a letter written by him to some children in the State Almshouse who had severally written to him, and the following note about the pupils in the Hartford school for deaf mutes² is evidence to his popularity there.

¹ "During his term of office there was hardly a place of confinement of criminals in the whole Commonwealth, from Nantucket to Berkshire, which he did not personally visit. He believed that care of our penal institutions was next in importance for the welfare of the State to the care of the schools." — Browne, p. 55.

² At that time, there being no such school in Massachusetts, the State had to send its deaf mutes to Hartford, Connecticut.

HENRY WARE¹ TO JOHN A. ANDREW

BOSTON, October 16, 1866.

DEAR GOVERNOR, — At the visit to the Hartford Asylum the other day, the pupils were called upon to welcome the Governor [Bullock] on their blackboards, and almost all of them lugged *you* into their compositions, after saluting his present Excellency. It was evident that your memory is held in affectionate remembrance by them all. But one good-looking young lady concluded her remarks about yourself in this manner, and, although the style smacks a little of an epitaph, I thought you would be pleased to see it.

“He was a large and pleasant man.”

“All of which, sir,” as Hamlet says, “I most powerfully and potently believe, and hold it honesty to have it thus set down.”

Yours Truly,

H. WARE.

While he was winning the confidence of the inmates of the various state institutions, the Governor was on the watch for every grievance that could be done away, every wrong that could be righted, in all sorts of matters, from diet to religion. He once dismissed a reform-school superintendent for destroying the Catholic newspapers which were sent to the boys by their friends; he improved the health of a whole prisonful of men by suggesting as an explanation for their troubles an excess of “that corn-fed business,” — a diet which he said he knew well from a boy.

¹ Henry Ware continued in the office of Private Secretary for a time under Andrew's successor.

Nothing was too small to take pains about ; no pains were too great to take. Browne tells the following story to illustrate Andrew's habit of holding his subordinates to their duty, but it is equally applicable here. On the day before Christmas he once found the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth closed half an hour earlier than usual.

There was a severe snow-storm raging, which suspended business through the city, and the clerks of that office had closed it, forgetting that there should have been drawn and forwarded up-stairs during the day, for the Governor's signature, a pardon which had been granted to a convict in the State Prison, according to a custom which prevailed with him to grant one pardon, upon the recommendation of the Warden, every Christmas morning. It irritated him that the clerks below should have forgotten such a duty. During his own hard work through the day, the thought of the happiness which the morrow would bring to that convict had lightened his heart, and he felt a positive pain that others should not have shared that feeling. Though unwell, he hastily broke out of the room, walked through the driving snow across the city to the house of one of the officers of the State Department, brought him back to the State House, stood by him while the pardon was drawn and the Great Seal of the Commonwealth was affixed to it, signed it, and then despatched it by one of his secretaries to the Warden at Charlestown.¹

Finally, Andrew looked at the work of the state institutions from the larger point of view of the reformer. Up to the middle of his term as governor

¹ Browne, pp. 54, 55.

each of them was managed by a separate board of inspectors, the members of which were appointed by the governor from among the people of the neighborhood. One bad result of this unscientific attitude of the State toward its institutions was that an improvement made in one of them might be for years unknown at another. As early as November, 1861, Andrew said in a letter that he had "more than a year ago . . . expressed the opinion that all our institutions, whether penal, reformatory or sanitary, should be under the supervision of a single board, with a competent Secretary," and that he intended to appoint a committee of the Council to investigate the whole subject. The following letter to S. G. Howe, written when Andrew was preparing his annual message for 1863, shows what more he would have liked to do.

December 15, 1862.

I wish you would, some early day this week, place on paper, for my edification, your views in reference to general and systematic improvements in our method of public charities.

I am delighted with the plan of the Girls' Industrial School at Lancaster, and with the plan, as it is conducted, of the School ship. I do not fancy the aggregation of vast numbers in great buildings. I like the two *little* families at Westboro, and I don't like the *great* concern. I don't see the use — in the country where there is land enough — of piling up bricks and stones on to each other, and making human beings climb over them hourly for generation after generation. Nor do I like the herding of human beings, so that each of them ceases to be known

by his individuality, but is only recognized as No. 1, or No. 500, with a Christian *name* to it, but with no character at all.

I confess I do *not* like our State pauper system. It is contrary to the law of God. We should keep the poor *with* us, not set them apart in great pens. It is not a natural order. In great cities we perforce must have some great almshouses. But, why should we multiply them, beyond the urgency of controlling circumstances? Why elevate the pauper into another estate of the realm?

I think the State pauper institutions more expensive than it would be to leave the State paupers — where they once were — to the towns, — compensating the towns reasonably with board money. Moreover, we should then have three hundred, instead of three, sets of officers, whose duty it would be to be on the lookout for employment for the paupers. And the paupers would be nearer to the places where, being known, they would be in the way of opportunity.

Now, I have just thrown out very crudely and hastily the direction my mind is taking. *You* have reflected a good deal and have learned a good deal on all such matters. I want you to help me get right in regard to some of the more important aspects of this great subject of reformatory and charitable institutions, — *and also to help me say it right*. I desire to call the attention of the Legislature to the subject, hoping now only to help give a little direction to the public mind, and that ultimately the fruit may begin to appear.

For lack of statistics on which to base his opinions, Andrew was obliged to forego making any such

suggestions; he contented himself with urging the Legislature to organize a committee which should devise a method of exact statistical returns from all the institutions, through which it should be able to "watch the symptoms of social disorder and disease in the body of the State, and to study the cure." In response the Legislature passed a law instituting the first State Board of Charities in the United States, and Andrew completed his share in the work by appointing its members, among whom was Mr. F. B. Sanborn, as Secretary, and afterwards S. G. Howe.

Keen as was Andrew's interest in the philanthropic and reformatory work of the State, it was surpassed, if possible, by his interest in education. In his reverence for the word he was a true son of New England; as a devoted believer in the principle of free schools he was fond of making the remark that "the rebellion itself would have been impossible had a system of Free Schools pervaded the Union." What attention he was able to give to the subject of education was concentrated on an effort to make Harvard a university in the broadest sense of the term, the head of the system to which the public schools belonged, the place of research and learning which should keep the standard high for all the instruction given throughout the State.

In 1862 Congress passed an act making available for the several states funds derived from the sale of public lands for "the endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college, where the leading object shall be . . . to teach such branches of learn-

ing as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts." Not long before this time Harvard University, of the board of overseers of which the governor of the State was chairman, *ex officio*, had received from Benjamin Bussey a bequest of land and money to be devoted to "instruction in practical agriculture, in useful and ornamental gardening, in botany, and in such other branches of natural science as may tend to promote a knowledge of practical agriculture, and the various arts subservient thereto." Also, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to which a charter had been granted in 1861, was still vainly seeking enough money to enable it to make a beginning. The possibility which occurred to Andrew of combining these scattered opportunities under the direction of the University at Cambridge was one of those visions which come only to minds of the broadest grasp, and which, once having conceived, no man could rest without seeking to accomplish. To put this scheme for consolidation properly before the General Court, by which action must be had on the congressional grant, he made it the chief matter of his message for 1863, preparing himself by consultation with professors and men of practical experience in the technical arts,¹ and by an investigation into agricultural colleges in the United States and in Europe. After explaining to the Legislature the terms of the grant and of the Bussey bequest, he urged the importance of combining them.

¹ For an interesting example of the letters he wrote, see the *Life of William B. Rogers*, vol. ii. p. 141.

This Congressional grant is exposed to the danger of being divided in each State among several unimportant seminaries, instead of being concentrated on one institution of commanding influence and efficiency. . . . We shall not use the grant of Congress wisely, if we make of it simply a means of giving farmers' sons such an education as they could obtain by living on a well-managed farm and attending an ordinary high school. It must be made the means of a positive increase of human knowledge in the departments bearing on agriculture and manufactures.

After describing such a school as he had in mind and giving an enumeration of its professorships, he was led naturally to a discussion of the university system, of which the school would be a part. "Let us plan to concentrate here," he exclaimed, "the 'gladsome light' of universal science. Let learning be illustrated by her most brilliant luminaries, and let the claims of every science be vindicated by its bravest champion." Having marshalled statistics to show that the economic prosperity of Massachusetts depended upon skill in the higher branches of industry, and that all her traditions were those of the highest liberality toward education, he concluded as follows : —

I commend to the legislators and people of Massachusetts these considerations and opinions, which have earnestly impressed my own mind and are the results of patient study and reflection. They are inspired by the idea of realizing the highest culture, securing the amplest means and material, and hus-

banding them in the surest way to the good of all the people, and for the renown and influence among the States of the Union, of this venerable Commonwealth. Let no friend of any local institution, actual or proposed, avert his eyes. When we shall have obtained one central school, or a combination of schools interchangeably working each with and for the others, devoted to the grandest development of knowledge for agricultural, mechanical and military¹ uses, and to the enlargement of the domain of science and art, to the discovery and encouragement of their true prophets and teachers, and to the widest diffusion of all their influences, then you will find the local seminaries springing up and distributing the results, — just as our town and district schools to-day disseminate the elementary lessons of science of which every boy and girl would be left in ignorance, were it not for the higher institutions, the original thinkers and the lifelong students.

To have done even thus much for the cause of higher education in Massachusetts was no small thing; from a man immersed in the cares of military administration one might reasonably expect nothing further. Andrew, however, early in February called a meeting at his house, at which the Lawrence Scientific School of Harvard, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the State Board of Agriculture were represented. The informal discussion that then took place revealed the difficulties with which individual men and their interests encumber measures. Since the new president of Harvard,

¹ Instruction in military science was a condition of the congressional grant.

Dr. Thomas Hill, was not yet installed in office, there was no commanding person in a position of authority to speak on behalf of the University; Professor Rogers, for the Institute of Technology, was doubtful whether his own scheme for a technical school of the highest efficiency did not need perfect independence to develop in; the members of the Board of Agriculture, believing that the "land grant" was their particular plum, would not consent either that it should be divided, or that it should be contributed to the common educational pudding. When the matter came before the General Court, the views of these last gentlemen naturally met with a ready acceptance among the large number of members from farming towns. The inadequate reasons given by the committee of the Legislature were allowed to prevent the establishment of an agricultural college on the Bussey farm under the auspices of Harvard,¹ but the strong momentum which the plan for the Institute of Technology had gained made it impossible for the advocates of a small, isolated agricultural college to keep the whole sum of \$450,000 to themselves, and the Legislature gave three tenths of it to the Institute.

Although Andrew's noble plans for the University had been "appreciated more truly by scholars and

¹ The substance of these objections was that young farmers would not be willing to engage in manual labor near a city and near institutions where men were preparing for the professions; that proximity to the city would make board high, and expose the students to the dangers of immorality; and that experiments upon soils could not be so well made as at a greater distance from the city.

thinkers all over the world than by the respectable body to which they were addressed,"¹ he had too long known what it means to be ahead of one's time to be seriously discouraged. He had had a vision of the University as the home of comprehensive scholarship, and that, too, in days when such an ideal was cherished by few in America, and, outside the academic world, understood by still fewer. As early as March, 1861, Agassiz, writing to him about a proposed grant of money by the Legislature to the Museum of Zoölogy in Cambridge, had said : —

You will appreciate better than anybody one of the highest aims I am working for in this Museum ; which is to free science in America from the dependent position in which it still stands with reference to Europe. In fact scientific men in America have now to fight for their independence, and they will never take the standing to which they are entitled before the scientific institutions of the country are on a level with those of Europe, and we ought if possible to raise them higher. You can urge this argument for me ; if I do it myself it would appear presumptuous, and yet I know that this is the bitter state of things under which every devotee of science is now sighing in this country.

Even more plainly than Agassiz's tribute to him as able to " appreciate better than anybody," Andrew's own words show his comprehension of the ideal of scholarship.

¹ Browne, p. 119. Browne quotes in full a letter to Andrew from the Comte de Gasparin, which was one of many admiring acknowledgments from Europe of the Address of 1863.

I wish we had more men whose appeal is to the suffrages of the serene judgment of sincere thinkers everywhere and of the future as well as of to-day ; more men led by generous ambition as well as conscience, to the higher and purer spheres of reason and learning ; men, who, like Gasparin, like John Stuart Mill, like Arago, like Humboldt, can claim an audience of mankind itself, and throw a light clear across the darkness of diplomacy, of politics, of commercial or national jealousy and ignorance, speaking with both the authority and the humility of disinterested greatness.¹

Again, in the address delivered at Springfield in 1864, Andrew said : —

I implore you to unite and not divide, in your policy. Whenever you can create a great school or find a great professor, unite to strengthen the school and to make sure of the man. Our system of diffusing knowledge through the local schools, our plan of distributing elementary instruction, are things of which we are sure. But your district schools will themselves go to seed, your knowledge will become bigoted and mean, unless you remember that the encouragement of these higher institutions from which they are fed and where their teachers are themselves taught, is as needful as the creation of the head of water above the dam is to the spindle's point.²

In all this thought over the problems of university education, Andrew, far from wandering afield,

¹ Address at the Inauguration of President Hill at Harvard College, on March 4, 1863.

² Address delivered before the New England Agricultural Society, at Springfield, Massachusetts, September 9, 1864.

was working well within the limits of statesmanship. "He clearly foresaw how Massachusetts, by the limitations of its territory, must become relatively less and less powerful, man for man, than newer states of greater area. The method by which he expected to maintain the ascendancy of this State against such inevitable odds, was by making the Massachusetts man count for more in the destiny of the country than the man of any other State. For this he looked to facilities for broader and deeper education here than can be obtained elsewhere in America."¹ As Andrew was accustomed to put it, the Yankees were the "seed-corn" of the nation. Precisely as the great states of the Middle West and the Northwest needed New England, so New England needed them. The natural jealousy, with its mutual disparagements, which existed between them and her he deplored and did all in his power to break down. An instance of his efforts in this direction was the letter to S. F. Wetmore, prepared in the early part of 1863. Wetmore, a newspaper editor in Indianapolis, had reported to him an invidious inquiry of the Indiana Legislature as to why Massachusetts had furnished so few troops for the war, and as to what substantial interest Massachusetts had taken in the development of the West. To answer these questions the Governor caused circulars of inquiry to be sent throughout New England to people who had dealings with the West, whether of a religious, educational, or business nature. With the answers that he received,

¹ Browne, p. 119.

with tables of statistics which he had collected, and with long extracts from the speeches of Webster and Sumner, he proved conclusively that Massachusetts was anything but remiss either in her devotion to the war or in usefulness to the West. In this "Wetmore letter" Andrew took great pride, and he caused it to be circulated as widely as possible. The headings *New England and the Northwest* and *Western Transportation* in the message of 1864 show his continued interest in this important subject. In the message of the next year this interest took the form of a recommendation that measures be instituted to reduce the disproportion between the sexes in the older and the newer parts of the country. Having cited figures to show the excess of men in Oregon and other parts of the West and the excess of women in Massachusetts, he urged that the Commonwealth take practical steps to encourage the emigration of young women "who are wanted for teachers, and for every other appropriate as well as domestic employment in the remote West." This was philanthropic and philosophic statesmanship, to be sure, but the individuals for whose welfare Andrew was trying to provide, together with that of the nation, rather resented his method of bringing them under the operation of the law of supply and demand. Especially did they resent his reference to them as at present "leading anxious and aimless lives in New England." Andrew had to pay the penalty of attempting to dispose of people in the lump: his serious proposal was made light of in the news-

papers, and his pair of adjectives became the occasion of much merriment. Under these circumstances the Legislature naturally took no action on his plan.

Andrew had his best opportunity to help bind together Massachusetts and the West through the connection of the State with the enterprise of boring a railroad tunnel through Hoosac Mountain. When he became governor the undertaking had already suffered many difficulties and disasters, and, for the performance of one portion of the work, the State was making monthly issues of scrip, the amount of these issues being estimated by a State Engineer, according to the proportion of the work "substantially performed." There was much dissatisfaction with the contractors, H. Haupt and Company, and soon after the first of January, 1861, Andrew, distrusting the impartiality of the engineer, whom Banks had appointed only a few weeks before, removed him from office, in spite of the protests of the contractors, if not because of them, and put in his place a man in whose ability and honesty he had full confidence. The report of the new engineer showed that the work was being done in anything but a "substantial" manner and threw further suspicion on the contractors. All the work was stopped forthwith, and after July, 1861, no more scrip was issued. This complete stoppage of an enterprise which the northern line of towns in the State had greatly at heart stirred up in that region the utmost discontent. When, as the result of legislative action in 1862, it became the Governor's duty to appoint

three commissioners who should examine into the condition of the work, with a view to its being resumed under the control of the State, he felt the full force of this opposition to his policy. It was taken for granted that he was unfriendly to the tunnel scheme and that he would appoint commissioners as hostile as himself; he was importuned in behalf of this man and in opposition to that; and there were not lacking threats that, if he were not compliant, the fall election might be disastrous to both him and Sumner. Some sentences from a letter written by him after he had solved the difficulty to his satisfaction show what course he took.

I may be sanguine. But, I studied three weeks before I came out of the fog; and when I had reached the point, I felt perfectly clear, sure and content. — A perfectly disinterested and obedient will is a great power in clearing the intellect. And when I had succeeded in dismissing all conscious efforts to *please* anybody, or fend off criticism and suspicion from myself, I found my way out of all doubts.¹

The three commissioners whom Andrew appointed, John W. Brooks, S. M. Felton, and Alexander Holmes, were men of skill, experience, and integrity, and entirely unprejudiced. Under their direction the work on the tunnel was resumed in October, 1863. Andrew's part in the tunnel enterprise, though limited, was played at a critical moment, and counted for much in the history of the road. He refused to

¹ To D. W. Alvord of Greenfield, May 19, 1862.

accept an engineer at the dictation of the contractors ; he appointed commissioners who were not prejudiced by local or political considerations. Of these acts he later wrote with pardonable pride : —

. . . Single handed I broke down the humbug which was going on under Mr. Haupt. The old scheme was buried below soundings, never to be revived. I secured a sound basis for the enterprise, freed it alike from speculators, from politics, and from local ambitions. I accepted, as did the Legislature, the conclusions of the best and strongest men in the profession of Civil Engineering applied to the branch of the Art.¹

In giving attention to these many undertakings proper to the welfare of Massachusetts, Andrew was constantly chafed by the necessity that kept him from working at them with thoroughness. He was full of plans, and he had time barely to begin putting them into effect. Writing to some one about the Hoosac Tunnel, he expressed a wish that “some honorable progress in a great work of peace” might be made during his administration, so that he might not be “like King David, who was forbidden to begin the Temple of God, because he was only ‘a Man of War.’” Though man of war it was his destiny and his glory to be till the end of his service, what he did in the fields to which other governors have devoted themselves exclusively is by comparison in no way unworthy.

¹ To John Quincy Adams, May 16, 1866.

CHAPTER XIV

END OF THE WAR : VALEDICTORY ADDRESS

“THE statesmanship of the future gives cause for more anxiety than any military concern of the present.” In these words of his annual message for 1865, Andrew expressed his sense that his characteristic work as war governor of Massachusetts was coming to an end. Under the generalship of Grant and Sherman the final triumph of the Union arms must be a matter of only a few months. The combatants had grappled for the death-struggle ; there was nothing to do but await the issue. When at last the day of Appomattox came, when the four years’ strain was relaxed, and a whole nation raised the song of thanksgiving, who shall say that to have learned the lesson that righteousness exalteth a nation was not a meet reward for what had been endured ? And when the crisis of joy was succeeded by the crisis of sorrow, who shall say that this too was not needed to teach the nation its lesson to the end ? The discipline of those days, it would seem, could have been lost upon no one ; and yet, happen what may, human nature remains the same.

In the greatness of those early days of April, the shock of one event succeeding another, — of war

giving way to peace, of the nation's joy turned into mourning, — every man's life was in heroic wise ; the emotion of the individual was lost in the mightiness of the national passion. Still, in Andrew's case, the necessity of pulling himself together to communicate to the Legislature with due formality the fact of the President's assassination¹ has left, in his appreciation of Lincoln's character, the record of his own feelings at the time. He paid full tribute to the personal qualities of the dead President which had already endeared him to the nation, and gave a just estimate of Lincoln's intellectual power, though not of his transcendent gift of expression.² As to the degree in which the great events of the past four years had been of Lincoln's making, Andrew said : —

¹ "The last official communication from Governor Andrew to President Lincoln was a telegram, dated at Boston, April 11, 1865, urging the President to proclaim a National Thanksgiving for the capture of Richmond and the final victory of Grant, and suggesting April 19, the anniversary of Lexington and Baltimore, as an appropriate day. But on April 19 the Governor was attending the funeral ceremonies for the President in the East Room of the White House at Washington." — Browne, p. 162.

² "The MAN on whom the people hung with fonder hope and confidence than had ever been exercised within the memory of the generation to which we belong." "We should still be enabled to challenge all human history to produce the name of a ruler more just, unselfish or unresentful."

"Perhaps little that he spoke or wrote will pass into literature, yet few men have ever written or spoken with greater effect or to better purpose in appealing over the passions of the hour, to the sober judgment of men, face to face with their combined duties and interests ; and, very few there have been who knew so well as he how to reach the understanding of plain and honest men who compose the intelligent masses of the American people."

It were premature for us to assert how, or how far, during the four years of his administration, he *led* this American People. The unfolding of events in the history we are yet to enact, will alone determine the limits of such influence. It is enough for his immortal glory that he faithfully *represented* this People, their confidence in democratic government, their constancy in the hour of adversity, and their magnanimity in the hour of triumph. . . .

Comparing his declarations of purpose and of inclination, with the great actions of his career, we recognize how that career was shaped by external, more than by internal forces. Until long after his inauguration, he never proposed nor counted upon war. He proposed only to hold, occupy and possess the places and the property which were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. And yet he waged to a successful issue a civil war the most tremendous which history records. Nor had he ever proposed, or inclined to interfere with Slavery in the States. He proposed only to check its spread and suppress its existence in places within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Union. And yet he proclaimed liberty to three millions of American slaves, and prepared the way for universal emancipation.

In the exaltation of his faith in Democracy, Andrew looked upon Lincoln's crown of martyrdom as the sign that his work was done. "His career closed at a moment when its dramatic unity was complete." There is no sense here of the loss that was greater than all the sacrifice of battle,—of the removal of the wise and patient leader through whom alone North and South might be perfectly reconciled, of the fate-driven tragedy that now impended.

The year 1865 gave the Governor, after all, the lighter labors for which, when consenting to serve a fifth term, he had hardly dared to hope. Countless as were the odds and ends of affairs to be attended to, his duty toward most of them consisted of a dictated endorsement on the back of a letter, turning the matter over to the proper official on his well-organized staff.

Not only was there no long piece of work to be put through at high pressure, but also the most considerable undertaking of the year, — that of disbanding the vast volunteer army, — was almost entirely in the hands of the federal authorities. To give a warm welcome to the boys in blue and to care for them generously in camp until the United States could disperse them to their homes was a task into which the Governor threw himself with special zest. When Frank Howe reported to him complaints because the Massachusetts regiments were not allowed to march through Boston and then go to camp in the various parts of the State from which they had originally been recruited, he replied:—

It is all nonsense. *I* never indicated any route of transportation, save to ask, in individual cases, as I did the other day, in the case of the 37th regiment, that they might have that route *they preferred*. There are divers ways of reaching Readville and either route would bring the men for the same price. But over that I have no control, nor have I any influence over it. *But* I do try to make the men happy and comfortable in camp. I have arranged

to have a camp, where we have ample accommodations, have all the appliances, rules and advantages for the soldiers while in camp that they have when in hospital. We spend \$30 per day for *cooks* etc., irrespective of rations (outside of the United States expenditure). The men have milk, butter, cheese, fruits, fresh vegetables, chowders, and sit at tables spread for them as if at a hotel. I cannot accomplish this, save at one place. . . . The *men* don't want to be lugged about. . . . Some officers on horseback want to *use* their men for their own exhibition perhaps. But I don't mean to try to compel the men at the expense of their legs and their bellies to do it. I will do all I can for those poor boys. And then, if they choose to come into Boston and have a review I will give them that. Don't be afraid about its hurting me. A man can't be hurt doing his duty.

"*Now, just assume,*" he said again in his half-joking, positive way, "*that I am always right. I decide nothing by chance — only in careful study, and for the good of the mass.*"

The year was full of public functions. In Washington, the Governor and Mrs. Andrew saw the grand review of the armies of Grant and Sherman;¹

¹ In a letter read at the Governor Andrew Memorial Day of the Massachusetts Club in January, 1888, J. M. Forbes told this story : —

"It may not be amiss to give here a comic incident which marks the Governor's perfect indifference to appearances, or to the supposed requirements of his high position as to personal dignity. When he arrived at Washington, in May, 1865, to witness the grand review, the whole city was so much absorbed by the coming spectacle that a seat in a carriage could only be found for Mrs. Andrew; but the Governor, nothing daunted, hired a dark brother with a cart, and, depositing their baggage in it, appeared in due course of time at my house,

at home, besides returning regiments, generals of all sorts and conditions, not unwilling to put their military capital out at interest by paying visits up and down the land, were to be received, and men who for four years had been kept by government business at one desk now found government business which obliged them to travel. Of the Union generals, Meade and Burnside were Andrew's personal friends, and when they came to Boston he welcomed them warmly. So, too, when it became known that Grant, on his way to Maine, was to pass through the city, the Governor, with a flourish of Executive orders, sent the Adjutant-General to Albany to escort him through the State, and himself led the public demonstrations in Boston. The acquaintance then made between the two men grew, thanks partly to an increasing political sympathy, into a considerable regard. In the latter part of the summer, Andrew took his turn at this kind of thing: an educational convention at New Haven, Commencement at Brown

perched on the top of it. I remember, too, that on the second day of the review, when Sherman's bronzed regiments were approaching the grand stand, Gov. Andrew, wearied by the well drilled monotony of the previous day, when no shouting was permitted, slipped down from his seat, and, getting the ear of those in authority, obtained permission for Sherman's veterans to give a touch of their quality by their ringing cheers when passing the official headquarters. Some of those who heard that vocal music may like to know that the call for it came from our Governor, whose instincts were always responsive to those of the people. The steadiness and dignity of the army of the Potomac were wonderful, but an equally marked feature of that memorable show was the cheering of the vigorous men who were just finishing a march of 2500 miles, the last three or four days of it made at the rate of thirty miles a day."

University, an agricultural fair in Concord, New Hampshire, a visit to the Cadets in their encampment at Nahant, and the notorious Barnstable Ball,¹ gave him much real relaxation and little more trouble than that of uncomfortable railroad journeys. Later, while he was in New York on private affairs, it happened that Stanton, accompanied by Surgeon-General Barnes of the United States Army, arrived in Boston. Surgeon-General Dale, on whom, in the Governor's absence, would fall the duty of playing host for the State, appealed to his "Dear old Master" to come back in time for the harbor-party in honor of the visitors and their ladies. The Governor sent Dr. Dale's note to Mrs. Andrew, endorsing it in official fashion to the effect that he should not come home and that he wanted her to join the harbor-party and "help dear old Dale along, who is worth the whole crowd." In his next letter he explained further: "I am glad to be absent while that party is in Boston; and I am sure I wont run *after* them. *If* I *was* in the city I wd be very polite. As I am not, I need not break up my own

¹ At this ball the Ancient and Honorable Artillery, which had come down as escort to the Governor and Major-General Sickles, were so incensed with the ladies of the town for resenting their disregard of the ceremony of introduction that their commander stopped the music at twelve and would not be induced by Andrew's best efforts at peacemaking to revoke his order. Mrs. Julia Ward Howe wrote a song, celebrating the event, of which the following is a stanza: —

"Gov'nor A. won't hang for homicide,
That's a point that bothers us all;
He must banish ever from his side
Sitch as murdered the Barnstable Ball."

trip to conform to them." Perhaps his conscience pricked him a little at having to write home a few days later: "Went to the party, saw more new people of distinction than I ever met at once at any time in my life. Ever so many gentlemen were brought up to me to be introduced. Mr. Stanton told me that he called on Mrs. Andrew and that he was delighted with Forrester. I replied that he takes after his mother which accounts for his attractiveness."

Of public meetings in the summer of 1865 by far the most notable was the day of Commemoration set apart by Harvard College in honor of her sons given to the war. In the services of the day Andrew's part was of the smallest, but in the preparations he had had a share, obtaining from the War Department furloughs for the Harvard men still in active service, that they might be present, and doing his best to persuade President Johnson to come. A sense of the difficulties ahead made him anxious that the man so much distrusted in New England should seize this chance of understanding and being understood where need was greatest. "I am sure," he wrote to the President, "that at no moment in the history of the Union has any concurrence of circumstances yet happened where more good could be done by any such means." The formal invitation Andrew asked F. P. Blair, who knew the President well, to deliver, in the hope that thus Johnson might be brought to see the importance of accepting it. But the President pleaded official engagements, or bad health, or both, and the opportunity was lost.

An incident connected with the Fourth of July of this year is an example of Andrew's incorrigible habit of saying a good word for a political opponent when no one else would speak in his behalf. He had planned to spend the day at Salem and to take part in the welcome which the city was to give on that day to her returning soldiers. At the last moment he was called upon to speak at the dedication of a statue to Horace Mann which had been set up on the slope in front of the State House, corresponding, on the right of the main approach, to the statue of Webster on the left. Andrew's disappointment at losing his holiday burst out in the note of apology which he hurried off to the chairman of the committee of arrangements at Salem.

JOHN A. ANDREW TO ROBERT S. RANTOUL

BOSTON, July 3d, 1865.

R. S. RANTOUL, ESQR., SALEM.

MY DEAR SIR, — It is strange that "the bottom drops out" always, when I try to do anything for my own pleasure. It was my firm intention to spend this night at yr. house. But — as if a fate followed me — I am put on duty here at 8 A. M. to-morrow to dedicate, (or what not) the statute [*sic*] of Mr. Mann. I cant run, have nothing to say, am half angry, tired, nervous and — if it would do — I wd. be discouraged. And now, at 4 P. M., after eight hours constant office work this very day, I must try to think out a brief speech for morning, must remain in the city over-night, must lose my visit to you, and the floral procession, spoil my "Independence-day,"

Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Executive Department.

Boston, July 3^d 1863-

R. S. Rantoul, Esq.

Valen

My dear Sir, It is strange
that the bottom drops out "always"
when they do anything for my
own pleasure. It was my
firm intention to spend this night
at your house. But - or of a fate
showed me - I am put on duty here
at 8. A.M. to - in room to dedicate,
(on what not) the statue of W. L. G. I
can't, I have nothing to say,
am half angry, tired, nervous and
it would do - I'd be discouraged.
And now, at 4. P.M. after eight

hours constant office work
this very day, must try to
think out a ~~big~~ brief speech
for Monday, must remain
in the city over-night, must
lose my visit to you, & the
floral procession, & will my
"2^d Independence-day" — spend
there, as usual, in my mill,
— Will you let me come
some other time? —

Mrs. Alden bid me this
morning, for her acknowledg-
ment Mrs. Rantoul's kind note,
She is so ~~trifling~~ for the
summer, & is for the moment
not quite in good health, but
if I had been able to go with

her to Salem I wish I have
telegraphed to him to
come up for that purpose,
so it is I have notified her
that I can't see her to
night at all.

With my best regards to
Mrs. Rantland, I am very
truly, (and very truly) yours
G. M. Anderson

— and turn, as usual, in my mill. — *Will* you let me come some other time? —

Mrs. Andrew bid me this morning, for her, acknowledge Mrs. Rantoul's kind note. She is in Hingham for the summer, and is for the moment not quite in good health. But if I had been able to go with her to Salem I wd. have telegraphed to Hingham to come up for that purpose. As it is I have notified her that I cannot see her tonight at all.

With my best regards to Mrs. Rantoul, I am my dr. sir, Yours very truly and resp'y

JOHN A. ANDREW.

Andrew's difficulty proved to be, not in having nothing to say, but in the inconvenient proximity of the statue of Webster. The way in which he reasoned himself out of the difficulty appears in a letter from him to Montgomery Blair, written immediately after the exercises were over.

. . . Since Mann and Webster quarrelled bitterly in 1850-1, and the "immortal hate" of Greece and Troy became renewed in them, and in the adherents of each, immitigably, I had to walk on thin ice. As Governor, as a gentleman, I could not ignore the contiguity of these most conspicuous statues, and thus seem wilfully to forget "The Great Defender." And yet, I was not a Webster man; — nor could, nor can, I become other than the opponent of the Websterism of his declining years. There *was* a Webster — and there always *is* Daniel, the old, original, New Hampshire farmer's son, the man of nature, human sympathies, and human faults, — a Webster, — which in defiance of all dislikes I honored and still hold dear. And, since the good we say

and do is of the immortal essence, and the bad, of the mouldering earth, I thought that, without injustice to Horace Mann himself, I, his friend, could afford to remember the immortal and forget the corruptible.

The reconciliation between the opponents which Andrew attempted to make in his peroration, however, went so far as actually to give the disgraced Webster the most prominent position in the speech.

. . . Side by side the statues of Webster, and of Mann, will attract the gaze of coming generations, defying the decays of time, long after those living men and women, who assist in this day's ceremony, shall have slept in the dust with their fathers.

On the one hand is the statue of Daniel Webster, the great *Jurist*, the great *Statesman*, the great *American*. On the other hand is the statue of Horace Mann, the *teacher of Philosophy* in its application to politics and to popular learning, *whose constituency was Mankind*. The rising sun of morning will turn from the purple East to salute his brow; and when his golden orb ascends the zenith, shining down from on high in Heaven, he will wrap and warm them both with generous embrace, in his lambent love and glory; and when at last the God of Day is descending beneath the horizon, his expiring ray will linger upon the brow of Webster.¹

¹ The newspaper report of the speech concluded as follows: "The closing remarks of the Governor were undoubtedly the inspiration of the moment, for just as he was finishing his address, the light of the rising sun, having already enveloped the statue of Mann, was just beginning to play on the head of the statue of Webster. The setting sun would reverse this picture."

Andrew's comparison, it is needless to say, was not to the taste of Mann's friends, who were persuaded that the Governor had overdone the business of being fair to Webster. Their method of expressing their displeasure, however, was hardly wise. When S. G. Howe asked leave to strike out the offending passage in the report of the proceedings which was to be issued in pamphlet form, Andrew replied: "I am not willing to strike out what I said, and thus pretend that I did not say it. . . . I think that would be a mean dodge on my part." Though on this point he easily had the best of the situation, Howe and his friends could only shake their heads in amused despair over the Governor's declaration that what he had spoken was "everlastingly true, — just as the angels see it, whether men do or not."

The last of these official occasions for which the Governor's service was expected was the most congenial: it was an opportunity for him to stand and to speak once again as the war governor of Massachusetts. The flags of the Massachusetts regiments had been deposited for the most part in the Doric Hall of the State House. In order that they might all be placed there permanently, with due form and ceremony, it was arranged that the lately disbanded volunteers should reassemble at Boston, receive their banners, and, after carrying them in procession through the city, bring them to the State House, where, on the part of the State, the Governor should receive them. Andrew's sense of historic dates was pleased by the suggestion of December 22,

and the review was fixed for that day. It was the first of such veterans' reunions ; so real and so recent were the events called up that the men seemed as soldiers still to belong to the present rather than to have taken up a place in the memory, and they put on their uniforms and responded to the call as if doing the duty of the day. In familiar array the ranks marched through the snowy streets. As each regiment reached the State House its color-bearer left his place and mounted the steps to the spot where the Governor stood. When the flags were all gathered there, and a prayer had been made, Major-General D. N. Couch, in command of the procession, holding the flag of the Seventh, the regiment which he had led from the State, addressed Andrew briefly. His speech done, he gave the standard into the keeping of the Governor, who replied, almost as briefly, with the emotion which was characteristic of his addresses to soldiers. The procession was then dismissed and the flags were carried into the Doric Hall, to become henceforth a part of the archives of the Commonwealth. The flag is a symbol wherever it is flown ; the rendering of these colors, torn and stained, to the authority from which they had issued, was a symbol of still fuller meaning. The men who took part in the form of that day could feel in it the continuity of national and of state existence ; reviewed once again by the little Governor in his long military cloak, they could also see the rounding out of his service into completeness. As they phrased it, "he ordered the overcoats and received the flags."

Andrew's purpose not to be again a candidate for the office of governor he had announced in his annual message in January, and, because it seemed more respectful and considerate to give formal expression to his wish, he had, at the time of the Republican State Convention, reiterated it in a letter to the chairman of the State Committee. Alexander H. Bullock was unanimously nominated as the candidate of the party, and in November was elected by a triumphant majority. To turn over the affairs of the State to the new governor with every *t* crossed and every *i* dotted was now Andrew's last ambition. So far as Washington was concerned, the only outstanding matter of importance was the adjudication of the accounts for expenses incurred by Massachusetts at the beginning of the war. The penalty for Andrew's having cut the red tape in those days of emergency was that the auditing department at Washington, having never received the usual vouchers, declared that these expenses were "not properly incurred." In each year of his service as governor he had made requests for payment; now he prepared a legal argument to prove how untenable was the auditor's position. To a bureau bound by rules of its own making, however, an argument founded on law is almost as much beside the point as one founded on common sense, and Andrew was forced to relinquish the fight. A final brush with Stanton occurred in the endeavor to get him to authorize the payment of about \$600,000 of claims already adjudicated. This amount Stanton had promised Andrew

should be paid to Massachusetts as soon as the army had been paid, and the state treasurer had made his arrangements on that basis. After three months, however, Stanton was still unwilling, alleging that the payment to Massachusetts would bring down upon him and the Secretary of the Treasury \$27,000,000 of claims from all the other states, — an amount which the Treasury could not at this time afford to pay.¹ In reply, Andrew urged his desire that the account should be settled while he was still governor, and offered the argument that the State had present need of it to offset the sum of \$460,000 paid out in state bounties to the hundred days' men sent to the defence of Washington in the summer of 1864. Of this episode in the part played by Massachusetts in the war, he was inclined to make much because Stanton, in his report for 1864, had paid an elaborate compliment to the five western governors who had offered and sent more than 65,000 men, exclusive of their quotas, for service of one hundred days, in the spring campaign of that year, and had omitted altogether to mention what Massachusetts had done in the summer. Jealous that his State should lose no iota of just credit, the Governor now took pains to remind Stanton of this service, incurred voluntarily, and under no pressure of danger

¹ Though this last named account was paid up within a few weeks after Bullock's inauguration, the claim for expenses incurred in April and May of 1861 was not settled in full for some twenty years. The State also claimed from the United States reimbursement of the money spent by it for gold with which to pay interest on its war bonds, — a claim which is still (1904) in process of adjudication.

from invasion; he had Schouler prepare a special report on the "One Hundred Days' Men furnished by Massachusetts and not mentioned by the Secretary of War;"¹ and in his message to the Legislature he made pointed reference to this contribution, "as a duty I owe to the truth of history." Thus the last word was with the Governor; he went out of office, as he had continued in it, sounding the note of watchfulness for the State, and holding high her fame.

For the purpose of making to the Legislature the usual summary of the official year, Andrew sent to it, upon its assembling on January 3, 1866, a special message, accompanied by reports from the members of his staff in charge of the military departments which had grown up during the war. Besides commenting on these reports, giving the final figures of the number of men furnished by Massachusetts for the war, and stating the total war expenses of the State and the present condition of her finances, — all this being in the nature of closed records, — he devoted considerable space to the subject of the reorganization of the militia, which, owing to defects in the law of 1865, he had been obliged to discontinue and turn over to his successor to complete, with the aid of better legislation.² Having in this way disposed

¹ 6670 volunteers; 1209 for 90 days, 5461 for 100 days.

² Ever since the outbreak of war Andrew had labored for the establishment of a satisfactory militia, — at first with Congress, then with the Legislature, and then, after issuing a general order which constituted a number of regimental organizations to receive volunteers, with city and town authorities and with the stay-at-homes. At

of all affairs of business, he was left free, when he should deliver his valedictory address to both branches of the Legislature, to speak upon national affairs alone, — to make clear, in quitting public life, his position on the public question of the hour, Reconstruction.

The interval between the day when Andrew Johnson took his oath as President and the assembling of Congress in December, 1865, includes the first period of Reconstruction as an active political question. The problem was wonderfully complex, comprising, besides many minor elements, the theoretical status of the states which had seceded, the personal equation in the case of President Johnson, and the questions of what treatment should be given to the freedman and to his late master. To understand the position which Andrew came to take and to which he sought

the time of Lee's invasion he had no militia to send in response to Governor Curtin's call for help, and it was the same when the draft riot broke out in New York. In 1864, however, the Legislature passed a compulsory militia law which divided the State into company districts, and which he hoped would result in "a body of citizen soldiers never surpassed." No sooner had it been put into operation, however, than the Legislature of 1865, alarmed at the prospect of so large a militia in time of peace, suspended the district system, retaining in the service only the men that had volunteered for special companies. Many of these, having volunteered solely because they understood that service somewhere would be compulsory, were naturally indignant. The law of 1865 had other weak points, but it was chiefly because of this one that the Governor had to abandon his hope of organizing as militia the fine soldiers then on the rolls of Massachusetts. "It was my utmost pride," he said, in his communication to the Legislature, "to be completely identified with their final and successful organization."

to win others by his Valedictory Address, it is best to consider in order his belief on these four points.

As to the position, with reference to the Union, in which the states that had formed the Southern Confederacy stood at the end of the war, Andrew did not subscribe to the generally accepted Radical theory of "state suicide." According to that theory those states had destroyed themselves as states, and were now a part of the United States as mere conquered country, — "territories," in the terms of the Constitution, which could be readmitted to the rights of statehood only by act of Congress. To a man of Andrew's humanity, this method of healing the wounds of war seemed neither merciful nor sure. In his annual message of 1865, he made a passing reference to the theory of state suicide as "reactionary;" in his message to the Legislature at the time of Lincoln's assassination, he put his objections to it in strong words: "The schemes of sentimental politicians, who neither learn nor forget, whose ideas of constructive statesmanship are only imitative as are the mechanical ideas of the bee or the beaver, the plans of men who would rebuild on the sand, for the sake of adhering to a precedent, must be utterly, promptly and forever rejected." On this theoretical issue, then, Andrew was opposed to Sumner and to most of the radical Republicans in Massachusetts.

In his attitude toward the President, Andrew was also at variance with the prevailing sentiment in Massachusetts. The bibulous atmosphere of the ceremony of inauguration of Johnson as Vice-President

was a thing which New Englanders found hard to forgive, particularly as at the Baltimore Convention the year before their delegates had thrown over for Johnson their own candidate, Hannibal Hamlin. This resentment against Johnson Andrew did not share.¹ On Saturday, the morning of Lincoln's death, he had refused to allow himself to be hurried off to Washington by the clamor of a few panic-stricken men on State Street; in his address to the Legislature, his words about the future were full of

¹ Albert Browne, Jr., who was in Washington shortly after the inauguration, wrote to Andrew on March 21, 1865:—

“I met Mr. Blair yesterday on the portico of the White House and after a little preliminary conversation, I, as directed, remarked that you are ‘glad that the Blairs have taken Andy Johnson in charge.’ To which he replied that A. Johnson is ‘all right;’ that ‘he did n’t say anything that was bad sense, only bad taste,’ and that ‘it is not true that he is a drunkard, or was drunk then; but he had been sick with typhoid for six months, and had taken a little whiskey that day, and was a little disordered, by the situation, and all the other things.’

“Mr. Blair further remarked . . . that it would n’t have been ‘nearly so much of a thing, if Sumner had n’t been so exquisite about it.’ . . .

“I then asked if he was n’t a little hard on Mr. Sumner;—if it might not be that Mr. S. felt unusually sensitive about such a matter, as I knew a great many of our people at home did, for the reason that the Massachusetts delegation in the Baltimore Convention went over to Johnson, deserting our own New England candidate; and now Johnson had, rightly or wrongly, brought public disgrace on himself, which Sumner as a Massachusetts man, perhaps thought that he *himself* shared. . . . I further observed that . . . while you were friendly to Johnson, yet you thought that all N. E. shd have held by Hamlin; and for that very reason perhaps, you are not as ‘sensitive’ now to all these stories about Johnson as Sumner is, and that the message you sent by me was a friendly one to Johnson, although it was playfully worded.”

faith and courage. Accordingly, when, after the President's proclamation of May 29, which seemed to propose a way for the Southern states to organize on too easy terms, a meeting was called in Faneuil Hall on June 21, to deprecate "haste in receiving back the rebel states, before they have proved their loyalty," Andrew felt it his duty, in writing a letter to be read at the meeting,¹ to make a strong appeal for a charitable judgment of the President. It is true that Andrew was in full sympathy with the object of the meeting as thus declared. Johnson's action he regarded with "inexpressible concern." No scheme of reconstructing state governments could, at this early stage, be successful, he said, for "the loyalty of the South needs *time for concentration*." The Southern leaders had appealed to force and had been beaten. They must not be allowed the chance to recover themselves by an appeal to fraud . . . "*hold on to the power*, and—in the fear of God—let it be used. It was bought with the blood of more than a quarter of a million of heroes and patriots." Nevertheless, in spite of Johnson's precipitancy, Andrew was not afraid to declare his belief that "though for the present it may seem otherwise to superficial observation I do not expect to find the deliberate judgment of the President, who is an able statesman and an honest patriot, differing with that of Massachusetts herself. In his reply to my

¹ At this meeting Theophilus Parsons presided; speeches were made by him, R. H. Dana, Jr., Henry Ward Beecher, S. C. Pomeroy, and George B. Loring. Letters were read from Andrew, A. H. Bullock, C. G. Loring, A. H. Rice, S. Hooper, and Benjamin F. Butler.

own remarks introducing to him a large delegation of gentlemen from Massachusetts, the President emphatically declared his purpose to do his utmost to make the country 'permanently free.' The logic of events is irresistible. Thus far freedom has been constantly gaining, *and* it has held whatever it has gained. With patient, hopeful and manly courage on our part the future is secure."

The third element in the problem of Reconstruction, — the question of what should be the political status of the negro, — Andrew regarded from the point of view of humane common sense. Almost all the early friends of the negro, who had seen come to pass the extreme measures that they had advocated, were now insisting that the negro's right to the ballot was as indisputable as his right to freedom. Moreover, the plan of enfranchising the freedmen had at the moment tremendous practical advantages as a reward to him for loyalty, a punishment to the master for disloyalty, and a safeguard to hold the South to the Union and to the party of Union. From this proposal, — from the theory on which it was based and from the expectations which it inspired, — Andrew totally dissented. In his letter to the Faneuil Hall meeting, which had been called also to recommend the extension of the suffrage "to all friends of the Union irrespective of race or color," he explained what he would do with the freedman.

. . . As a radical believer in the *suffrage* for all men of competent capacity, irrespective of color or

national origin, I the less regret that colored men are not now permitted to vote in the South. . . . They will vote by and by. Their *votes* will be wanted, just as their *arms* were wanted. All people will yet see that poor and ignorant as they are, they are on the right side, and that they can be neither cheated nor bullied into its betrayal or desertion. Meanwhile they will be gaining in knowledge and in admitted capacity for exercising the political functions of citizenship. And all the North will by and by agree, that the theoretical superiority of the white masters, which did not prevent them from committing the most monstrous of all the crimes and blunders of History, renders them for the purposes of practical statesmanship, inferior material for good citizens to their humble and unlearned freedmen.

I deeply deplore the raising of the general question of the suffrage for colored men in the South, as yet. I had hoped that the last vestige of heresy on that question might be first eradicated from New England where it even now maintains a foothold. I had hoped that the poor negro might have the opportunity of a brief future unprejudiced by being again and immediately the subject of political controversy. For one, however, I still hope and believe that there need be no strife nor angry debate. We have reached a point where temperate, philosophical and statesmanlike treatment of grave questions has become easy, because it is of controlling and absolute necessity. We are to have an era of calm, wise and yet brave counsels. The People cannot afford others. They must and will resume control of public affairs, — at some times too much entrusted to accident. And then the prejudices of tradition and the caprices of politics will be alike disregarded.

These three parts of the question, important as they were, were nevertheless subordinate to the great problem of what should be done with the rebels. The art of forgiveness after a quarrel is as delicate between nations, or parts of one nation, as it is between friends. Therefore, one would think, all the personal tact which the one requires should be employed in the other. For all that, the radicals in their day of triumph emphasized the need of justice rather than of mercy. Though during the war Andrew in moments of heat had not scrupled to refer to the confederate armies as the "wiley and barbarous horde of traitors," and in his message of 1865 had counselled forgiveness only for the "oppressed democracy" of the South, "hurried, precipitated by a superior power dominating their intelligence and their capacity of resistance into the vortex of a ruin they neither foresaw nor even yet comprehend," yet no sooner was the war over, no sooner were the proud rebel leaders put down from their seats than his sympathy turned to them and he sought to take their part. The ruined masters appealed to him in much the same way in which the oppressed slaves had appealed to him. He had no intention of yielding to them one jot of what had been won by battle,—his sentences in the letter just quoted make that plain,—and he realized that their loyalty needed "time for concentration;" but he stood ready to hasten the day when they should be truly and heartily loyal. His sympathy once enlisted, he obeyed an impulse long since crystallized into habit, and made efforts to put

himself in touch with Southerners of position and to discover without prejudice the facts of their hard situation. When he went to Washington, he made it a point to become acquainted with men from all parts of the South; when he was in New York, he regularly stayed at the New York Hotel, the place most frequented by Southerners. Week after week he pursued the facts in this way, with the zeal of a scientist on the verge of making a discovery.

It is wholly characteristic of Andrew that he approached this problem not from the political but from the economic side. In September, 1865, an enterprise known as the "American Land Company and Agency" was organized with Andrew as president, and Frank Howe as vice-president and general agent in the North. The object of the company was to do a brokerage and agency business in behalf of Northern capital seeking investment in the South. To Andrew, however, and to his friends who were interested in the scheme, — there were but thirty-five shares at one thousand dollars a share, — the undertaking was much more than a mere commercial enterprise. To establish business confidence between the two parts of the country was, they felt, the first step toward establishing political confidence. The following extracts from letters written by Andrew about this time show the results which he hoped to see attained in the way of bringing men of all parties, whether north or south, to work together again.

January 21, 1866.

. . . In this Land movement, I am impelled by the same class of ideas, by which I have always been controlled in public life. I am not at work simply for a single campaign, and while I desire to give to it a scope and a direction, adapting it to the ultimate hopes and purposes of the "*radical philosophy*," I am also not unaware of the valuable aids within our reach, from men not wholly in declared sympathy with you and me. If one only knows how to lead, hopefully and affirmatively, not antagonistically towards the truth, it is easy to derive much support and ultimate agreement from men who always thought themselves to be in your opposition. Of course you must select real *men*, nothing can be done without brains, and what the Ministers call a "*realizing sense*." Now I want to get—— and—— . . . to take a leading hand, and help to press forward in the direction of helping the landless and despised negro to become an independent free-holder. Until we begin to work powerfully for this end, we are without genuine inspiration. At the same time working as we do, in aid of the cultivation of Southern staples, and the general material development of the South, we are recognized by enlightened men of the old proprietary class, to be among their best and soundest friends as well as among the truest friends of the laboring freedman. So that it is very natural, and therefore easy, for us to combine in this work, men sentimentally very different or unlike. I should regret to observe in any one, a disposition to any kind of exclusiveness. Selfishness and exclusiveness are the only "*damnable heresies*." No matter how large the catalogue made by ecclesiastics, I recognize those two alone.¹

¹ To W. L. Burt.

November, 1865.

. . . The waste of war has left the land-owners poor in all save their lands. Floating capital has disappeared in the South. Their mules, machinery, fences, buildings, tools have been absorbed by the enemy or destroyed or worn out to an extent hardly to be appreciated. And, just now, when they need credit more than ever, to replace them, they are without bankers, factors, lenders. Without money or credit, the planter can neither buy mules, corn, bacon, small stores, cloth for the support of the freedmen, nor can he pay them their needful wages, while making the crop. To aid in meeting these present wants and help restore Industry and to help emancipation prove an early and visible success, I accepted the presidency of an institution called The American Land Company and Agency, having its headquarters in New York, a branch at Boston and agents in the South; and if large or smaller capitalists in Europe shall desire to invest either in cotton lands, or in loans, thoroughly secured, or in a company for the purchase of lands in large lots or to be cut up into small freeholds and resold to the freedmen, poor whites, immigrants, etc. etc. etc. our company could act for them I think, with efficiency and success. . . .

I hope that every exertion will be made now and without delay, to introduce reasonable amounts of capital, and also numbers of capable, ambitious and right-minded men into the South. These, more than all things else, will tend to restore society and business, and to confirm Peace for us all, and practical freedom and happiness to the Colored race. . . .¹

¹ To the officer in charge of the commissary department of the Freedmen's Bureau in Louisiana.

November 30, 1865.

Mr. King called on me and I talked with him freely and at several interviews. He is an "old fogey," kind hearted and rather intelligent. But he is unfitted for the new state of things. Among all the planters I have seen he stands alone, unless one from Texas may be "counted in." The most hopeful and reliable men I meet are the active men accustomed to business, owning plantations, men of education and culture, and Rebel officers of rank. These have brains enough to understand and manliness enough to admit and accommodate themselves to the new position.

But the Government ought not to *overwork* these men, on the one hand, nor *tie them down*, on the other.

It ought to declare a policy *up to which* as a necessary policy, derived from the superior power, they *must* come, and up to which they should have the opportunity to lead the people.

Now the people are led by those who are not their *natural* leaders. Those leaders are therefore *timid*, and lack the spirit of leadership, which is a gift of God and not a device of man. And they must do what not even the best leaders *could* well do, with no *proper fire on their rear* to hold them up to the work. Meanwhile the most important forces in Southern Society are neutralized.

Declaring a policy for the South to work up to, the *people*, rebels and all, should be made free to accomplish it. A rebel vote is the best of all, if it is only cast in the right way. If they are not prepared to vote for those measures needful — as conditions precedent to the safety of the Union, the public integrity and the security of the Wards of the Nation

against reënslavement, — then they are not prepared in their minds for *reconstruction*. I believe that if the men who know how to *lead* were free to act as citizens in the work, that these States would soon be reorganized on a basis of Constitutional Amendments of a safe and satisfactory character. I may be wrong ; but, as a Yankee, thus I *guess*. . . .¹

This “guess” expressed conviction with all the emphasis that the word has on the lips of a Yankee ; it was the corner-stone of the structure which Andrew was building, and at the time it was made was well founded. The reactionary movement of the rebel leaders, which took its start from a delusive hope in President Johnson’s leniency and which expressed itself chiefly in the enactment of laws concerning apprenticeship, vagrancy, and civil rights, the object of which was practically to reënslave the negro, had not yet gone too far. Indeed, when Congress met in December, the only State which had passed such acts was Mississippi, the act passed in November by South Carolina having been merely preliminary in its character. To be sure, the report of one of the gentlemen, Mr. Carl Schurz, whom Johnson had sent through the South on a tour of investigation, represented the Southerners to be in no submissive frame of mind ; but on the other hand, General Grant, returned from a similar visit, though it was so hasty that his observations were popularly described as having been made from a “car-window,” reported

¹ To Rev. Hermann Bokum, in the Bureau of Immigration, Washington.

that "the mass of thinking men at the South accept the present condition of things in good faith." For a man of Andrew's optimism and generosity it was impossible to do otherwise than accept the more hopeful view.

Here, then, was Andrew, on all the main points of Reconstruction, — the present relation of the Southern States to the Union, the position of the President, the political status of the freedman and of the rebel master, — taking an opposite stand from that of the radical Republicans. Glad as he would have been to make little of this difference of opinion and to work with them as far as possible, — for to him the supreme need was for all sections and parties to help establish the new ideal of national loyalty, — he was prevented by their readiness, now as in anti-slavery days, to declare that he that was not for them was against them. With Sumner this was especially the case. The opinions which Andrew had come to hold necessarily intensified the feeling which Sumner had shown at the time of the Governor's candidacy for a Cabinet position, and increased the distance between them. When, on November 7, L. E. Parsons, Johnson's provisional governor of Alabama, spoke at the Union Club in Boston, soliciting a loan for his State, Sumner took advantage of the occasion to declare the iron terms on which alone he conceived that the South should be taken back into the Union. Andrew sprang to the defence of Governor Parsons, and, aided by Henry Ward Beecher, who was present, engaged in a warm discussion with Sumner.

Andrew's attitude of persistent friendliness appears in a letter which he wrote a fortnight after the meeting, in reply to one from Sumner presenting some of the facts on which the Senator based his conclusion that only the most drastic measures would avail to protect the negro. Sumner's answer has the hardness which he often showed toward any one who had differed with him sharply.

JOHN A. ANDREW TO CHARLES SUMNER

November 21, 1865.

DEAR SENATOR, — I have read the letter, not I am sorry to say with the interest of novelty. All along I have been informed of similar transactions. Moreover I should believe their existence, even if I had never heard of them. There are unhappily thousands of mean and brutal minds who hate, despise and dread the negro. The master used to be a protection. Now the law must supply that protection, or he is a necessary victim. But the law also must have a moral support, or it too is powerless. The presence of Northern men, of the influences and motives of free civilization, *must be had*. Without them there will be a long failure. Meanwhile, too, we must cultivate all there is of possible good in the Southern people themselves. The educated, most enlightened and superior persons of the South have a strong tendency *now* towards the right side. They see a new order of society, to which they must conform. They have learned very rapidly these last five years. We may win, instruct and help them to do right, if we try. We shall *try*, I am sure.

As to the Freedman's Bureau, — that is an old project of mine. I greatly regretted the delay in its

being organized, and the imperfections of its final organization. I regret its want of independence, — its too great dependence on other departments and functionaries. Hereafter the Bureau ought to control and command the local military, and not be subordinate to the Military. A first class, clear, strong, self reliant, bold man should be at its head, with *power* in his brain, *power* in his heart, and *power at hand* and *in* his hand, which he can wield for the protection of his wards, and the assertion of his own official rights. That Genl. Howard is himself such a man, I do not doubt, but his power and means are limited. I earnestly set forth to President Johnson last week the utter impossibility of success, without sustaining this Bureau. I insisted that if that failed all would fail; that unless he heard complaints, and even just complaints of *excess* by its officers, he might be sure they were going wrong. Any excess by them can be remedied on appeal. But their neglect or failure will discourage the poor blacks, and no appeal can afford a remedy for the utter demoralization and ruin which may follow. As to the reception of Senators and Representatives into Congress from the Seceding States, I expressed my opinion to the Faneuil Hall meeting, that the President's experiment would not succeed. I still think it will not. But I hope he will get all the good out of it, possible to it. The right position for *New England* is one of friendliness, not of antagonism. In taking the latter we are defeated, — in the former we shall win. And we shall carry our own doctrines into the South. We can get the Southern people, by popular vote, to adopt the necessary amendments to their Constitutions and meanwhile they will wait outside of Congress. During this time Congress should pass

laws to *carry into effect* the Great Amendment of Freedom, to assure the freedmen in their rights, get President Johnson's signature, and *then* the freedmen will have their real chance for safety and progress. I believe there is an honest desire on his part and on the part of many whom we might be tempted to suspect, to obtain the best result. But, the practical questions are intricate, involved and difficult, certainly to many minds. They sometimes stumble over them. Still we shall get on best by *working with* all whom we can work with, and save all possible friction. At all events, I don't want Massachusetts to seem otherwise than disposed to peace and coöperation. Of great griefs and wrongs I am sure we must see much. But I never felt more confident, hopeful and courageous. We have got rid of War. We now can take hold of the arts and methods of Peace. We have dealt the death-blow to one barbarism by the arm of another. Now we have Civilization, Reason, Religion, — all these to work with.

CHARLES SUMNER TO JOHN A. ANDREW

Mr. Sumner asks pardon for not sooner acknowledging Govr. Andrew's letter, and begs to say that he rejoices in the many generous acts which the Governor has done, and especially in the recent testimony to our National duty which he narrates.

Mr. S. hopes that the Governor will not cease that watchfulness which has done him so much honor. He ventures to suggest that first and foremost "among the arts and methods of peace" which the Govr. now wishes to cultivate, is justice to the oppressed, and he entreats the Govr. not to allow any negro-hater, with his sympathizers, to believe him,

at this crisis, indifferent to the guarantees of Human rights or disposed to postpone his efforts in their behalf.

Hancock St.,
Friday afternoon.

Thus by the end of 1865 Andrew's creed of Reconstruction was formulated; there remained one last opportunity to pronounce it from the seat of authority. Having disposed of all state matters, as has been said, in a special message sent to the Legislature as soon as it convened, he devoted his valedictory address exclusively to the national question. He knew that he was to strike out on new ground, and that his power to advance his political ideas further was, by reason of his retirement to private life, to cease with the moment of his uttering them. To make his last words of the greatest possible weight, therefore, he put into the work of composition all his powers, and that their influence might be wide, he invited to hear them all who had any claim on his regard. "Who that was present can forget that last day in office?" wrote James Freeman Clarke in reference to the Valedictory. "He invited to his rooms a large number of his friends to go in with him and hear it. There you saw together a memorable company. There were men and women of all ages, from Levi Lincoln, then eighty-four years of age, to little boys and girls. Side by side were old abolitionists and old conservatives, orthodox men and radicals, — those who had never met before in one room in their lives." The spirit in which he did

all this he put into impressive words at the end of the introductory section of the address.

But, perhaps, before descending, for the last time, from this venerable seat, I may be indulged in some allusion to the broad field of thought and statesmanship, to which the war itself has conducted us. As I leave the Temple where, humbled by my unworthiness, I have stood so long, like a priest of Israel sprinkling the blood of the holy sacrifice on the altar, I would fain contemplate the solemn and manly duties which remain to us who survive the slain, in honor of their memory and in obedience to God.

Andrew's argument was an elaboration of his opinions on the four points which have already been mentioned. Of the first two he spoke briefly at the beginning; to the last two the body of the discourse was devoted.

In opposition to the doctrine of state suicide, he presented his own interpretation of the relation which a State bears to the Union.

The power to put an end to its life is not an attribute of a State of our Union. Nor can the Union put an end to its own life, save by an alteration of the National Constitution, or by suffering such defeat in war as to bring it under the jurisdiction of a conqueror. The Nation has a vested interest in the life of the individual State. The States have a vested interest in the life of the Union. I do not perceive, therefore, how a State has the power by its own action alone, without the coöperation of the Union, to destroy the continuity of its corporate life. Nor

do I perceive how the National Union can, by its own action, without the action or omission of the States, destroy the continuity of its own corporate life. It seems to me that the stream of life flows through both State and Nation from a double source; which is a distinguishing element of its vital power. Eccentricity of motion is not death; nor is abnormal action organic change.

In replying to the question which he put himself: "What of the policy of the President?" Andrew's defence of Johnson was full of generous ardor.

Thus far the President has simply used, according to his proper discretion, the power of commander-in-chief. What method he should observe was a question of discretion, in the absence of any positive law, to be answered by himself. . . . He deemed it wise, therefore, to resort to the democratic principle, to use the analogies of republicanism and of constitutional liberty. . . . If he has assisted the people to reorganize their legislatures, and to reestablish the machinery of local state government; though his method may be less regular than if an Act of Congress had prescribed it, still it has permitted the people to feel their way back into the works and ways of loyalty, to exhibit their temper of mind, and to "show their hands." Was it not better for the cause of free government, of civil liberty, to incur the risk of error in that direction, than of error in the opposite one? It has proved that the National Government is not drunk with power; that its four years' exercise of the dangerous rights of war has not affected its brain. It has shown that the danger of despotic centralism, or of central despotism, is safely over.

Andrew's conviction that the Southern States should return to the Union under the leadership of the men who took them out of it, deserves full statement in his own words.

I am aware that it has been a favorite dogma in many quarters, "*No Rebel Voters.*" But it is impossible in certain States to have *any* voting by white men, if only "loyal men" — *i. e.*, those who continued so during the rebellion — are permitted to vote. This proposition is so clear that the President adopted the expedient of assuming that those who had not risen above certain civil or military grades in the rebel public service, and who had neither inherited nor earned more than a certain amount of property, should be deemed and taken to be sufficiently harmless to be intrusted with the suffrage in the work of reorganization. Although there is some reason for assuming that the less conspicuous and less wealthy classes of men had less to do than their more towering neighbors in conducting the States into the Rebellion and through it, still I do not imagine that either wealth or conspicuous position, which are only the accidents of men, or, at most, only external incidents, affect the substance of their characters. I think that the poorer and less significant men who voted, or fought, for "Southern Independence" had quite as little love for "the Yankees," quite as much prejudice against "the Abolitionists," quite as much contempt for the colored man, and quite as much disloyalty at heart, as their more powerful neighbors.

The true question is, now, not of past disloyalty, but of present loyal purpose. We need not try to disguise the fact that we have passed through a

great popular revolution. Everybody in the Rebel States was disloyal, with exceptions too few and too far between to comprise a loyal force, sufficient to constitute the State, even now that the armies of the Rebellion are overthrown. Do not let us deceive ourselves. The truth is, the public opinion of the white race in the South was in favor of the rebellion. . . . The Southern People — as a People — fought, toiled, endured, and persevered, with a courage, a unanimity and a persistency not outdone by any people in any Revolution. There was never an acre of territory abandoned to the Union while it could be held by arms. There was never a rebel regiment surrendered to the Union arms until resistance was overcome by force, or a surrender was compelled by the stress of battle or of military strategy. The people of the South, men and women, soldiers and civilians, volunteers and conscripts, in the army and at home, followed the fortunes of the Rebellion and obeyed its leaders, so long as it had any fortunes or any leaders. Their young men marched up to the cannon's mouth, a thousand times, where they were mowed down like grain by the reapers when the harvest is ripe. Some men had the faculty and the faith in the Rebel cause, to become its leaders. The others had the faculty and the faith to follow them. . . .

When the day arrives, which must surely come, when an amnesty, substantially universal, shall be proclaimed, the leading minds of the South, who by temporary policy and artificial rules had been, for the while, disfranchised, will resume their influence and their sway. The capacity of leadership is a gift, not a device. They whose courage, talents and will entitle them to lead, will lead. And these men —

not then estopped by their own consent or participation, in the business of reorganization — may not be slow to question the validity of great public transactions enacted during their own disfranchisement. If it is asked, in reply, “What can they do?” and “What can come of their discontent?” I answer, that while I do not know just what they can do, nor what may come of it, neither do I know what they may not attempt, nor what they may not accomplish. I only know that we ought to demand, and to secure, the coöperation of the strongest and ablest minds and the natural leaders of opinion in the South. If we cannot gain their support of the just measures needful for the work of safe reorganization, reorganization will be delusive and full of danger.

Why not try them? They are the most hopeful subjects to deal with, in the very nature of the case. They have the brain and the experience and the education to enable them to understand the exigencies of the present situation. They have the courage, as well as the skill, to lead the people in the direction their judgments point, in spite of their own and the popular prejudice. Weaker men, those of less experience, who have less hold on the public confidence, are comparatively powerless. Is it consistent with reason and our knowledge of human nature, to believe the masses of Southern men able to face about, to turn their backs on those they have trusted and followed, and to adopt the lead of those who have no magnetic hold on their hearts or minds? Reorganization in the South demands the aid of men of great moral courage, who can renounce their own past opinions, and do it boldly; who can comprehend what the work is, and what are the logical

consequences of the new situation ; men who have interests urging them to rise to the height of the occasion.

To meet the objection that this plan would put the negro at the mercy of his old master Andrew hastened to define the guaranties of good faith which the North should demand.

Has it never occurred to us all, that we are now proposing the most wonderful and unprecedented of human transactions ? The conquering government, at the close of a great war, is about restoring to the conquered rebels not only their local governments in the States, but their representative share in the General Government of the country ! They are, in their States, to govern themselves as they did before the rebellion. The conquered rebels are, in the Union, to help govern and control the conquering loyalists ! These being the privileges which they are to enjoy when reorganization becomes complete, I declare that I know not any safeguard, precaution, or act of prudence, which wise statesmanship might not recognize to be reasonable and just.

After discussing and discarding one expedient after another proposed to meet the need of protecting the negro in the exercise of his liberty, Andrew proceeded to inquire into the nature of the rights and privileges of citizens under a form of popular government such as that of the United States. By citation and argument he built up the proposition that such a form of government, if it would deal justly, requires "*The maintenance of equality between free citizens concerning civil RIGHTS, and the distribution of*

PRIVILEGES *according to capacity and desert, and not according to the accidents of birth.*" To secure this justice no local or temporary device for punishing masters by denying them the suffrage, or rewarding freedmen by presenting them with it would avail. In order that, according to Justinian's definition of justice, "to every man should be secured his own right,"¹ there was needed "a uniform, equal, democratic, constitutional rule of universal application."

Congress may, and ought, to initiate an amendment granting the right to vote for President, Vice President and Representatives in Congress, to colored men, in all the States, being citizens and able to read, who would, by the laws of the States where they reside, be competent to vote if they were white. Without disfranchising existing voters, it should apply the qualification to white men also. And the amendment ought to leave the election of President and Vice President directly in the hands of the people, without the intervention of electoral colleges. Then the poorest, humblest, and most despised men, being citizens and competent to read, and thus competent, with reasonable intelligence, to represent others, would find audience through the ballot-box. The President, who is the Grand Tribune of all the People, and the direct delegates of the People in the popular branch of the National Legislature, would feel their influence. This amendment would give efficiency to the one already adopted abolishing Slavery throughout the Union. The two amendments, taken together, would practically accomplish, or en-

¹ Constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi.

able Congress to fulfil, the whole duty of the nation to those who are now its dependent wards.

Andrew's plan thus developed, it remained for him to exhort Massachusetts to enter upon her part of the work with due charity, — an admonition which was by no means unnecessary.

I am satisfied [he said, quoting the words of General Grant's "car-window" report] that the mass of thinking men at the South accept the present condition of things in good faith; and I am also satisfied that with the support of a firm policy from the President and Congress, in aid of the efforts of their good faith, and with the help of a conciliatory and generous disposition on the part of the North — especially on the part of those States most identified with the plan of emancipation — the measures needed for permanent and universal welfare can surely be obtained. There ought now to be *a vigorous prosecution of the Peace*, — just as vigorous as our recent prosecution of the War. We ought to extend our hands with cordial good-will to meet the proffered hands of the South; demanding no attitude of humiliation from any; inflicting no acts of humiliation upon any; respecting the feelings of the conquered — notwithstanding the question of right and wrong, between the parties belligerent. . . . Patriotism and Christianity unite the arguments of earthly welfare, and the motives of Heavenly inspiration, to persuade us to put off all jealousy and all fear, and to move forward as citizens and as men, in the work of social and economic reorganization — each one doing with his might whatever his hand findeth to do. . . . In sympathy with the heart and hope of the nation, she [Massachusetts] will abide by her

faith. Undisturbed by the impatient, undismayed by delay, "with malice towards none, with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right," she will persevere. Impartial, Democratic, Constitutional Liberty is invincible. The rights of human nature are sacred; maintained by confessors, and heroes, and martyrs; reposing on the sure foundation of the commandments of God.

"Through plots and counterplots;
Through gain and loss; through glory and disgrace;
Along the plains where passionate Discord rears
Eternal Babel; still the holy stream
Of *human happiness* glides on!

There is ONE above
Sways the harmonious mystery of the world."¹

The merits of the plan proposed by Andrew are obvious. It made provision for both mercy and justice. Less obvious, perhaps, is its importance as an expression of the mighty change that the Civil War had wrought. The result of all the struggle and sacrifice was that henceforth the term "United States" must be a noun of singular number. That the record of this attainment of full growth as a nation might be put into the Constitution, the amendment abolishing slavery needed to be supplemented by another which should make the franchise a subject not of state but of national control, with qualifications to apply to North as well as South, to white as well as black. As the Constitution of the United States now stands, the provisions of the fourteenth amendment do not constitute a "uniform, equal, democratic . . .

¹ The Valedictory Address is printed in full by Browne and by Chandler.

rule of universal application." Devices of a temporary, sectional, and punitive character, totally at variance with the spirit of the instrument of which they are a part, they exist to-day to testify to the passions of the period, and to cause the Scripture to be fulfilled, declaring, "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge."

As for the reception of the Valedictory by the public, the plan presented by Andrew was not distinguished from those proposed from time to time by other governors, by members of Congress, or by newspapers. Where many were found to praise the broad statesmanship of the Valedictory, there were few to seize upon it as a practical scheme. Of all those who wrote to Andrew at this time to congratulate him upon his successful term of service, the only man who subscribed heartily to his doctrine was Henry L. Dawes. "In this day of theories and prescriptions and *schools*, multitudinous and conflicting," he wrote, "I have read nothing to which I can so entirely assent. I agree with it all. Permit me to congratulate myself, condemned for 'conservatism,' when away from Massachusetts, that I find myself, at home, in accord with one who has won so distinguished a position in Radicalism." Dawes' support meant also the support of the *Springfield Republican*. The *Boston Advertiser*, though full of general praise for the "soundness of the political theories and deductions" of Andrew's address, could not march up squarely to its main proposition. "We are far from being satisfied as yet," it said, "that

a chief necessity in a safe reorganization is not the permanent transfer of power and influence from the hands of the class of 'natural leaders.' ” The *Commonwealth*, the organ of the Boston radicals, merely made a dazed attempt to prove that fundamentally Andrew's plan was the same as Sumner's, and that there need be no fear of party division. The New York *Tribune* gave a long analysis of the Valedictory, praised its statesmanship in one perfunctory sentence, and made no other comment.

Beyond calling out these utterances of the moment, the address apparently had no appreciable effect. In the first place, it was spoken as a last word by a man leaving the field of politics. In the second place, to be effective it needed to be pressed in the halls of Congress, where, except for Dawes, the members of the Massachusetts Delegation would naturally have nothing to do with it; indeed, they did not even take the trouble to acknowledge the printed copies which Andrew sent them. In the third place, Congress was already on the verge of that sickening quarrel with the President the evil consequences of which have persisted even to the present day. When that quarrel was once entered upon, every man must join one camp or the other; no foursquare principle of justice and mercy, such as Andrew propounded, could avail. Though by virtue of its foundation on this principle the Valedictory Address meets triumphantly the test of history,¹ yet at the time when it was delivered it was merely read, complimented, and forgotten.

¹ “Above all other men in the whole land, Governor Andrew, of Massachusetts, in his farewell address to the Massachusetts legis-

On January 6, the day after the Valedictory was delivered, Andrew performed, at the inauguration of his successor, the duties demanded of a retiring governor, and left the State House a private citizen. Whatever men thought of his present stand on Reconstruction, for his work in the long term of service from which, as he expressed it, he was now "mustered out," there was nothing but praise in the fullest measure. Solid men of State Street, bidden by him to the Representatives' Hall to hear the Valedictory, as they sat waiting for him to begin, looked back to the time when they had thought his first election a public calamity, and in their present eulogiums defined the distance which all men had come since then. The newspapers brought out their handsomest language. Throughout the State, from the people, to whom his inspiring personality, his force as a moral leader, and his position as war governor had made him thrice dear, there was a heartfelt farewell. What all men were thinking and saying to each other some were moved to express to Andrew himself; let one such letter speak for all.

CHARLES ELIOT NORTON TO JOHN A. ANDREW

CAMBRIDGE, January 11, 1866.

MY DEAR GOVERNOR ANDREW, — Whatever expressions of public gratitude you may receive they lature, . . . discussed with elaboration the Southern situation, and urged views and suggested policies which will mark him always in our annals, at least with the highest minds, as a true, prescient, and lofty statesman, versed in the past and able to prejudge the future. His valedictory address is veritably prophetic, — as prophetic as it is politic and practical." — Daniel H. Chamberlain, in an article on *Reconstruction in South Carolina*, in the *Atlantic Monthly* for April, 1901.

cannot satisfy the desire of individuals to testify to you in their own names of the honor in which they hold your five years services to the State, and of their personal gratitude as citizens of Massachusetts for all that you have done for her, and for them as her children, during this time.

To you more than to any other man is due the fact that throughout these years of trial Massachusetts has kept her old place of leadership. Through you she has given proof of her constancy to those principles to which she was from the beginning devoted. You have helped her to be true to her own ideal. You have represented all that is best in her spirit and her aims. There are no better years in her history than those with which your name will be forever associated in honor.

The cares, the anxieties, the responsibilities and the trials of your position during these years must be amply compensated by the happiness of knowing that your services are universally recognized, and will always be held in grateful remembrance. I wish you joy in this happiness.

May you have a season of rest now, to gain health and strength for the future service of the State! Massachusetts cannot spare you long to private life.

With true respect and gratitude, I am

Your sincere friend,

CHARLES ELIOT NORTON.

To the men who had been Andrew's intimate official helpers, — and how much he owed to them no one knew better than he, — the breaking up of their "family" brought a pang that seemed like that of disaster. They did everything they could think of to express their affection; they dragged him to the

photographer to have a group taken on a day when he was so exhausted that it needed their chorus of *Johnny Schmoker* to keep him awake; they gathered for a farewell dinner; they one and all wrote him letters of touching, manly devotion. Here again one letter stands for all, testifying that the man was more to them than the governor.

HENRY WARE TO JOHN A. ANDREW

January 6th, 1866.

DEAR GOVERNOR, — . . . Those of us whose great privilege it has been to serve in close personal relations to yourself, know how richly deserved are the commendations of your public service that are heard every day from every part of the Commonwealth, but, as Colonel Wetherell said last night, those who have been so near to you as I, have occasion chiefly to thank you for the high example that your daily life has daily set before us.


For the unvarying kindness towards me that has marked every moment of our intercourse during the years that it has been my happiness and honor to be with you, I can only return my most heartfelt thanks and say that it has awakened in me a love towards yourself that I entertain for no other living man. For you and yours I pray for every blessing, and remain ever with the most profound respect and affectionate love,

Faithfully yours,

HENRY WARE,

Private Secretary.

To His Excellency,
John A. Andrew,
Governor of Massachusetts.



1. Col. J. F. B. Marshall
Paymaster-General
2. Major William Rogers
Asst. Adjutant-General
3. Lieut.-Col. Nehemiah Brown
Asst. Adjutant-General
4. Col. Francis L. Lee
Acting Aide-de-camp

5. Major-Gen. William Schouler
Adjutant-General
6. Lieut.-Col. William L. Candler
Aide-de-camp
7. Lieut.-Col. John W. Wetherell
Aide-de-camp
8. John A. Andrew
Governor and Commander-in-Chief

9. Brig.-Gen. William J. Dale
Surgeon-General
10. Lieut.-Col. John Quincy Adams
Aide-de-camp
11. Major Henry Ware
Private Secretary
12. Brig.-Gen. John H. Reed
Quartermaster-General

13. Lieut.-Col. Frank E. Howe
Asst. Quartermaster-General
14. Col. Anson P. Hooker
Asst. Surgeon-General
15. Major Jarvis D. Braman
Asst. Paymaster-General
16. Brig.-Gen. William L. Burt
Judge-Advocate-General

GOVERNOR JOHN A. ANDREW AND HIS STAFF



CHAPTER XV

IN UTRUMQUE PARATUS

THE problem of how to earn a living after leaving the governor's chair was one which had begun to vex Andrew early in the year 1865. As the moderate salary attached to the office had been by no means sufficient for the needs of a governor who had had no time to supplement it by private earnings, even what money he had saved during his practice at the bar was exhausted. He had no clients to return to, and no certainty in his present state of health of being able to work hard or continuously. Moreover, he was reluctant to take up any work which should seem to reflect unbecomingly upon the dignity of the office which he had held. One opportunity which came to him in March, 1865, — an offer from Lincoln of the position of Collector of Customs for the Port of Boston, — he refused at once for this reason. "Conversing with a friend on the subject soon afterwards," says Browne,¹ "the Governor remarked that it was the most lucrative public office in the New England States, and as it had been the habit to intrust it to men who had held other high official stations and rendered large public

¹ pp. 152, 153.

service for inadequate pay, he supposed it was tendered to him in accordance with that practice; 'but,' added he, 'I can accept no such place for such a reason. As Governor of Massachusetts I feel that I have held a sacrificial office, that I have stood between the horns of the altar and sprinkled it with the best blood of this Commonwealth — a duty so holy that it would be sacrilege to profane it by any consideration of pecuniary loss or gain.' "

The use of this Scriptural image, which found its last utterance in the Valedictory, is the best explanation of the feeling which held him back when he considered the advisability of returning to the bar in Boston. That he might not be obliged to "rough it in the Superior Court," he proposed to open an office in Washington, in the hope of working into a practice before the United States Supreme Court and the Court of Claims. But John M. Forbes, when consulted in regard to this plan, rejected it with emphasis. Andrew, he declared, ought to remain in Boston; his prestige as governor would serve him there better than elsewhere; in a few years he would be the leader of the Massachusetts bar. This was pretty stiff advice, but Andrew submitted.

In the summer of 1865, however, another opening of a totally different sort from the Custom House exercised temporarily a strong fascination over him. He received the offer of the presidency of Antioch College at Yellow Springs, Ohio. This institution, which belonged only nominally to the sect known as *Christian*, and in the service of which Horace

Mann had worn out his life, had always interested Eastern Unitarians. During the war it had been closed, and now that it was about to open its doors again they desired that it should be the representative college of liberal ideas in the Middle States. At first the nature of the work appealed to Andrew so strongly that he persuaded himself that he was well adapted to it. The salary, to be sure, was only three thousand dollars and a house, but he was encouraged to believe that fifty thousand dollars in the form of a fund for his wife and children would be guaranteed him. To his friends, who had his own and the public interests at heart, the unworldliness and childlike eagerness with which he yielded to the attractions of this untried occupation in what seemed to them a sphere far too small for him brought something little short of consternation. They roused themselves to counter endeavors. "Don't give up to a sect what was meant for mankind," remonstrated Bird, and his protest was only one of many. John M. Forbes and Cyrus Woodman discussed plans for securing from various Boston firms fifty thousand dollars in retainers to keep Andrew in Massachusetts. Then, if by reason of "a clear call like that of 1860," his return to political life should seem necessary, the money could form a fund for his wife and children.

Though nothing came of this plan, enough was evidently said and promised to make Andrew feel sure of a safe start in Boston. From the general interest which the incident excited, Andrew came to realize more fully than ever before the value which men set

upon him as a public servant, and by way of being in readiness for the service for which his friends desired to hold him he accepted once for all the present necessity of going back to the bar. All later proposals, such as the offers from Washington of diplomatic service, and the tender by Governor Bullock of a seat on the Supreme Bench of Massachusetts, he peremptorily dismissed as incompatible with this purpose. Accordingly, when his last day's work at the State House was done, he returned to the old life between which and his present self he had built up a five years' barrier.

It proved fortunate that Andrew was not at once forced to take up a new course of life as exacting as the old. Indeed, even for what little business his friends gave him to begin on his strength barely sufficed. Body and brain were both exhausted. From Washington, whither he had gone on business for John M. Forbes, he wrote to his client on March 5, 1866: "I have *one* benefit of being here, viz: that I keep on my feet and move about in the air among the departments, — which is useful to my weak and half worn out head, relieving me of much of the pain in my head and back I have suffered from these last three months." Ten days later he wrote: "I have got pretty well over my influenza. But, my head and nervous energies constantly warn me to *rest* — save when I can be of real use by *not* doing so."

Besides being handicapped by bad health, Andrew was hampered by the difficulty he found in taking up at once his old legal habits. After the administra-

tion of a public office, with its oversight of manifold affairs, its delegation of drudgery to subordinates, its bustle of publicity, its constant touch with matters of large interest, the task of bringing his mind to run in the strict groove of a lawyer's work was no easy one. Of the effort it cost him, he said later: "I have marched my mind clear round into the tracks of professional thought and study. It was a struggle — but I did it."

After Andrew's release from his "mill," he had time to build up the home life and the social life which had suffered such a lapse. To live deprived of his children, as he had lived for five years, would be a conscious loss to any man; and Andrew had not only a man's love for his own children but a woman's love for childkind. He once said that he never passed a child without an impulse to caress it, and he carried his little sons and daughters on his heart as a mother does. The children's nurse, who was with them for years, said that he seldom entered the house or left it without going first and last to the nursery; if the weather changed in the night, he never failed to come straight to the children's beds. Nothing rested him more than to romp with them or to hold them spellbound by his singing of *Johnny Schmoker*, the *Frog Song*, or *The Straw Bonnet*. Forrester, always a most affectionate son, being now in his sixteenth year, was of an age to be a companion, to take his father to drive in the afternoon, to go with him on journeys to New York and Washington.

For social intercourse Andrew found his opportunities much more numerous than they were when last he was able to accept invitations. He was a member of various clubs : besides belonging, with Mrs. Andrew, to a small club of married people, of which James T. Fields, S. G. Howe, William B. Rogers and their wives were also members, he went to the dinners of the Saturday Club, to which he had been elected in 1864, to the long-established Thursday Club, to the Friday Club, a small group of conservatives, almost all of whom had voted for McClellan, and to the Wednesday Club, which also met at various houses on Mt. Vernon and Beacon streets. He was a charter member of the Union Club, founded in 1863 ; he was now elected to the University Club of New York, and to the Examiner Club of Boston.

Although in the exercise of hospitality Andrew was able to do little, for he still lived in the small house on Charles Street, where his way of life was the same that it had always been, nevertheless, as a guest he was in great demand. He seldom made a trip to Washington without spending a night on the way at New York, Dobbs Ferry, or Philadelphia ; he was a frequent visitor at the seaside homes of Bostonians. All the "titles of good fellowship" were his. He told stories capitally, and his store was inexhaustible.¹ His laughter took a company by

¹ "He had as quick and lively perception of the ludicrous as President Lincoln himself, and his anecdote was free from coarseness. Of the Yankee dialect he was a master. He had studied it analytically, just as he studied the intricacies of the typical Yankee character.

storm ; he was always ready to join the chorus of a song. He loved to go from gay to grave, to hold a roomful hushed while he declaimed one or another of his favorite lyrics. It was impossible for a host to hold him off ; if he came into a man's house, he came into his family. Mrs. Howe tells of his mixing a punch in preparation for a group of formal guests at her house, and of letting himself be caught with his coat off, in the very act of compounding, by the entire company. She also has a tale, probably of ante-bellum and ante-gubernatorial days, about some tableaux illustrating *The Rose and the Ring*, in which Andrew took the part of Bulbo with great success.¹ The truth is, he liked nothing in the world so much as "folks," and now, after his five years of unceasing labor, his most tonic refreshment was society.

When the summer of 1866 came and Andrew, finding that his practice had already attained proportions more than satisfactory, felt that he had fairly earned the right to the vacation which he so sorely needed, he planned a series of short trips that he and his wife should take by turns with one or another of the children. His longest expedition was with Forrester to the White Mountains, Quebec,

The every-day life of the country villages of New England, of their shops, farm-yards, stage-coaches, taverns, sewing-circles, and household firesides, was familiar to him in all its details, and served him constantly for illustrations of stories which he told with a hearty enjoyment it excites a smile to remember. This mirth . . . never betrayed him into levity, nor was it tinged in the slightest degree with sarcasm, although it was often full of satire." — Browne, p. 142.

¹ *Reminiscences*, by Julia Ward Howe, p. 260.

Montreal, and Ottawa. Scraps taken here and there from the brief letters that he wrote to Mrs. Andrew show him getting rest and enjoyment at home and abroad.

MONTREAL, July 17.

At Montreal we are receiving the attentions of some old residents here who are natives of Mass, have come to M. grown rich as manufacturers and merchants, Mr. Nelson and Mr. Brown, who took us to a long and fine drive last evening; and we are to *dine* at Mr. Brown's today. Rev. Mr. Corder is invited. Mr. B. displayed the *American* flag, over his door as a compliment.

NEW YORK, August 23.

I stayed in doors all day, in Frank Howe's study, and worked on my Address.¹ . . . This is a troublesome city to work in, people are so far apart, next worst to Washington. I am now trying to find Horace Greel[e]y and old father S. B. Ruggles, from whom I hope to get a little intelligence. But, I find for the most part, that I have learned more by my recent reading than the people whom I consult know in their own specialties. However, I enjoy the work. It gives me something to think of and to do, in connection with my vacation. So that it is not wholly barren and fruitless.

BOSTON, tuesday A. M.
September 25, '66.

DEAR WIFE. All well — and all right. We get along just as smoothly as possible. Harry is a perfectly good boy, goes off quietly to school every morning, is about as little trouble as Forrester, who takes good care of him, — as we all do. I had a quiet talk

¹ See pp. 299, 300.

with Harry about eight days ago in regard to the fusses he made about being dressed etc. etc. mornings, telling him that it made me unhappy all day to leave home thinking of his "tantrums." Since then he has behaved like a gentleman. I expect to go to the Hingham Cattle Show to-morrow, and on Thursday to take the 12¼ train, and dine with Mr. C. G. Loring, at Beverly, in company with Mr. Shaw-Lefevre, of the House of Commons, now here. I don't know what day Betty expects to come. . . . Mind and pay yourself for any carriages used. Don't let Dr. Wight be out of pocket. — I hope dear little cunning "E" is well and happy. . . .

NEW YORK, October 9.

I am invited to dine at Genl Dix's at 5½ which will be my last chance before they leave for Paris. And I will make use of it. Besides, I don't mean to get home, so as to be visible, until after the Congressional Convention of to-morrow evening. I wish to avoid all talk and all political temptation. To-day and to-morrow in Boston would be two days *lost* for all *law*-work — if not worse. If I can get away from the dinner in season, I shall probably go in to see "Joe Jefferson" a while at the theatre.

The renewal of vitality which Andrew felt after his summer's vacation made it possible for him to look forward to a winter filled with work. Even in August he was engaged in preparing an address to be delivered at Brattleboro, Vermont, the subject of which was the dependence of the country for prosperity upon variety of industries. This address, like his Springfield address of two years before, presented statistics well-ordered, was full of commercial details,

and glorified industrial power; yet it was based on a belief in the fitness of men of the upright stock of New England to obtain and to use that power aright. Difficult of amalgamation as are such materials, there was a force in Andrew's presence, as well as in his method of arrangement and presentation, that fused them all into one, giving his listeners a light to their minds and a warmth to their hearts. Something of these qualities remained even when the address was printed, and it was read widely, especially in the West.¹

¹ In view of the discussions that have taken place since Andrew's death as to whether or not he was a high-tariff man, in the course of which the tariff reformers have claimed him for their own, partly on the ground that, in his time, there were no high-tariff men in his party and partly on the negative evidence of his public utterances, it is worth while to notice what he said in this address on the subject of government encouragement to home industry. There is no evidence that he ever discussed the tariff question at all, but, in this address, he justified by the event all that the United States government had done in the past to foster diversity of industry, and pleaded for the continuance of that diversity, — for the maintenance of "the magic circle of . . . Industrial Power" — as the best means to national development and independence. Reciprocity, however, with Canada and Mexico, was a no less cardinal point of his doctrine, and one on which he much oftener laid stress. In April, 1866, he wrote to F. P. Blair: "Much to my surprise, Massachusetts has not favored in Congress the continuance of Reciprocity of trade, between the United States and the British Provinces. Our members are divided on the subject. I am a warm and confident believer in it.

"We ought to have, I think, freedom of trade between ourselves and all our neighbors, — of course, properly guarding against abuse on the part of the Imperial Government of Great Britain."

In 1867, in an after-dinner speech at the annual meeting of the New England Agricultural Society, he said: "The first thing that we of New England need to do is to take the lead in free trade and unrestrained commerce all over the continent of America. We want

Although the Brattleboro address was the only elaborate speech that Andrew allowed himself to make, he took upon himself numerous obligations outside his regular work. Companies and societies of all sorts were eager to get him upon their managing boards, and he probably declined twice as many such offers as he accepted. President Johnson appointed him as the New England representative on the board of directors of the Union Pacific Railroad; in 1866 the Harvard alumni, at the first election under the new charter, made him one of the overseers, and when he refused to serve, on the ground that a former *ex officio* connection with the university should not form a precedent for a complimentary election, they elected him again the next year. He became also one of the trustees of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; from having been president, he took his turn on the executive committee of the American Unitarian Association, and was especially interested in its denominational work in the South. The number of philanthropic societies to which he belonged was larger than ever: he thus showed his interest in aiding emigrants to Florida, freedmen, and discharged convicts, and in sending relief to the Cretans in their war for independence. When it was proposed to raise a sum of money as a national testimonial to William Lloyd Garrison, Andrew, between whom and Garrison had long existed a warm

the Canadas, and we want Mexico, as new hunting grounds [for the] active enterprise, ingenuity and thrift of the New England mechanic."

friendship, was one of the committee, and wrote the Address to the Public.¹ He was elected president of the New England Historic-Genealogical Society in 1866 and again in 1867. Toward matters historical his taste always led him as soon as he had leisure : at one time he was engaged with Robert C. Winthrop in raising money to purchase a medal for the society ; at another time, a chance encounter with an old spinet in South Windham started him upon a long and minute investigation of its history and of the place of the spinet in the development of musical instruments.

The professional work to which Andrew returned after his vacation was increasingly dignified and remunerative.² The solid men of Boston, who had learned to trust him as their governor, now trusted him as their lawyer. His reputation was great enough to induce Seward to ask him to become counsel for the government against John H. Surratt, the only one of Booth's fellow conspirators who had succeeded in escaping from the country after Lincoln's assassination, who had been captured in Egypt and brought back to the United States early in 1867. Andrew had been unable to approve of the military trial of Surratt's mother and the other conspirators, and knew that his part in this trial would be "to help the Government put a rope about the neck

¹ For Garrison's estimate of Andrew, see *William Lloyd Garrison*, vol. iv. p. 188.

² During the last year of Andrew's life, his legal fees amounted to thirty thousand dollars.

of a fellow-man ;” therefore, though he was twice pressed to take the case and fully appreciated the prestige it would give him, he steadily refused. One famous case in which he was engaged is evidence of the way in which his popular fame as Governor served him with a jury even too well. He was employed against E. D. Sohier, one of the most renowned lawyers of the day for skill in examining evidence, in a suit for breach of promise brought by Belinda Ellms, a widow, against Daniel D. Kelley. The case was one in which the facts presented on both sides were so meagre and ambiguous as to offer a large field for constructive interpretation. Such an interpretation Andrew made in his plea for the widow, throwing himself into it with all the ardor which he had formerly been wont to use in cases of this nature, and carrying the jury along with him irresistibly. When, the next day, he learned that they had returned a verdict for the plaintiff, with a handsome amount of damages, he was a bit taken aback at the effect of his eloquence. What to him had been merely an honest effort in behalf of his client he now saw that a jury of Massachusetts men regarded as a dictum from a source too weighty for them to gainsay. A little later, after Andrew’s death, the defendant’s lawyers appealed from the verdict, and though the case came to trial several times, the plaintiff was never again successful.

In the study of the men of Andrew’s generation, it is interesting to compare the “causes” to the service of which they turned their energies after

the subject of slavery was disposed of. Some stalled themselves on the side tracks of "greenbackism" or similar subjects. Others, knowing by intuition the line on which national events would travel, were looking straight forward to the new course even before the old was finished. Andrew's eagerness to see the nation move unimpeded upon its true career is illustrated by an incident related by Daniel H. Chamberlain, ex-Governor of South Carolina. In 1863 the young man had gone to the State House to receive his commission in the Fifth Cavalry.

Gov. Andrew inquired [he says] why I was leaving the Law School to enter the army. I replied in substance, — "Because I am tired of the slavery question and want to see slavery abolished, the Union preserved, and the people left free to deal with other great questions." The governor assented with much emphasis, saying, — "I want slavery removed, as you do, because it stands in the way of our national progress; because it hinders us from dealing with the great problems of statesmanship which must be met and solved, if we are to be a great nation. I am counted a radical, a fanatic, because I insist that slavery must be abolished, but I am certainly moderate on all other questions, and I want to see our people studying other subjects, such as the problem of municipal government and the regulation of the liquor traffic."¹

Now that the war was over, Andrew turned gladly to the study of these questions and the problems deal-

¹ Address delivered by D. H. Chamberlain before the Eucleia Club of the Worcester High School, January, 1898.

ing with the industrial development of the country. The Wetmore letter of 1863¹ and the Springfield address of 1864² show his desire to be at these last questions even before those started up by the war were well out of the way. Early in 1866 he presented before committees of both Congress and the state Legislature the claims of the European and North American Railway for aid in starting its line from Bangor, Maine, to Halifax, Nova Scotia. The relation between New England and the seaboard British provinces had interested him from the outbreak of the Civil War, and he had conceived that, in the event of the success of the Southern Confederacy, the destiny of New England would lie in a union with these provinces rather than in a continuance of the bond between her and the middle and western states. This new scheme for uniting commercially New England and the maritime provinces by means of a railroad he now took up with great zeal. The community of interest between the two regions, the advantage of the neighboring coal supply to New England, the desirability of reciprocity in trade were points which he studied and elaborated with all the earnestness and skill of a man accustomed to thinking in terms of nations. Although the reader of to-day may not follow the grateful president of the railroad in declaring that Andrew's argument had all the interest of a romance and all the charm of a poem, yet at the time it attracted wide attention.

It was on one of the issues of which he had spoken

¹ *Vide supra*, p. 239.

² *Vide supra*, p. 170.

to young Chamberlain that Andrew made his most conspicuous appearance before the public in his new rôle. In the winter of 1867 a movement was made against the state prohibitory law on a scale quite beyond anything which had yet been attempted. Petitions bearing the names of upwards of thirty thousand legal voters were presented to the Legislature, praying for the enactment of a judicious license law; counter-petitions followed on their heels. A committee consisting of the proprietor of the Parker House and other innkeepers in Boston invited Andrew, without making any conditions whatsoever, to manage the case before the proper committee. Such an opportunity to attack the prohibitory law was all that he could have hoped for. He accepted the case, and for three months devoted all his time to managing the hearings and to preparing the final argument. Of course, in so identifying himself with the "rum-sellers," his eyes were wide open. He knew how sharply and at what a peculiar angle the line of cleavage on this question went through the whole structure of New England society, and he knew that his action in becoming chief advocate against the established order of things might alienate from him almost any personal friend or body of supporters. Moreover, it exposed him to attacks not only upon his honesty of motive but upon his personal habits¹ from a body of men whose inordinate zeal made

¹ "He was fond of wine and used it freely, but always with temperance; and he despised, from the bottom of his heart, the prevailing hypocrisy as to its use." — Browne, p. 58.

them none too scrupulous in this connection. The prospect of such attacks, as well as their probable effect on his political future, moved him not a whit. He was keenly interested in making a thorough study of the question and in presenting the real issue to the people for free discussion as it had never been presented before, — indeed, he declared afterwards that “in all his life, public and private, there was not a single act which afforded him more internal satisfaction than this attack.”¹

The hearings lasted for six weeks, during which time there appeared for the petitioners alone “more than one hundred witnesses, from all quarters of the Commonwealth,” “of nearly all professions and callings.”² As the testimony went on from week to week, the audience increased so that it became necessary to hold the sessions in the Representatives’ Hall. Andrew had from the beginning, in his examination of the witnesses, based his attack broadly, after his fashion, on the contrast between the opposing principles of the two parties, — a method which, with the tremendous momentum that he knew how to give a case, presently seemed to be carrying all before it. The prohibitionists, finding themselves driven to the wall, grew desperate, and Dr. Miner, the clergyman who had charge of their case, snatched at the convenient weapon of personal abuse.³ Natu-

¹ Browne, p. 62.

² *The Errors of Prohibition, an Argument delivered in the Representatives’ Hall*, Boston, April 3, 1867, by John A. Andrew, p. 147.

³ The contrast in point of dignity between the two opponents was the comment of the whole city. In its editorial on the morning after

rally, as the time drew near for the final argument to be made, public interest was at fever heat, and on the day set for Andrew's final plea admission could be procured to the Representatives' Hall only by ticket.

Defining the two points of theory on which the prohibitionists rested their case as "the essentially poisonous character of alcoholic beverages," and "the immorality of their use," Andrew devoted himself to overthrowing every argument that could be brought to support these propositions. Under the first head he recapitulated in an exhaustive manner the testimony of eminent physicians and men of authority in science. Under the second head he attacked all the moral arguments which have been

Andrew's final argument, the *Advertiser* said: "Such a body of trustworthy observation and authoritative opinion . . . was never before brought to bear upon any subject of legislation in Massachusetts. Nor will the public be less inclined to respect the judgment and the sincerity of men eminent in science, in medicine, in theology, and in literature, because the leading advocate of the prohibitory system thought it necessary to descend to personal insult and to those petty arts which, it seems, his cloth may borrow after they have fallen into contempt in the police court."

The following extracts from Dr. Miner's speech give some notion of his style of argument: —

"Remember the theory of the Romish and of the Episcopal church, a theory that outlaws the State, and claims everything for the clergy, and which seems to dominate over the consciences of men, even at the Friday dinner table, and are you surprised to find them opposed to the law?"

"If I am to define a license, stringent or otherwise, engrafted upon our present law or standing alone, I would say that it is a legal means of recruiting the army of drunkards with the approbation of ex-Governors of the Commonwealth, whiskey-drinking priests and members of Harvard Medical College."

used in behalf of Prohibition. He massed evidence to show that drunkenness is not a cause of degradation and crime, but a concomitant; he opposed vigorously the principle of sumptuary legislation; he dwelt on the demoralizing effect upon the community of a law in which a large and important body of people did not believe; he matched and reinterpreted the Scripture texts quoted by his opponents. Though in the discussion of no other subject, except perhaps that of woman's suffrage, is it so difficult to keep on the highest levels of argument, Andrew's plea, which occupied nearly four hours in its delivery, was in every way worthy of his best powers. It was solid in structure, it was crowded with facts, at times it was touched with eloquence; but its distinguishing characteristics were its sanity and its breadth of view.¹

As Andrew had foreseen, his action in advocating the overthrow of a system of twelve years' standing — a system thoroughly congenial to the Puritan conception of law — shook the confidence in him of hundreds of men who heretofore had been his most earnest supporters. This circumstance, together with the well-known disagreement between him and the party leaders in Congress on the subject of Reconstruction, and the fact that a former member of his staff, John Quincy Adams, was the Democratic can-

¹ As a result of the state election in the following November, which returned to the General Court a large majority in favor of repealing the statute that Andrew had attacked, a license law was passed in 1868; it was so ill drawn, however, as to cause a reaction in favor of modified Prohibition, and to delay the adoption of a practical license system for several years.

didate for governor, was taken advantage of by the Democrats in the fall campaign of 1867. They asserted — groundlessly, of course — that Andrew's support was, for this election at least, to be given to the Democratic party. These consequences of independence Andrew took as a matter of course. As in the Green murder case he had stood alone against popular clamor, so now, having laid his course by chart and compass, he was as serenely indifferent as the mariner is to the officious advice of the landsman.

Ready as Andrew was to exert himself publicly in connection with such questions as these, on the vital question of Reconstruction he was silent. Except by private action, he had no way of recommending to others the opinions declared in the Valedictory Address; there was no place in either the legislative or the executive branch of the national government in which he could serve; and, even if he had so far lacked discretion, he lacked means to venture forth, Wendell Phillips-wise, as a free lance. He could see that the men on whom lay the burden of government — men as sincere as he in their desire to hold to the truth — were in the clutch of the tragedy of Impeachment. The fierceness of the quarrel between the party of Johnson and the party of Congress made it necessary for them to regard every principle and every act in the light of its relation to this opposition of forces. Thus to make principles the weapons of partisan controversy was to Andrew intolerable. The necessity that was upon men of his way of thinking to keep clear of the whole miserable

affair was plain to him even as early as March, 1866. In a letter written in that month to F. P. Blair, Senior, Andrew justified his attitude of aloofness.

. . . Seeing so clearly as I do, the duty of us all, of endeavoring to meet the present and coming emergencies, in the spirit, and in the manner of calm, patriotic, liberal minded statesmanship, I am opposed to public meetings called in support of, or the interest of, any man, leader or party. All the men whose names are made prominent in a controversial way, will have to yield something of what they may have said, in favor of what in the calm depth of their own souls, they will all find themselves to believe:— And in this remark, I include President Johnson himself. The difficulty is, that in what they say, men are constantly striving to see how much of their own personality, how much of their own previous declarations and biography, they can secure a place for, in the new combinations or adjustments, which we call "Reconstruction." This is natural enough. But, it is a limitation of the usefulness and capacity of us all. And it is only in proportion, as a man can forget himself, and remember only the cause, forget his own past, and remember only the people's future, that he can see the truth, and serve the people with honor and fidelity. The attrition of debate, and unavoidable controversy, will tend to knock the nonsense out of many heads. When any man sees, that other men have individuality, as well as himself, though he learns the fact only by getting *hit* by it, he will after rubbing his head a little at last come to the memory that, reason was born before he was, and will survive when he dies. Now, if one set of men get up meetings for Paul, another set will get

up meetings for Apollos. The result will be, antagonism, not patriotism, and the intensifying, and exaggerating the importance and value of the relatively unimportant, chance utterances of individuals in controversial moods; which ought, if possible, to be forgotten.

Now, I have no doubt, that the *People* at last, will settle down, upon those of the ideas, contained in the Resolutions of Stewart of Nevada. 1st. The extension of the Suffrage to all men qualified therefor, without respect to condition, color or descent.— 2d. Universal Amnesty (including all persons), for the offence of engaging in the Rebellion. — 3rd, Requiring the popular vote of those classes of persons entitled to vote in 1860, and who carried their States into Rebellion, to be taken on the adoption or rejection of the measures proposed as the basis of “reconstruction” in their States respectively.

I see no possible hope for real peace, on other conditions. The black man must be treated as a citizen, or he must be exterminated. The ex-rebels must be treated as citizens, or they must be exterminated. Amnesty to the Rebels, and political rights to the black man, constitute the obverse and reverse of the shield. Any scheme which omits either, is empiricism, and not philosophy. Then having cleared the case of that friction, which would necessarily, and forever, irritate and retard if either of these two classes of persons were excluded from the rights of citizenship, — we shall be in a condition, to assist the operation of those laws of society, industry and economy, which will lead men of opposite races, naturally to separate, and not to combine. The good to be done in that direction, is both possible, and very great. For myself I do not now speak of the

subject of the mutual repulsion of such races. I think to talk about it, has some tendency to prevent people by a certain natural obstinacy from helping to do, and even to lead them to oppose things which, in, and of themselves, on general grounds, they would agree to support. . . . While the Congressional debate is going on, therefore, *I* for one, desire not to encourage popular excitements, most of all not to aid in making any. I desire not to act at all, in *political*, still less, in partizan ways ;—hoping ere long to see the day, when we, who feel and think as I do, in New England, can join with you, and with large minded men at the South, in working through the agencies, which political economy, business enterprise, etc. etc. easily suggest — to promote these practical views and methods, which we have, in conversation discussed, and which we both alike desire to see prosper.

Although Andrew held consistently to this position, still, within the range of private effort, he was never idle. His endeavors centred in the Land Agency, because, as has been said, it was his firm conviction that the way to reconciliation between North and South was by the economic rather than by the political road. He was right, and yet set his hopes too high. As the months went by, it began to be clear that the baser passions were controlling men,—a legitimate legacy of the curse of war. The proud Southerners were slow to forgive and accept the aid of their conquerors ;¹ the good business Chris-

¹ On May 11, 1866, Andrew wrote : “ . . . I know Governor Parsons and Governor Sharkey, Senators elect from Ala. and Miss. and some other Southern men, with whom I propose to have a conference

tians of the North, though willing possibly to forgive their enemies, felt that it was quite another thing to lend them money. Moreover, the radicals, getting the upper hand in politics, could carry into effect their desire to punish treason under the guise of doing justice to the black man. To these difficulties of man's making was added the unkindness of nature. The crops of both 1865 and 1866 were failures. Early in 1867 the Land Agency issued a circular announcing that on account of the number of commissions which were due to it and which probably would never be paid, it was obliged to suspend business. The circular went on to give the reasons why the transactions of the agency had fared so ill.

Every Northern man engaged in planting has lost his entire investment; many their entire fortunes. We do not report one instance of success amongst those who went through our agency, and from whom commissions are due. Not one has escaped without the loss of his entire capital invested, and nearly all have returned North and abandoned everything, while the two or three who still remain promise no better. These purchasers are now suffering without exception, from the peculiar trials of their new position, but more than all from the terrible and ruinous seasons of the past two years.

Something of Andrew's disappointment at the disaster to his hopes he expressed in a letter to Montgomery Blair, written on January 7, 1867.

in Washington before long, on the subject of the inhospitality of Southerners toward Northern men and Northern capital, as well as with the President himself."

I send you by this mail a copy of a pamphlet advertising the business of the Land Agency, which was started under my auspices. I think the pamphlet contains all that I could tell, save only that the Company could do so little, found so little Northern response that the experiment had no success. Very few persons were willing to trust their investments in the South. And, it is easier to sell an imaginary copper mine in Jupiter, than it is to hire 10 per cent on the best lands in the South, on the northern market. Not long ago I tried — as a matter of feeling — to help as good a man as Kenneth Rayner of North Carolina. Some three or four rich men, moved partly by Mr. Winthrop, who knew him in the House of Reps, were induced, after great effort, to raise \$20,000, in the aggregate. But it was a hard struggle. No matter what a man's politics may be, his sensitive pocket nerve shudders at an investment South. They have a notion that nothing from the North is safe in those regions. I hope time and good conduct will root out those apprehensions. But constant reports from sojourners in those States, and the return of men ruined in the effort to live as neighbors to "the Secesh," are daily received, and universally believed. I desired to help do some good. I felt that the questions ought to be simply economical ones, to receive an economical solution; that War had disposed of the old, political questions, and had left no good ground for new ones, of a sectional character. If I was wrong, I am glad that it was my heart which erred, and not my head.

No other single fact could better measure the present distance between the radicals and Andrew than his working with Robert C. Winthrop, — Sumner's

bitter political and personal opponent of twenty years' standing, — to raise money for a Southern planter. A letter of Winthrop's, written in the latter part of 1866, shows how completely his opinion of Andrew had changed since the days when he thought that Andrew's election would be a public calamity.

Our extreme Radicals have learned that they thrive best upon mischief, and they will do their utmost to keep the country by the ears. There are, however, some notable exceptions. A conversation I recently had with John A. Andrew has led me to augur well of his moderation should he succeed Sumner in the Senate, which, I hear, is talked of. He is young enough to render important service there.¹

Winthrop's feeling was shared by many Massachusetts men who had been won to the Republican side during the war, and who set an immense value upon Andrew's record for efficiency in the chief executive office of the State, — a record which seemed to them all the brighter by contrast with Sumner's unpractical and somewhat egotistic idealism. Whatever may have been Andrew's inclination for a seat in the Senate, he could not but resist every attempt to set his name in opposition to that of Sumner. It was not within the power of his nature to go against an old friend for such cause. As for Sumner, to whom, in a life not over-rich in close affection, an intellectual difference had so many times meant the rupture of friendship, be it said to his credit that he held to the better part. When busybodies tried

¹ *Life of Robert C. Winthrop*, pp. 269, 270.

to make trouble between the two, he set matters straight in a letter to Bird, the constant friend and monitor of both himself and Andrew. Let this be the last word in the history of their friendship.

17th Aug. '66.

I have thought much of what you said yesterday. I cannot comprehend those spirits who seek to misrepresent me with Andrew. What do they seek to accomplish?

I have known Andrew for years and have never thought of him except with affection and respect. I was one of the earliest and most determined to press him for Govr, and I have ever since sought to serve him. The speech which you say was attributed to me, was impossible. I never said it or thought it.

I have often said that whenever Andrew desires my place I shall not be in his way. There are reasons why I might be glad to exchange it for another service. And yet there are two objects which I should like to see accomplished before I quit. One is the establishment of our govt. on the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the other is the revision of international maritime law. But I would give up readily opportunities which I value, if I could in this way gratify an old friend and a valuable public character like Andrew. I mention these things that you may see the absurdity and wickedness of those who seem so constantly attributing to me something which is not in me.

After the political events of the winter and spring of 1867, when Congress had set its trap for the President right in the path where his obstinacy and rashness were sure to lead him, and whence he could be

dragged to the doom of Impeachment ; when it became plain that the rest of the presidential term must be given over to a blind struggle for power between the legislative and the executive branches of the national government, and that the men who should inaugurate the forward movement which could begin only with the next administration must possess unexceptionable war records, and must also be without encumbrance of any records whatsoever from Johnson's calamitous term, — in the coil of all these events and chances, Andrew's friends thought that they discerned the opportunity for which they had been jealously guarding his name. All indications pointed to Grant as the nominee of the Republicans for the first place on the ticket in the national campaign of 1868 ; it was within the range of easy possibility that the vice-presidential nomination might fall to Andrew. The strength and balance of such a ticket would more than anything else win back confidence in the Republican party ; Andrew, with his store of political sagacity and wide acquaintance with men in public life, would be the complement of Grant at the point where the soldier had least experience. On October 22, 1867, Albert Browne, who had been dining with Dana of the *New York Sun* and Bowles of the *Springfield Republican*, reported to Andrew their opinion that the probability of his receiving this nomination was strong.

As the state elections of 1867 drew near, considerable anxiety manifested itself among moderate Republicans as to whether the people would not

even now rebuke the radical leaders who had used their position to carry on a factional quarrel. An inquiring editor wrote to Andrew, asking his opinion about the situation. Andrew's long reply, dealing with these questions of the hour, is also the key to his whole political career. The man who had served by deeds knew that to stand and wait was also to serve. The man of action was not fretted by having no part; the man of thought was not captious of other men's works, and his faith in the future was generous.

JOHN A. ANDREW TO JOHN BINNEY

September 10, 1867.

The necessity of devoting myself to the profession of the law for the support and promotion of my family has compelled me to avoid for the present political action, and even to submit to misconception and blame.

The truth is that five years of exclusive and utter devotion to public business, to the absolute neglect of every private interest of my own, left me in a condition where it would dangerously compromise my personal independence and self-respect, were I to remain out of the practice of my own proper profession longer.

Now the *Law* is a jealous mistress. You must be faithful, or you are discarded. Thus, you see, for the present, I am in a sense condemned to quiet in politics. But I am not an indifferent observer. Indeed when I can act without publicity, I am *constantly* doing *something*.

The movement which sent Sen. Wilson, and others, to Richmond was made by me. The meeting was *held* in my office. So, too, the large committee to raise

funds etc. etc. to help our friends at the South in their elections, and the like, began in my office, where several of the early meetings were held. Which being observed, (as also the active coöperation of old personal friends of my own being noticed and alluded to in the newspapers,) indicating something for my own political benefit, has rendered me still more quiet and cautious.

I do not fear any *harm* from some apparent ill luck in the Elections of this autumn. It is needed to renew and quicken the sense of responsibility of our people. We have been so very strong lately that, reckless and bad, selfish and not very patriotic men, dangerous cliques and *isms*, have jumped on to the Republican party, and, (in the preoccupation of better men in other matters,) they have been permitted to *ride* the party. I think the fall State Elections will scare us enough to wake up every honest heart in season for next spring — when in New Hampshire and Connecticut we shall begin to choose the State tickets at State Elections, which will open the great presidential campaign of 1868.

With you I believe fully in the patriotic fidelity of *Gen. Grant*. He is pure gold, no political trickster nor self-seeker, and he has entirely learned the wisdom and truth of our essential creed.

I also, utterly reject the dogma of impeachment. Whenever the President clearly and perversely breaks the *law* which governs *him* as well as others, and by unlawful and wanton acts counterworks the law, it will be time to consider impeachment. As yet, while he has done many disagreeable and pettish things, and said many undignified and irritating things, nothing has been done or said which can be constitutionally regarded as impeachable.

Again, I have suspected that it is the plan of some men to try to hurry Johnson on to his fate; that is to *stir up* the Republicans to *impeach him*; with the hope of thus causing them to so confuse the issues in 1868, as to throw a much coveted advantage into the hands of the Copperheads. And I trust we shall not be weak enough to do any such thing.

The impatient and ill advised manner in which impeachment was broached as a cure for political ills, at a time when it would have been sheer madness, (unless we design to Mexican-ize our country) had moreover this additional mischief, viz. It tended to arouse in the minds of the President and his friends the apprehension of a purpose to overthrow the executive department by revolutionary means, and thus it stimulated a re-acting spirit in return.

In respect to *principles* I am always *radical*. In respect to measures I am always conservative. Principles are of God. That is they are founded in the Eternal fitness, harmony and reality of the Universe, over which he presides. Measures on the other hand, are human devices by which men attempt to actualize in human affairs the principles they perceive and believe in. We can safely trust a principle, and go [to] its very roots, because it is — when true at all — radically true.

But we do well to be conservative in our measures; carefully holding on to the best results of past experience, and seeking the combined wisdom both of ages and of many minds, instead of implicitly following the would-be leader of the hour.

While I regret any wrong done or attempted, still I do not lament the incidental effect of the President's conduct found in its tendency to postpone reconstruction. If it takes a state as long to

work its way back as it spent in trying to fight its way out, I do not think it can grumble much about it.

And the teachings of much time, trial and experience seems needed for the instruction of all men in the true significance, alike of rebellion and of reconstruction. I desire to see all the states *in*. But there is an *in*-ness which is worse than *out*-ness. The rebel states were for a time, before actual war began, *in* the Union, but not *of* it. They were machinating inside of it how to weaken and injure it, as a preparation for war against it.

Again, I think, our first need is a *general economic prosperity* — which can come only of industry and good crops. Until a certain prosperity, pretty universally felt and enjoyed, had begun to repair the waste of war, and until the people had begun to feel accustomed to steady industry, and feel its value and its encouragements — I think, (or I fear) that the South could be in no state of mind fit for coöperation with us in assuming the direction of the government and managing for its future. Therefore, I do not lament the disappointment of our hopes of an earlier reconstruction. Indeed — I wish never to worry about results. I regret any failure, honestly to try, boldly and faithfully to *endeavor*.

But what we call a defeat is more often a victory in disguise, to those who have done their best, and ever in the right.

And, now, my only anxiety is that the Republican party may have an inadequate sense of the grandeur of its position, and the responsibility it carries. We are working for the ages, not merely for an election campaign. If we show ourselves broad-minded, true hearted, patient, hopeful, and statesmanlike, the peo-

ple will not allow the Election to go against us. There are men still remaining in the opposition ranks who would *vote with us*, if needful to prevent our overthrow. That I am sure of. The ark of Israel is intrusted to our shoulders. We can be beaten only by ourselves.

This letter must stand as Andrew's last word on public affairs. It squares with his whole life ; it is an application on a national scale of the spirit which governed him in private relations. In the perfect balance preserved between principles and measures resides the fulness of its wisdom. To few men is it given to win so clear a sight of the middle way, and to walk therein with such sure footing, yielding to ideals and to human nature the just due of each. This ability, when it is exercised in behalf of nations, is statesmanship of the highest quality.

Here was gathered in one man a store of wisdom and experience to meet the need of the nation ; in him, too, was centred the devotion of a strong group of friends and a popular admiration that spread far beyond the bounds of Massachusetts ; and all this concentrated power was humanized by a great and ardent soul. But what if this beginning should prove the end, and the exhausted body refuse its duty to the spirit ?

In the summer of 1867 Andrew's family scattered as usual for vacation. A letter from him to his wife, who had gone away on a visit, shows the good spirits with which the season began.

BOSTON, June 25th, 1867.

DEAR WIFE, — The children are now nearly ready. Alfreda arrived this morning. They are to start [for Gorham, New Hampshire] on Thursday A. M. . . . Johnson and the Masons had “an immense time” yesterday; and today they are finishing it up. Your eldest son called Sunday P. M. at the Tremont House and paid his respects to the President in person. I followed his example last evening, taking Col. Ritchie with me. Sam. Hooper invited [me] to dine Sunday evening, with Seward et al “which likewise I did *not* do.” —

Enclosed is a small work of art, by Harry, which will be more amusing than aught I can add. It is 10 P. M. and Woodman is waiting to take this to the P. O. — I propose to “give a dinner” to-morrow to the distinguished party who are to leave on Thursday for Gorham, N. H. I have just ordered the champagne to be put on the ice; have arranged with Forrester to procure lamb, and peas, have ordered maccaroni, etc., etc., — with strawberries and ice-cream for desert. Woodman is to dine with us, and I hope to give a pleasant impression on my company. Bess, who will remain with me, will join me in doing appropriate honors to the guests. Harry has gathered up his pictures and story books for the summer’s absence; and evidently enjoys with childish curiosity and vague hopefulness the prospect of a new experience of the world. — Good night — with all love, Yrs.

J. A. A.

For his own vacation, Andrew took with Cyrus Woodman a driving trip through the British provinces as far as Halifax and back. They were gone

some four weeks, and on their return Andrew stayed a few days with the family of Peleg Chandler, at Brunswick. The hours of chat and confidence which Andrew and Woodman spent, as they drove over the country roads, were a renewal as complete as anything could be of the long days of youth in which their friendship had been formed. Woodman, who on Andrew's election in 1860, had congratulated him in fear and trembling lest he prove unequal to his task, had watched with wonder and delight his growth into power and honor, until, as Woodman was fond of saying, he took as much pleasure in Andrew's fame as if it were his own. He had been brought back from the West chiefly by his desire to be near Andrew, and during the three or four years that had since passed they had had much happiness from each other's companionship. With no one else could Andrew have found this driving trip so complete a rest.

At the end of August he was back at work, and was obliged to refuse Forbes' invitation to spend a week at Naushon.

I have two or three matters *hot* [he wrote], and must stand by the anvil, or near enough to it, to strike, if need be. Forrester is at the White Mountains, spending his vacation, since our return from the eastward. All the children are absent, and Mrs. Andrew is living in her trunk. I command the whole army, from this base; and the scattered condition of the forces is another reason which requires *me* to be within the reach of rail and wire. . . . We have had Ch. Jus. Chase and Gerrit Smith here this week

[he added by way of political comment]. . . . Grant keeps between the wind and all of them, and makes ten-strikes, every time, in the popular estimation.

In refusing another invitation from Forbes, — this time to the annual October deer-hunt on the island, — he wrote: "I have been very lazy this week in consequence of being unwell, and even the grasshoppers have been a burden." He soon got about his work again, and after a fashion managed to carry it on. It was the thick of the state campaign, and he even allowed himself to go to a ward meeting and speak in behalf of the nomination of a friend; the enthusiasm that greeted him touched and stirred him profoundly, and he declared when he got home, that, now that he had made a beginning, he was ready to go through the campaign. But his vitality was intermittent. "I am even now writing in pain from a spasm," he said in a business letter dated October 18. On October 30 the fatal stroke came. "After tea some gentlemen called for a legal consultation. He suddenly complained of want of air in the room and endeavored to open a window. He staggered and was helped to the sofa, when he made earnest efforts to speak. A pencil was handed to him, which he vainly tried to use. He lingered in unconsciousness till the next evening at half-past six, when he died in the arms of his only brother, Isaac, who was in the act of raising him in bed to assist his breathing."¹ He was forty-nine years old.

¹ Chandler, p. 65.

The city, startled by the news of Andrew's illness, and stopping again and again through the busy day for the latest reports, received the final shock as one receives a personal grief. The emotion stirred in all men's hearts was recorded by "Warrington."

. . . I thought of that chapter in Carlyle's French Revolution which describes the death of Mirabeau. One little sentence sticks to the memory, and when a great man dies, it always recurs to me: "In the restaurateur's of the Palais Royal the waiter remarks, 'Fine weather, monsieur.' 'Yes, my friend,' answers the ancient man of letters, 'very fine; but Mirabeau is dead.'" But here in Boston the waiter speaks of it as soon as any man. We, who got home from Shelburne Falls and Springfield yesterday afternoon, got our first news of it from the hackman, who felt the ex-governor's loss as keenly as any man. . . . There were periods during the war when the governor's friends feared he would break down. He had a worn, absent, "flabby" look, and had to go off for a few days to recover himself. I saw that same look on him, I thought, — an uncertainty of gait, as it seemed to me, — the last time I met him, perhaps ten days ago, on Tremont street. . . . He was chatty and cheery, . . . [at one of Bird's dinners] but hardly so strong and muscular and vital as he used to be. He told stories with the old flavor, and I heard him repeat with much feeling a poem by Henry Timrod, a southerner of some literary pretensions, who has lately died. The verses were written for the dedication of a monument to the rebel dead in one of the Carolinas. . . .

John A. Andrew was conscious of his great powers as a public man, conscious that he had made a national reputation, ambitious of opportunities of usefulness and probably also for place and distinction in themselves. Eager for life, I dare say, as every man is who is happily situated as to family and friends, and no man, I suppose, was more happy in these respects than Andrew. But I cannot doubt that he would have chosen just such a death as this, after his time of service should be finished. The prayer to be delivered from sudden death is from death unprepared for, not from death, like Andrew's, in the fulness of time, with every duty performed and ready for the next call upon him, whether for life or death. The spirit of Matthew Arnold's prayer was no doubt in his mind at all times : —

“ Let me grow
Composed, refreshed, ennobled, clear ;
Then willing let my spirit go
To work or wait elsewhere or here.”¹

More than once, I think, the governor, at the funerals of the soldiers, quoted that verse of which I remember only three lines, and perhaps those not quite correctly : —

“ No cold gradations of decay;
Death snapped at once the vital cord,
And freed his soul the nearest way.”²

And he always jerked out the last line with an emphasis and unction which indicated his entire in-

¹ Slightly altered, from *A Wish*.

² Somewhat altered, from Samuel Johnson's *Verses on the Death of Mr. Robert Levett*.

dependence of the future, and his willingness to meet it, when his time should come.¹

“Warrington’s” last words are borne out by something which Andrew himself had written the year before at the time of his friend Gurowski’s death. “For myself,” he said, “though I enjoy living, and have a passion for *life*, still I cannot happily contemplate a useless, decayed, wearisome old age. . . . I have lived long enough, and have observed and experienced enough to *feel*, not merely to *think*, how careful and how tender are the dispositions of the Divine Providence, arranging, I suppose, for all, the best which is possible for each, in view both of time and immortality.”

The pageantry of obsequies, the resolutions passed by societies, the memorial meetings in Boston and New York, the eulogies of which the newspapers were full,—forms which, being the vehicle of feeling more than usually profound, took on their pristine significance,—all these spoke the universal sense that it is the fate of nations to learn to do without the men who can least be spared. For all this recognition of high fame, men’s sorrow everywhere was less for the power than for the goodness that was gone from the world. While Andrew lay dying, negroes crowded the street before his house; they stood humbly in the rear of the church and outside it during the funeral services, and walked by the hearse all the long way to Mount Auburn. Every

¹ Springfield *Republican*, November 2, 1867.

man, woman, and child, every soldier and soldier's wife or widow, of the many thousands whom, as governor, Andrew had cheered and aided, was as a friend bereaved. His great labors for his country and for a despised race had been but a part of his daily obedience to the command: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

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